Office of the Historian

256. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Vietnam Affairs (Wood) to the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson)1

Washington, December 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

  • Diem’s Resentment
[Page 706]

After going through all the messages and weighing the pros and cons, I have changed my opinion and I think it would be a mistake to recommend that the Secretary call in Ambassador Chuong to affirm our support of Diem and his government. My reasons are as follows:

1.
The nature of Diem’s resentment is difficult to analyze and therefore difficult to meet, but it appears to center around Diem’s feeling that we did not give him personally enough support during the attempted coup but rather sought a rapid compromise between anti-Communists in order to avoid giving the Viet Cong an opening. This is pretty close to the truth and it would be difficult for the Secretary to make an honest and convincing statement which would arrest these resentments. Throughout the coup attempt Ambassador Durbrow’s chief preoccupation was to avoid a bloodbath and to urge that the Government and the rebels get together. Our line with the press at that time was “The American Ambassador remains accredited to President Diem so long as he remains President.” (Saigon’s 10222) This certainly was not undying support (as Madame Chuong pointed out to my considerable irritation).
2.
After the coup Ambassador Durbrow said to the press that he was “happy that President Diem had successfully resisted the coup,” (Saigon’s 10883) and Mr. Parsons emphasized to Ambassador Chuong that “our support for President Diem as the leader of his people and as the head of the GVN continued as it had for so long.” (Memorandum of Conversation, November 184)
3.

Nhu has said he fully understands the U.S. role during the coup attempt including our efforts to exert influence to retain the President in an active role and to avoid bloodshed. He comments that our role was to seek a compromise among non-Communist forces. His complaint is that we should start from some more fundamental strategy based on the application of the Constitution and that any force that challenged this strategy had to be opposed by the Government, not met by a compromise. …

In plain English, all these resentments could only be met by assuring Diem that we will back him at all times, under all circumstances and forever. This we cannot do. Our role is to back the legitimate Government of Viet-Nam against the Communists, and if for purely internal and non-Communist reasons there is a change of Government, it would under most circumstances be wrong for us to interfere. One of the chief criticisms that we hear from non-Communist Vietnamese who are opposed to Diem is that we appear to back [Page 707] Diem at all times and at all costs. The proper answer to this is that we back the legitimate government of Viet-Nam.

4.
If we go further than Mr. Parsons’ statement that we continue to support President Diem and if we make Diem believe that our support is in any way “absolute”, we will weaken our own pressures for government reform and liberalization.
5.
Another problem involved in meeting these resentments is that they have come to us indirectly … . This makes it difficult to take official cognizance of them.
6.
Finally, Ambassador Durbrow has not recommended that the Department take any action.

Conclusion

Since the State Department, speaking through Mr. Parsons, has already indicated our continuing support for Diem and Ambassador Durbrow has indicated publicly and privately to Diem our gratification that he was able to resist the coup speedily and with a minimum of bloodshed (Saigon’s 10825 and 11296), I think we should go no further than to suggest to Ambassador Durbrow that he say to Diem at his next meeting that in order to avoid any misunderstandings arising from the tensions caused by the coup that there is no question but that the USG supports President Diem and his government, desires to continue to work closely with it, and to discuss and work out in a frank and friendly manner all problems of mutual interest.

  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 91–VN 1960–Chief Executive: Ngo Dinh Diem. Secret. Sent through Cleveland and initialed by Anderson.↩
  2. Document 220.↩
  3. Document 239.↩
  4. Document 244.↩
  5. Document 237.↩
  6. Document 249.↩