Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

253. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)¹

Washington, November 30, 1960.

Dear Jeff: With reference to my letter of November 8th enclosing my comments² on MAAG’s suggestion to increase RVNAF force level to 170,000, I have received the attached reply from General McGarr to the comments contained in my memorandum.

Since Admiral Felt could not come here because of the coup, we were unable to discuss this question with him and therefore I sent a copy of my memorandum to CINCPAC PoLAd so that the Admiral could have my views. As you will note from General McGarr’s attached letter, he has also sent copies of his memorandum to Admiral Felt requesting that this matter be resolved at higher echelons. Since you will probably be in on any Washington discussions, I am sending you General McGarr’s memorandum so that you may have a full record of both our views on this matter.

I am now working on a telegram to give my further ideas on the prospects of Diem’s putting into effect needed reforms and suggesting, as I did in my 1105,³ that we should not give favorable consideration to granting a 20,000 force increase unless Diem takes effective, dramatic, far-reaching action to rectify his policies so as to win support for his Government. (Incidentally, you will note from General McGarr’s memorandum that he now feels that the additional 20,000 men could be trained in a year to 18 months rather than two years as I indicated in my letter of November 8th.) While Diem, Thuan and others are talking about far-reaching reforms, I am very much afraid that the action to be taken may be neither drastic enough nor constitute enough of a psychological shock to turn the tide which is frankly running against Diem at the present time. I believe, therefore, it is important to bring as much pressure as we possibly can on Diem to take drastic action and I sincerely feel that we would be wasting time, money and effort if we accorded him a force increase before he institutes the very much needed reforms. For these reasons I have informed General McGarr that I cannot approve the force increase at this time.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

• Durby
• Elbridge Durbrow

[Attachment]

Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Saigon, November 21, 1960.

Dear Admiral Felt: On 8 November, Ambassador Durbrow handed me a memorandum⁴ stating the Embassy’s views opposing an increase in the force level of the Armed Forces of Viet-Nam from 150,000 to 170,000. On this same date, he sent a copy of this memorandum to Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

Today the Ambassador was given MAAG’s comments on this subject, stating the arguments which justify and dictate an increase in strength. Since it appears at this time that the difference in the Embassy and MAAG views on the subject may not be resolved at Country Team level, and since the Embassy’s views have been forwarded for consideration in Washington, it is considered essential that the entire matter be referred to higher authority for resolution between the Departments of Defense and State. Accordingly, there are enclosed herewith, for your information and forwarding to DOD, copies of both the Embassy and MAAG memoranda.

The arguments contained in the MAAG memorandum are believed to contain ample justification of the need for an increase in forces. A more detailed justification of the specific units considered necessary is contained in the MAAG-proposed Counter-Insurgency Plan, which has not yet been approved by the Country Team.

Realizing we should not permit ourselves to be forced into decisions by unilateral actions taken by the Government of Viet-Nam, it would nevertheless be unrealistic and short-sighted to neglect the consideration that if the U.S. does not soon agree to an increase. President Diem may well decide to make the increase on his own, using present RVNAF resources for this purpose. This, as you know, was done in the case of the Rangers last March, and the U.S. later agreed to accept and support the Rangers although their organization was and is not yet what we would have desired.

President Diem has spoken of the need for an increase of 20,000 or more sufficiently often in recent weeks to indicate that he may again take such unilateral action. If he does, the forces which he would organize would almost certainly consist only of additional small combat units and not those which MAAG studies have indicated are required to provide a properly balanced force capable of providing the desired rotation for training, increased combat power and essential logistical support which has never reached acceptable standards. While these considerations cannot be considered as a factor in influencing the U.S. decision for or against a force increase, they do point up the urgency of an early decision.

A prompt decision favoring the force increase would permit the MAAG to condition the approval of the increase on the establishment of proper type units and proper utilization of all forces available.

Sincerely yours,

Lionel C. McGarr
Lieutenant General U.S.A.

[Enclosure]

Paper Prepared in the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam

Saigon, undated.

MAAG COMMENTS ON RECOMMENDED 20,000 INCREASE IN RVNAF FORCE LEVEL

After an analysis of your 8 November comments on my recommended increase of the RVNAF force level to 170,000, I would like to provide you with additional thoughts on this matter. My answer is keyed, as applicable, to the comments expressed in your paper.

It is an agreed fact that the problem confronting VN today is one of a politico-military-psychological-economic nature which cannot be resolved by military means alone. The final solution can come only through a coordinated use of all of the elements of national power. In this respect, the history of communist “take over” of a target nation illustrates clearly that the timely, ruthless use of military force—or the supportable threat of its use—has often been a determining factor. Therefore, the fact that the North Vietnamese Third National Party Congress admits the current failure of its politico-psychological attack and has directed increased military-guerrilla-action is significant. This again shows, if further proof is necessary, communist understanding and use of all the major elements of National Power in a balanced, coordinated, cohesive manner—and it reemphasizes their reliance on military force, if required, as the final arbitrator.

