258. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)1

SUBJECT

  • Talk with Mr. Merchant: Vietnamese Force Level

President Diem has long wanted to increase his armed forces from 150,000 to 170,000.

Recently MAAG/Viet-Nam and CINCPAC have recommended that this be done. Ambassador Durbrow is opposed to such an increase at present on the grounds that Diem is not using his available forces effectively and that if he is given the means to increase his [Page 712] forces by 20,000, he will think too much in terms of force and not enough of reforms. General McGarr has written Admiral Felt asking that this difference between the Embassy and the MAAG be resolved at higher levels.

The Pentagon is troubled by the shortage of funds.

The GVN is faced by many needed reforms—some to give more liberalization and others to increase governmental efficiency. The former need not be extensive, but should be genuine moves towards liberalization (particularly the press and the National Assembly). The latter involve inter alia a National Security Council (already established), a better chain of command and a unified intelligence organization. Our Country Team is working on an over-all plan.

Ambassador Durbrow has spoken strongly to President Diem on the need for both liberalization and government reform.

As to the Vietnamese armed forces, FE is very much aware of recent reports of North Vietnamese troops massing near the 17th parallel.2 The intelligence community does not believe they are preparing to attack. If they are, a decision now to increase ARVN by 20,000 would be a little late as these recruits would need 18 months of training.

We agree with Ambassador Durbrow that now is not the time to distract Diem from the problems he must solve soon by dangling hopes of a major force increase which he is likely to regard as a panacea, particularly as we would have great difficulties with funding.

We are writing Ambassador Durbrow informally to suggest some alternatives to a 20,000 man increase which he might want to ask his Country Team to study if he thinks they might be useful. These are:

1.
Present plans include counter-guerrilla training for 32,000 members of the Civil Guard. Should this program be increased to give training to all 54,000 Civil Guardsmen? These men already exist in units designed for local defense and protection.
2.
Increased training and equipment for the existing 47,000 members of the Self-Defense Corps whose primary role is village protection.
3.
An increase in the number of engineers in the armed forces of up to, say, 5,000. More roads and airstrips in the troubled areas and near frontiers would increase the mobility of the defense forces. Army engineers can increase this important infrastructure and protect themselves at the same time.
4.
We are seeking approval of the Embassy’s recommendation that we concur in the GVN’s suggestion that conscription be suspended provided the GVN is prepared to meet the increased local currency costs resulting from the fact that regular troops get more pay than conscripts. At present about 50 percent of the fighting [Page 713] troops are conscripts. MAAG and the Embassy concur that regular troops would be more effective.

Suggested for immediate action:3

Ambassador Durbrow has asked to be instructed “soonest” to inform Diem that while force level increase is under consideration, Washington cannot now see its way clear to grant such an increase when other more important steps are essential at present in the fight against the Viet Cong and to make further progress in Viet-Nam.

Recommendation: that Ambassador Durbrow be instructed to say that no force level increase is possible at present, that the matter will be studied and that it will not be possible to have a final decision for some months. Meanwhile no plans should be made which assume such an increase.

  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 108–VN 1960–National Defense Affairs (General). Secret. Drafted by Wood and cleared by Cleveland.
  2. See Document 260.
  3. See Document 262.