Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

237. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 15, 1960—2 a.m.

1082. Re Department telegram 782.² I had 50-minute talk with Diem beginning 1700 14th.

I opened conversation by expressing my personal gratification that he safe and alive since I had been very concerned about his safety during first day of coup and therefore I had instructed all members of staff who were contacted by rebels to urge them to prevent bloodshed and negotiate. I then told him I had received instructions from the Department to express gratification violence had ceased and express my government’s admiration for Diem’s courage during crisis. I added my government pleased to note there no doubt both people and Government of Vietnam, even rebels, were strongly anti-Communist. Referring to my telephone conversation evening 12th urging forgiveness and leniency in dealing with rebels (Embassy telegram 1066³), I stated that since both rebels and pro-government forces were obviously strongly anti-Communist, government hoped Diem would do all possible to reunify anti-Communist elements and refrain from undue acts of retribution. I stated my government would appreciate Diem’s considered views on developments.

Diem thanked me and then went into more detailed explanation of how paratroopers and others had been “duped” by small number leaders as he had told me 12th (Embassy telegram 1066). He told me he had not taken any action against paratroopers except a few leaders but those who rebelled were for the moment confined to their barracks. He spoke highly of bulk of paratroopers who “were his children”, who had been duped in attacking palace believing they were rescuing President. Regarding Lt. Colonel Dong and Thi he stated both had married “demimonde women” who were under influence of French and often “went dancing with French officers now in Saigon”. Dong was troublemaker and therefore had been removed from paratroops some time ago and stated Thi had shown signs recently of being unbalanced. He was not too vindictive about them but stated a few other paratrooper officers who may still be at large in country might cause further difficulties. He referred to one unnamed Major who had escaped to Tay Ninh area and had talked his way through frontier guards and escaped to Cambodia. I tried to find out whether he had arrested Dong and Thi but he was noncommittal and stated that probably they left by plane for Cambodia although he was not yet sure. While I was talking with him he received short message saying that General Hoang had been taken by rebels in plane to Phnom Penh but had been released. Diem obviously gratified most military were loyal and referred to fact paratroopers had not fired on loyal troops when they came to palace area because paratroopers began realize they had been “duped”.

During conversation I found several opportunities to urge him make every effort reunify entire anti-Communist elements to carry on fight against VC without indulging in recrimination. Diem, without agreeing directly, intimated he concurred except for few leaders. He brought up name of lawyer Thuy, allegedly civilian leader coup, and stated he had been compelled to dismiss him from government in 1956 because he over-ambitious, lacks political sense and is corrupt. He stated he had been very much worried about General Ty who had been captured by rebels and stated that he had sent his private secretary Vo Van Hai early to try to induce rebels to desist. He expressed pleasure in that neither of these had been harmed by rebels and indicated they had been very helpful in preventing rebels from spilling more blood.

Diem was obviously pleased with outcome and seemed to be in comparatively relaxed mood. He seemed particularly touched that Thai Ambassador, Dean of Corps, had called on him earlier to express gratification Diplomatic Corps that he had been saved. In consenting to have Dean make this call I and most Chiefs of Mission urged him to plead with Diem for leniency. I do not know whether Dean did this.

Since Diem has obviously not sorted matters out in his own mind, and is feeling particularly gratified at outcome, I did not bring up other questions suggested reference telegram re change government policies along lines my talk October 14. I will take first opportunity to do this as soon as matters clarify a bit. He did not attempt to give me his considered judgment of development.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.OO/11–1560. Secret. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC PolAd. Sent with instructions to pass to the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
2. Document 231.
3. Document 232.