Military force, in the form of increased communist insurgency, is clearly the major immediate threat to the stability of Vietnam today—and historically, insurgencies have been controlled or eliminated only after long, hard effort. For example, it took a force of 463,000 thirteen years to pacify Malaya against 10,000 communist guerrillas. The present insurgency in South Vietnam is no exception in this respect.

Yet, South Vietnam is unique in that it is the only country in the world which is being forced to defend itself against a communist internal subversive unconventional action—a “hot war” waged with deadly seriousness every hour of every day—while at the same time being subject to the militarily supportable threat of a conventional external attack from communist North Vietnam. The former of these threats requires an intensification of counter-subversive and anti-guerrilla type action while the latter requires the more conventional organization and action. Both actions, however, are based on the use of flexibility—mobility—improved communications, intelligence and psychology. The problem is twofold, although at present the anti-insurgency phase is the more dangerous—as it is the more immediate—and it is producing excellent results from the communist point of view. It is most dangerous not only to the future of Vietnam, but to the future of the Free World. If we fail to meet this danger, the Free World will once more lose one of its major battles for the freedom of Asia—probably its last—in a battle in which SEATO is being effectively circumvented by the known communist tactic of fomenting an internal revolution within the country through subversion and military attack. For here in Vietnam a preview in miniature of world conquest is being conducted—similar but not as simple of solution as that the communists waged and lost in Malaya.

Those of us near the problem in the MAAG entirely agree that its solution lies in the coordinated use of additional military, political, social, economic and psychological power with the objective of conquering the VC and winning over the population. We both agree that the assistance and cooperation of the population is absolutely necessary to overall success against the communist threat. With the population whole-heartedly supporting the GVN, the VC will not be able to gain its support against the government. Equally as important, the population will then be able to give its government and its military forces the intelligence of enemy plans and actions which it so badly needs.

From the purely military point of view, acting as one of these elements of power, the solution hinges on the capability of the Army to protect the very lives of the people—to include government functionaries—from communist assassination and intimidation. In the far-flung villages, especially those isolated from governmental protective power in point of time, space and force, this is most difficult. With both the present military and the political situation a matter of serious concern, it becomes daily more important that the Armed Forces be able to give the population full and complete physical protection from the VC. We are convinced that because of the steadily deteriorating military position of RVNAF, this cannot be done to the required degree at present.

Among the reasons for this are certain basic and fundamental weaknesses in the present force structure of the RVNAF. (As you know, corrective action by the GVN in this area now appears likely.) However, this and other deficiencies cannot be overcome merely by reorganizing units within the present 150,000 ceiling. Nor would the reduction or elimination of headquarters staffs create sufficient spaces to make a meaningful contribution to the counter-insurgency effort. While reorganizing, retraining and re-equipping the Civil Guard under DOD—together with other corrective measures which we have already agreed are necessary—will have an impact on the effectiveness of military operations, the military fact remains that additional units must be created to provide the means for improving the overall military posture and effectiveness of RVNAF forces so that they can meet the present threat. To do this successfully, the RVNAF must have the training, mobility and strength to take the offensive against the VC. This it does not have at present. Therefore, MAAG has recommended an increase in strength to provide for:

a. Meaningful rotation of combat units—Rotation of ARVN and Marine units cannot now be accomplished with required regularity. The result is that many units have been committed on operations for a year or more without relief. For instance, the ARVN staff is forced to commit Marine units and Rangers with little hope of rotation. Thus, many troops have been separated from their families for long periods and are battle-weary, in a low state of morale, and in critical need of recuperation and training. Successful combat demands teamwork and teamwork is the result of effective training. Unfortunately, combat, while improving the soldier as an individual fighter if he is adequately trained to survive, cannot take the place of all important unit training. Due to losses of key personnel and periods of relative inactivity under conditions precluding meaningful training, the essential teamwork of a unit deteriorates rapidly once it is committed in combat. Therefore, of necessity these units must be rotated periodically to home stations for rest, leaves with their families and retraining. The latter includes individual training of personnel to fill selected key positions, and unit training to overcome weaknesses brought to light as a result of operations. In addition to providing for the rotation of the regular units the recommended increase takes into consideration the need for an adequate rotational base to replace Civil Guard companies for training.

