Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

214. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)¹

Saigon, November 8, 1960.

Dear Jeff: As you are aware, the Country Team is in the process of working on an over-all counter-insurgency plan in order to induce Diem to take needed actions which would put him in a better position to fight the growing VC threat. My frank talk with him on October 14 was part of this plan. Diem has taken a few steps in the political, economic and social fields along the path that I suggested to him on October 14th, but they certainly are not far-reaching nor dramatic enough. We keep plugging to get Diem to take these further steps but he and/or Nhu are still very stubborn.

In connection with this exercise, MAAG has come up with a rather well-thought through counter-insurgency plan to make more effective use of the military means at the disposal of the GVN.² We all feel most definitely that unless Diem agrees to change his methods so as to use the military means at his disposal in a logical manner through a firm chain of command, set up a planning and operations organization, and establish an effective central intelligence agency down to the village level, he will not be able to meet and defeat the VC military threat. The MAAG suggestions are in general very realistic.

As you know, I have felt for some time that, while it is necessary to have more security forces, which I believe can be obtained expeditiously by stepping up the training of the Civil Guard, I have questioned the need to increase the RVNAF force level by 20,000 men. The MAAG paper referred to above gives another plug for this increase. While after further study and trying other more expeditious means, it may be necessary to raise the force level somewhat even up to perhaps 20,000, I still question the advisability of this for the reasons I have outlined in the attached memorandum. Apart from the fact that Diem is not using the available security forces effectively, I am deeply concerned that if we really give him more forces he will continue to think only in terms of defeating the VC by force and will fail to take the additional political, social, economic and psychological actions he must take to try to win over the population. In any event, since the question of the force level will be discussed in Washington I thought you might like to have my latest ideas on this subject. Although MAAG has not had a chance to comment on my memorandum, a copy of which I will give to Admiral Felt who arrives here on the 11th, I thought I should get my memorandum to you in the next pouch.

I am told that although the original MAAG counter-insurgency paper states it will take up two years to train and equip the additional 20,000 men, they now believe they can work out arrangements to cut this time considerably. In any event, I am still firmly convinced that force is not the only answer and we must find some way to get Diem to take the necessary political actions if he is to survive. For this reason I’ve suggested in the memorandum that we might use the possibility of a force increase as a club to get Diem to act in the political field first.

We hope to have our position paper worked up in the next ten days or two weeks. It will be submitted to CINCPAC, DOD and the Department for comments and suggestions before we present it in detail to Diem. In the meantime we are taking advantage of Admiral Felt’s visit to see if we can get him to plug for the needed organizational changes called for now in the military set up.

Keep up the good work.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Elbridge Durbrow³

[Enclosure]

COMMENTS ON MAAG SUGGESTION TO INCREASE RVNAF FORCE LEVEL TO 170,000

I have continued to give careful thought to the MAAG suggestion that the force level of RVNAF be raised by 20,000. I agree that additional security forces are needed. The question we are faced with is how to create the additional forces as soon as possible. I appreciate that if the RVNAF force level is raised to 170,000 the GVN would be in an even stronger position to counter VC guerrilla activities and at the same time be in a better military posture to face overt aggression from the North. I also appreciate that the addition of 20,000 men would eventually facilitate the training activities of the entire RVNAF and permit more frequent rotation. There is also another consideration which must be borne in mind. If Laos should come under effective, if not full Communist control, Viet-Nam would be outflanked by Communist elements in Central Viet-Nam and sufficient forces would be needed to control the Laos frontier much more effectively than would be the case if Laos were a friendly Free World power.

In giving consideration to the above factors, I have weighed against them several other factors which should be taken into account in order to determine the best way to increase the security forces as expeditiously as possible. In brief, these other factors are:

1. The stepped-up Communist menace is with us now and must be faced immediately with force, arms, matériel and other means, including political, social and economic, available at this time.

2. If proper use is made now of available military, political, social, economic and psychological means at the disposal of the GVN a much better showing can be made against the VC’s.

3. Since the immediate threat is a stepped-up guerrilla-subversion VC effort, and overt aggression seems remote, calculated risks must be taken to use available forces and means to conduct anti-guerrilla operations at the risk of reducing considerably the capability of facing overt aggression.

4. In view of the above it seems to me that we have two principal means at our disposal to increase the security forces expeditiously:

a) Since the actual threat is a guerrilla-type war and probably will remain so, the question arises whether we should continue to base our concept on corps and other large units with their large headquarters which perforce use a large percentage of personnel for other than combat duty. I suggest, therefore, that a large number of additional combat effective could be made available with the minimum of training by using a large percentage of personnel now on staff duty with corps and other headquarters. In view of the terrain, lack of roads in Southeast Asia, as well as the rainy climate, I have, since their inception, questioned seriously the usefulness of corps and divisions in ARVN. This higher headquarters staff personnel has received, I assume, considerable amount of training already and could be made combat effective in a very short time. What are needed, in my opinion, are more smaller units to take aggressive action against comparatively small VC bands. Diem and Thuan have from time to time during the last year complained about the large amount of personnel tied down in headquarters which has reduced the potential for front-line effectives considerably. (Incidentally, Thuan mentioned to me on the trip to Kontum November 5th that he had made a study which showed that about 3000 men could be released for combat duty if the corps and division headquarters were eliminated and other headquarters used for operations.) By transferring a considerable proportion of the staff personnel to combat units it should thus be possible to train quickly and assign these men to fill a considerable number of the spaces contemplated in the MAAG suggested force increase of 20,000.

