Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

247. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 18, 1960—7 p.m.

1105. Reference: Deptel 782.² In as much as I spoke to Diem rather firmly on two occasions about being lenient and indulgent and had urged him to adopt statesmanlike attitude in order unite all elements fight Communists and make progress, I have not endeavored see him again in order that we could take better readings of developments and let matters clarify a bit (Embtel s 1066 and 1082³).

In the meantime I have discussed matters with British, French, Australian, Korean and Japanese Ambassadors, as well as Menon (Indian ICC Chairman). Consensus these Chiefs of Missions, as well others, is: (A)It most fortunate coup put down quickly; (B) that Diem should be induced be lenient and not go in for retribution; (C) he has a golden opportunity to act like statesman to take necessary steps to unify country by instituting reforms if he acts quickly and broadly enough; and (D) unfortunately, although the Nhus are a symbol of considerable amount discontent, it would be counterproductive, at this moment, to try to get him transfer them. Since I had said my piece on the two occasions, I urged above colleagues, when they saw Diem, to endeavor talk to Diem along above lines. They all said they would.

Menon⁴ called on me early 18th having just returned from Hanoi to discuss developments, he expressed gratification Diem successful. Stated Diem had asked to see him soonest and therefore he desired discuss matters with me prior to call. I was pleased to learn Menon volunteered he plans speak at some length and frankly with Diem along following lines: He would draw on his experience in early days of Indian independence and his tours in Malaya and Kenya to urge Diem be lenient with rebels, take opposition into camp by bringing some into government as Nehru had done 10 years ago, relax too rigid restrictions and make full effort to learn needs of masses and do what he could to meet along lines he explained to me in Embassy despatch 142, October 4, 1960.⁵ I told Menon I very pleased he planned to do this because coming from Asian of his experience and stature I was sure it would be more beneficial than from European. General Choi, Korean Ambassador, who is being transferred at end of month, told me he will urge Diem be lenient and will stress, as military man, need to keep army out of politics, grant promotions on merit and not for political affiliation, and not make mistakes of Syngman Rhee by being too inflexible.

I hope colleagues will do as they say they will because there are apparently two factions working on Diem: A die-hard Can Lao group represented by the “Peoples Committee Against Communists and Rebels” (Embtel 1091⁶), and more level-headed group including Thuan who are urging him to adopt necessary reforms soonest, be lenient and take advantage of opportunity make strong appeal to masses. Diem, Nhu and Thuan have privately stated that GVN would adopt necessary reforms soonest, and Thuan, without going into details, stated this at press conference 16th (Embtel 1098⁷). While these are hopeful signs, the damage to newspaper plant, continued closing of at least two papers, as well as fears expressed by some GVN officials that nothing dramatic or concrete enough will be done to rectify situation, are disturbing elements in present picture.

From first-hand reports. Diem and both Nhus are outraged at press stories, particularly American, that Nhus must go before situation can be rectified. Therefore in my estimation this is not time to press Diem directly on this score since it will not only rub him wrong way but might drive him to listen to the die-hards who are urging tough line. Nevertheless, unless Diem does in fact immediately adopt lenient attitude toward opposition and rebels, and institute solid worthwhile reforms which will tend to increase support of masses, situation will go from bad to worse, particularly if Nhus stay in power. If in near future it becomes clear Diem not adopting reforms, we should give most serious consideration to giving practically an ultimatum to him that unless he gets rid of Nhus we must reconsider our whole policy regarding Viet-Nam. In this connection I believe I should be instructed to tell him that while we are considering assisting him to increase force level to 170,000, we could not see our way clear to do this unless he adopts most of measures along lines those I suggested October 14th including transfer Nhu. (My letter to Parsons November 8th.⁸) To give him more force before he has taken drastic action in the political, psychological, social and economic fields would not rectify situation.

In view of these developments, I plan to see Diem 21st and talk to him along following lines:

1. I will reiterate my government’s gratitude that he was successful in putting down coup;

2. I will tell him my government gratified he planning adopt soonest needed reforms and changes in policies;

3. Suggest again that he give serious considerations to adopting the suggestions I made on October 14th⁹ or their equivalent (these of course contain suggestion transfer Nhu but I would not specifically refer to that point); and

4. In course of conversation I will try to draw him out in detail on reforms and type changes he is planning.¹⁰

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11–1860. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to CINCPAC for PolAd.
2. Document 231.
3. Documents 232 and 237.
4. Gopala Menon, the new Indian Chairman of the ICC.
5. In despatch 142, the Embassy transmitted a summary of and a memorandum of conversation of a discussion between Durbrow and Gopala Menon. The two men discussed South Vietnam’s internal security, domestic politics, and the need for Diem to explain his policies to the people. Menon impressed Durbrow as both intelligent and objective. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/10–460)
6. See footnote 3, Document 241.
7. Dated November 18, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 951K.60/11–1860)
8. Document 214.
9. See Document 205.
10. In telegram 806 to Saigon, November 19, Department observed that in view of the strain on Diem of putting down the coup and the combined weight of démarches by the U.S. as well as other Ambassadors in Saigon, it would be well for Durbrow to speak to Diem in a “relatively relaxed vein” expressing gratitude that the coup had been foiled and interest in recently announced government plans for reform. If Diem raised the question of the leaflet or leniency for coup participants, Durbrow was to reaffirm the Department’s established positions. The Department strongly concurred that the time was not appropriate for raising the question of transfer of Nhu. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11–1860)