b. More effective surveillance of rugged terrain, border and coastal areas: The VC infiltrate into SVN by use of overland trails through Laos and Cambodia as well as sea-going junks and sampans from North Vietnam to transit the coastal waters into inland rivers, staging or regrouping areas. To prevent this infiltration, the GVN must have a firmer control of its frontiers. Frontiers which, because of the great length, ill defined boundaries, and nature of the terrain coupled with the political failure of the countries concerned to reach agreement on policing of borders make the military task of preventing infiltration almost insurmountable. However, this infiltration of both sea and land frontiers must be prevented by use of military land, sea and air action together with political action if the GVN is to be expected to successfully deny the use of these access routes to the VC “safe havens” in SVN which its condition of military weakness has fostered. Better utilization by the GVN of current military resources can somewhat diminish this traffic but cannot stop it.

c. Increased helicopter lift and close air support—Additional personnel are needed to man and support an additional H–34 helicopter squadron. As we have agreed, this unit which we have both recommended is urgently required to furnish the needed mobility to permit prompt commitment of forces against the VC in isolated areas. This helicopter squadron will provide a means of increasing the tempo of operations against the VC which is beyond the technical capability of the helicopters presently in use. However, the personnel required to man and support these additional helicopters cannot be provided within the current force ceiling. Further, in order to achieve optimum return from the investment in the VNAF and insure timely air support to ground forces engaged in anti-insurgency operations. Joint Operations and Air Support Operations Centers must be established and air-ground coordination teams organized and trained to operate with the ground forces in a close support role.

d. An increased military intelligence capability—The current military intelligence capability of the RVNAF is admittedly inadequate to support critical intelligence requirements. The Military Intelligence Battalion which I have included in the recommended increase in force level is a flexible, composite organization designed to conduct badly needed military intelligence operations in support of all echelons of the Armed Forces.

e. Correction of the present imbalance between combat and logistic units, and inclusion of additional support for the 15,000 increase in RVNAF combat troops and for logistical support of the Civil Guard—The additional personnel strength will also serve to correct logistical deficiencies. These have resulted from a long standing lack of sufficient logistical units to support the combat troops. This shortage is, of course, significantly accentuated by currently stepped up anti-insurgency operations. Augmentation is also required so that the RVNAF can absorb the additional work load derived from the transfer of the Civil Guard to the DOD, with MAAG assuming the responsibility for training from USOM as well as from the increase in force level.

f. Adequate forces in position to deter and to combat overt aggression and to prevent further expansion of the VC insurgency and concurrent communist infiltration of regular troops into South Vietnam in support of the VC insurgency effort. Of troops regularly stationed in the Hue-Danang area, at the present time, 14 out of 18 infantry battalions are committed to anti-insurgency operations. Three of the 14 battalions so committed are operating in the 5th Military Region far from home station. Of troops with home stations in the Central Plateau area, 13 out of 18 battalions are committed to anti-insurgency operations. Two of these 13 are engaged in operations in Zone D. In other words, 5 battalions of this deterrent force are operating out of their zones. This is cause for concern since it puts the deterrent force seriously off balance to meet an overt attack.

I fully agree that action must be taken immediately to bring about better utilization by the GVN of means currently available. If the recommendations of the Country Team, in regard to use of available military, political, social, economic, and psychological means are adopted by the GVN, some progress can be made within a reasonable length of time to limit Viet Cong activity and reduce the immediate threat. However, due to the topography of Southeast Asia and the proximity of out-of-country Viet Cong bases I cannot foresee the required elimination of organized Viet Cong military forces until the Civil Guard is fully trained militarily and capable of maintaining local internal security under present conditions; and there are also balanced, well trained regular forces in existence capable of defeating sizeable Communist forces now in the country and at the same time capable of guaranteeing the country’s borders against infiltration of strong VC forces.

Although the most immediate threat is the stepped-up guerrilla-subversion Viet Cong effort, I cannot agree that the threat of overt aggression can be considered remote. Clear evidence of the external threat can be seen in the recent attacks by out-of-country Viet Cong forces in Kontum province. These attacks, while relatively small, approach overt attacks in the true sense. In fact, they could well have been military “Reconnaissances in Force” for future possible actions. They clearly indicate the capability and flexibility of the Viet Cong to strike at any place and at any time of their own choosing. Thus, a reduction of GVN forces in the plateau area to reinforce elsewhere (which has already been done to a dangerous degree) may well result in loss of control of that portion of South Vietnam by default. Further, forces positioned in the high plateau not only serve to combat Viet Cong aggression, but are strategically stationed in accordance with current U.S. approved GVN war plans. The key terrain to the defense of South Vietnam from overt attack by North Vietnam is, in the final analysis, the Pleiku-Kontum-Plateau des Bolovens Complex.

In reference to your suggestion that corps, divisions and similar large headquarters be eliminated in order to generate more combat forces, I have recently approved a study that recommends inactivation of the headquarters of the Military Regions and the Field Command. However, the personnel saving that will result from the adoption of this recommendation is minimal as the functions of these headquarters must still be performed elsewhere. My primary reason for approving this study is to provide a clear cut chain of command within the RVNAF by utilizing proper military channels. Corps and division headquarters are primarily tactical headquarters, capable of controlling a large number of smaller tactical and logistical units either directly or through their organic tactical headquarters. Divisions, a number of which are controlled by a single corps, are composed of units that provide battlefield mobility in every type terrain and are capable, if properly employed, of closely coordinated action even when widely dispersed.