b) Since the Civil Guard with 54,000 men at present, is an organization in being and all of these men have had a considerable amount of training, I am of the opinion that we should devote all the time, effort, money and material we can to train as many Civil Guards as possible and thus speed up the effectiveness of the security forces in general. Since it is probable that it will be found that a fairly large number of Civil Guards have had sufficient basic and even perhaps advanced individual training, the planned MAAG training period for many of the CG can be cut considerably, thus getting more well-trained units into the field in a comparatively short time. As the Civil Guard becomes more effective it cannot only give better permanent protection to the countryside but it can relieve a considerable number of RVNAF forces from their present internal security duties to carry the fight to the VC and a certain number could be given further training while on rotation from operations. If at a later date it becomes evident that we need still more security forces to fight on the internal security front and give better protection to the population, we could undertake to train and equip the entire 54,000 Civil Guardsmen instead of the 32,000 now to be trained by MAAG.

5. For these reasons and because it will take approximately two years to recruit, train and equip 20,000 additional men, it seems questionable whether in view of the immediate task at hand, that time, effort and money should now be expended to create such an additional force which obviously can have little or no bearing upon the immediate threat. If after concentrating on creating forces to meet the immediate threat it should become clear that still additional forces might be needed, we could then start augmenting the RVNAF.

6. Unfortunately, Diem still seems to count primarily on force to defeat the VC threat, and if we concur in creating a larger military force, Diem will be more inclined than ever to neglect taking other actions which I believe to be the most important under the present circumstances, namely, political, social, psychological and economic motion to win over the support of the population.

7. Furthermore, the creation of an additional force of 20,000 would greatly exacerbate the already serious piaster problem. It is already evident now that the Vietnamese economy cannot support a force of 150,000 and if we should raise the RVNAF to 170,000 the burden would become more insurmountable and the prospects of Viet-Nam’s attaining economic independence would be put much further into the future.

Discussion:

Consideration of all the above factors leads me to the belief that it would be inadvisable now to expend the time, money and effort to increase the RVNAF force level by 20,000 men. As indicated above, we should concentrate our efforts on making the most effective use of available means to:

1. Induce Diem to operate through the Internal Security Council, the Directorate of Planning and Operations, and a rigid chain of command.

2. Once a proper chain of command is set up, reunite various units in their basic organizations; i.e., battalions, regiments, divisions, and corps, if that is really necessary, so that they may be used effectively and not on a piecemeal basis, as at present.

3. Take the calculated risk of reducing the number of divisions or units held in the High Plateau and Central Viet-Nam primarily to defend against overt aggression and use these units in the anti-guerrilla operations either there or elsewhere. I believe we should assume that if overt aggression should take place, at least the United States, if not SEATO, would send substantial forces in to help defend Viet-Nam.

4. Concentrate our main effort on reducing ARVN staff personnel to make more combat effectives and in training and supplying and making the Civil Guard, and organization already in being, as effective as possible in order to give permanent protection in the countryside, relieve ARVN of static security duties and permit ARVN to concentrate on fighting the VC guerrilla threat, and eventually obtain more conventional training to be in a position to meet any overt aggression which might take place.

5. In order to assist ARVN and the Civil Guard, as well as perhaps the Self-Defense Corps, we should do all in our power to supply arms, equipment and matériel especially suited to assist in anti-guerrilla operations. These supplies coming under MAP would not cause a piaster problem or necessarily disrupt the economy and if properly used would greatly increase the effectiveness of anti-guerrilla operations.

6. If the situation still remains serious a year or so from now, and if Laos should come more and more under Communist control, we should be prepared to increase our training and equipment program for the Civil Guard up to its present strength of 54,000. Such a well-trained para-military force, apart from its other duties, could be used for patrolling all frontiers to prevent infiltrations. Such increased training of the Civil Guard would not require large additional piaster expenditures, since the 54,000 are now being paid out of the GVN budget but U.S. support for the full 54,000 would require further MAP expenditures. While this would increase the U.S. dollar expenditures for MAP supplies, I believe it would be less in both dollars and piasters than the cost which would have to be met by increasing the RVNAF by 20,000. If later the situation warranted we could then increase the RVNAF force level to 170,000.

7. As I have made clear on many occasions, in my estimation, one of the principal immediate needs is to induce Diem to take the necessary political, social, psychological and economic actions to win over the population. The increase in the RVNAF probably would distract him from taking these steps, and if the Civil Guard is properly trained he would have sufficient security forces to meet that part of his problem more expeditiously than starting to train 20,000 more ARVN personnel who would not be available for combat duty for about two years.

8. In view of the fundamental importance of getting Diem to take dramatic political steps which are needed to rectify the situation, such as those I suggested in my talk with him on October 14,⁴ we might use the possibility of granting him an increase in RVNAF personnel to get him to take these most essential political steps. Provided we had clearance from Washington to increase the RVNAF to some justified level above 150,000, we could tell Diem that while we might be in a position to assist him to increase his force level we believe it is first necessary to take at least the most effective political steps we suggested to him on October 14th in order to obtain the maximum political support from the population. We could add that if after these steps are taken it still seems essential to increase the RVNAF, we believe we could obtain the proper authorization from Washington. In other words, we need another club to get him to take the essential political, economic and social steps which are needed immediately to try to win over the population, as well as to induce him to accept the basic premise of the MAAG military counter-insurgency plan.

ED

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 62 D 26, Durbrow. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Document 210.
3. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.
4. See Document 203.