Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

248. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 23, 1960—3 p.m.

1119. SecState for Presidency Thuan discussed following subjects with Emb officer Nov 22:

Political “reforms”. On “strictly personal and confidential” basis Thuan said program of reforms would be put into effect between now and middle December including following:

(1) National economic council would be established with representation from various sectors of economy, thus enabling much wider participation in national life (our G–196²). Without being specific he added similar institutions would be set up in educational, social and cultural fields.

(2) Press will be allowed freedom as long as it is honest and accurate. This would enable press to serve as control on government actions. However freedom of press will not extend to permitting activities favorable to communists, such as urging trade between two zones of Vietnam or pushing program of “we are all Vietnamese brothers so why not get together”.

(3) National Assembly will be given wider role particularly at committee level. Emb officer suggested that committee sessions, including those at which cabinet ministers now appearing to explain departmental budgets, should be public in order obtain greater political impact. Thuan indicated idea would be considered.

(4) Improved coordination will be established throughout government. Thuan was not specific on this score except to state that all agencies now attached to presidency would be redistributed to relevant ministries except for three or four such as directorate general budget and foreign aid. In response query Thuan said that he would remain as both SecState for Presidency and Assistant SecState for National Defense. Without saying so directly Thuan implied there would be changes in certain cabinet ministers.

Security forces. Thuan said Diem would sign on Nov 22 or 23 decree which would place Civil Guard under Dept Defense for purposes reorganization, training and equipment. Operational responsibility for Civil Guard will however remain in Dept of Interior except in areas seriously affected by insecurity, such as fifth military region. Thuan indicated Diem’s decision retain civilian control over military operations in less affected areas had been influenced by views expressed to Diem recently by Marshal Templer, former British High Commissioner in Malaya.

Thuan said various organizational recommendations by MAAG, such as establishment of operational command in ARVN, combination of military regions and corps headquarters, and designation of specific divisions for pacification responsibilities in fixed areas, had also been accepted. Thuan indicated also that he attached great importance for morale purposes to proposals he has made to Diem for construction of housing for military dependents and for establishment of simple PX and commissary system for armed forces. He said that he had recommended to Diem that housing program be carried out completely at once rather than slowly over period of years, and that he was looking for funds for this purpose (he mentioned figure of 150 million piasters) through reduction in various civilian programs.

Reasons for coup attempt. Embassy officer questioned Thuan’s assertion at Nov 17 press conference that foreigners in “echoing campaign disparagement GVN” had contributed to coup.³ Thuan reasserted same viewpoint, pointing specifically to article by expelled AP correspondent Inagaki in which he stated in effect that “U.S. has brought Diem up, now it should bring him down” (our 757⁴).

Thuan asked whether Emb officer did not think that outcome coup had shown unity of army. Emb officer replied that even if soldiers misled into participation, fact that officers of elite parachute unit as well as certain others involved, indicated something was seriously wrong in army. Thuan stated coup leaders Lt Cols Dong and Hong motivated by need for money. He also implied Communists behind coup by referring to document captured prior to coup indicating Communists would try overthrow government in Nov or Dec, and by noting that Indian ICC Commissioner Menon, who was with Pham Van Dong, Gen Giap and others in Hanoi on Nov 11, had reported they were jubilant and did lot of winking at each other on receipt of news of coup. Embassy officer repeated however that coup showed discontent among certain elements of GVN armed forces and Thuan said this would not be overlooked in analysis of causes of coup.

U.S.–GVN unity. Thuan then said U.S. should also draw proper lessons from coup by realizing necessity for closer unity and better support of GVN in fight against Communists. Emb officer replied he thought we were giving GVN just about everything it needs for this fight. Thuan replied by referring to requests for H–34 helicopters, additional budget support beyond that contemplated for calendar year 1961 and 20,000 increase in force level. Emb officer stated we continuing try obtain H–34s, piaster requirements for military budget are at present (in view continuing rise in GVN foreign exchange reserves) within GVN capacity to handle, and suggested perhaps might be better to see what political measures GVN is going to take before further considering 20,000 increase in armed forces.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11–2360. Confidential. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, London, and Paris.
2. Document 213.
3. The introductory remarks made by Thuan at the press conference of November 17 are in telegram 1104 from Saigon, November 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11–1860) Thuan’s assertion was apparently made in the subsequent question and answer period, of which no text has been found.
4. In telegram 757, October 7, the Embassy transmitted the text of the article by AP correspondent René-Georges Inagaki which occasioned his expulsion from South Vietnam. Inagaki attempted to report the extent of the fighting against the Viet Cong and noted that “compared to the viciousness of the undeclared war in South Vietnam, the pro-Communist Pathet Lao activity in Laos seems child play.” Inagaki also reported that there was even the view among some Vietnamese that in order to save South Vietnam from communism. Diem must go. (Ibid., 951K.62/10–660)