Taking advantage of these inherent capabilities and organizational characteristics, such forces are fully capable of defeating guerrilla forces provided they are properly trained and employed in meaningful anti-guerrilla action in an offensive role. The elimination of corps and division headquarters, which contain only 2166 spaces or 1.4% of the total force structure, would place the control of regiments and battalions directly on the ARVN General Staff. This would be an impossible task for that or any other single headquarters and would be militarily unsound. Our advisory objective has been, and will continue to be, a concerted effort to have the tactical headquarters perform their proper function which in the past has not always been the case.

From my present knowledge, I believe the state of training of the Civil Guard is generally inadequate for the mission it must perform in meeting stepped-up VC military activity. Among other factors, this is due to lack of equipment, inadequate time for proper training, and shortage of advisors and training facilities. In recognition of this training deficiency, the “MAAG Plan for Reorganization, Training and Employment of the Civil Guard”⁵ visualizes a major portion of the Civil Guard undergoing basic and advanced individual training, followed by basic unit training at existing military training sites. This training is considered essential, for an effective anti-guerrilla fighter must first of all be a well-trained, well-disciplined, well-motivated soldier who is conditioned to hardship. Although this will take time, MAAG considers the worth and effectiveness of this training to be in direct proportion to the time spent. The augmentation of the RVNAF ceiling was, for this reason, insisted upon at the time of negotiations for MAAG assuming the responsibility of Civil Guard training. If implemented without major deviations, (and currently this appears probable) this training will result in a Civil Guard more capable and more willing to perform its mission. To accomplish the required training, units will be relieved from present missions on a rotational basis to devote full time to training at suitable ARVN facilities. Since Civil Guard units will be issued U.S. weapons and equipment, the men must be trained in the use and maintenance of this equipment. To allow time for bringing all needed equipment into Vietnam, equipment must be phased into units as they are trained.

The statement that it will take approximately two years to recruit, train and equip the 20,000-man additional force is not entirely accurate when considered in proper context. It presents a picture which is unrealistically unfavorable. I am convinced that after approval of the recommended increase in force level, through certain emergency actions such as the call-up of prior service personnel, reduction in personnel attrition rates, and shortening of the training cycle, based on previous training, significant numbers of trained new tactical units will begin to join the RVNAF within a year, and that within eighteen months the bulk of this force will deployed in anti-insurgency operations or other vital missions. This augmentation to the RVNAF is vital if the initiative is to be seized from the Viet Cong by offensive military action and if a decisive offensive to eliminate them is to be launched. As I have indicated above, the elimination of the Viet Cong, considering the demonstrated Communist determination and known objectives for South Vietnam, can only take place over a period of years. Therefore, any delay in initiating action to reach the increased force level will mean a continuation of the presently ineffective, piecemeal commitment of inadequately trained units during a period when time and events are in favor of the Viet Cong. Laos may be lost to the Communist Bloc, and if the loss is coupled with indecisiveness on our part, it may well mean the loss of all of Southeast Asia.

Within the scope of my comments, I certainly feel that we should condition the approval of an increase in force basis on the acceptance by the GVN of MAAG recommendations for the composition and employment of these additional forces and of the proposed improvements in the military structure contained in our Counter-insurgency Plan. Moreover, such concrete evidence of strong U.S. support of the GVN, vividly demonstrated by the approval of the much-desired force increase, could be expected to assist in bargaining with President Diem for the adoption of other improvements in the political, economic and social fields which have been recommended by the U.S. in the past.

I strongly urge, however, that we initiate action to obtain Washington approval for the necessary force increase in troop basis as a matter of urgency, concurrently with attempts to influence the GVN to implement immediate actions. Delay in any of our efforts to meet the Viet Cong threat may well negate attempted improvements in other areas. In the military area, delay can only set back the time when both the Civil Guard and RVNAF will be adequately trained for their mission of defeating the communist military threat to SVN.

In summary, it is the professional judgement of this MAAG that, regardless of the obstacles which must be overcome, there is a clear and urgent need for an increase in military force to assure the restoration of internal security in the degree necessary to the development of political and economic stability. Further, the time to move in this direction is now and not later when the situation is out of hand and training will be both impossible and too late. Accordingly, I would hope that this exchange of ideas will bring our views into agreement or that we may further discuss the question at your earliest convenience.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Embassy Saigon, Official–Informal Misc. Letters. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Document 214.
3. Document 247.
4. See footnote 2 above.
5. Not found.