205. Despatch From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1
No. 157
Saigon, October 15,
1960.
REF
- Embtel 802, Oct. 15, 19602
SUBJECT
- Approach to President Diem
on Suggested Political Actions
Attached as enclosure 1 is the English text of a memorandum on suggested
political actions, a French translation of which was read and then
handed to President Diem by
Ambassador Durbrow on October 14,
1960. The French translation which was left with President Diem was classified ‘Top Secret” for
the purpose of impressing Diem.
For United States’ purposes, however, we consider the classification of
both the English and French texts to be Secret.
Attached as enclosure 2 is the English text of notes on the suggested
transfer of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Dr.
Tran Kim Tuyen, a French
translation of which was read to President Diem by Ambassador Durbrow at the same time.
President Diem’s reaction to this
approach was described in our telegram No. 802, October 15, 1960.
For the Ambassador:
Joseph A. Mendenhall
Counselor of Embassy for Political
Affairs
Enclosure 1
ENGLISH TEXT OF MEMORANDUM HANDED TO PRESIDENT
DIEM
Mr. President, in your struggle for survival against the Viet Cong,
you have taken many wise steps with respect to the security forces
of the Government, and I understand that you are in the process of
setting up a national Internal Security Council and a centralized
intelligence agency as important and necessary additional steps
toward giving effective guidance to and making maximum use of the
security forces. We have recognized the increased security threat to
[Page 599]
your Government and
the additional needs of your security forces. We have shown this
recognition by the comprehensive program for training, equipping and
arming the Civil Guard which I have just explained, by our
furnishing special forces personnel needs of ARVN for the war against the
guerrillas.
Our serious concern about the present situation is based, however,
not only on the security threat posed by the Viet Cong, but also on
what to us seems to be a decline in the popular political support of
your Government brought on in part, of course, by Viet Cong
intimidation. As your friend and supporter, Mr. President, I would
like to have a frank and friendly talk with you on what seems to be
the serious political situation confronting your Government. While I
am aware that the matters I am raising deal primarily with internal
affairs and, therefore, in ordinary circumstances would be no
concern of mine, I would like with your permission and indulgence to
talk to you frankly as a friend and try to be as helpful as I can by
giving you the considered judgment of myself and some of my friends
and your friends in Washington on what we hope would be appropriate
measures to assist you in this present crucial situation.
I believe that your speech to the National Assembly on October
3,3 in which you stated that
your Government has decided to reorganize certain of its
institutions and to rationalize and simplify its working methods,
indicates that we may be thinking to some extent at least along the
same lines.
I would like particularly to stress the desirability of actions to
broaden and increase your popular support prior to the 1961
Presidential elections. It would seem to me that some sort of a
psychological shock effect would be helpful in order to take the
initiative from the Communist propagandists as well as the
non-Communist oppositionists, and to convince the population that
your Government is taking effective political as well as security
measures to deal with the present situation. It would appear that,
unless fully effective steps are taken to reverse the present
adverse political trend, your Government will face an increasingly
difficult internal security situation. It is our carefully
considered view that small or gradual moves are not adequate. To
attain the desired effect, moves, major in scope and with extensive
popular appeal, should be taken at once. Specific actions which we
would suggest are as follows:
- (1)
-
We suggest that you consider Cabinet changes as a
necessary part of the effective moves needed to build up
popular interest and support. One Cabinet change that we
believe would be helpful would be the appointment of a
full-time Minister of National Defense
[Page 600]
in order to permit you to
devote your attention to developing over-all policies.
To achieve maximum benefit it is suggested that you
issue firm directives to assure that there is adherence
to channels of command both up and down and that firm
action be taken to eliminate any feeling that favoritism
and political considerations enter into the promotion
and assignment of personnel in the armed forces. Removal
of this latter feeling is of great importance if the
morale of the armed forces is not to be adversely
affected during their mortal struggle against the Viet
Cong.
We suggest that one or two members of the non-Communist
opposition be given Cabinet posts in order to
demonstrate to the people your desire for the
establishment of national unity in the fight against the
Viet Cong, and to weaken the criticisms of the
opposition which have attracted considerable attention
both in Saigon and abroad.
- (2)
- In rationalizing and simplifying the Government’s methods
of work, we suggest you seek to find new methods to
encourage your Cabinet Members to assume more responsibility
rather than frequently submitting relatively minor matters
to the Presidency for decision, thus allowing you more time
to deal with basic policy matters; that the new national
Internal Security Council be so constituted as to be the top
level policy-making institution by having it meet frequently
under your chairmanship for full discussion of all the major
problems confronting the Government and proposed solutions
thereto; and that the Government be operated as much as
possible through well defined channels of authority from you
in direct line to the department and agency heads properly
concerned. Under this system Cabinet Ministers and agency
heads can be held fully responsible for the operation of
their departments and agencies, because of the full
authority you have bestowed upon them. If a Cabinet Minister
cannot fulfill his responsibilities under this system, we
would then suggest that you replace him.
- (3)
- We would suggest that you consider altering the nature of
the Can Lao Party from its present secret character to that
of a normal political party which operates publicly, or even
consider disbanding it.4 If the first
alternative is adopted, various methods of convincing the
population that the action has been taken might be used,
such as party publication of a list of its members. The
purpose of this action would be to eliminate the atmosphere
of secrecy and fear and reduce the public suspicion of
favoritism and corruption, which the Can Lao Party’s secret
status has fostered according to many reports we have heard
in and out of the Government.
- (4)
-
We suggest that the National Assembly be authorized to
investigate any department or agency of the Government.
The Assembly should be authorized to conduct its
investigations through public hearings and to publish
the findings.5 This investigative authority
for the Assembly would have a three-fold purpose: (a) to
find some mechanism for dispelling through public
investigation the persistent rumors about the Government
and its personalities; (b) to provide the people with an
avenue of recourse against arbitrary actions by certain
Government officials; and (c) to assuage some of the
non-Communist opposition to the Government.
We further suggest that the National Assembly be asked to
establish requirements for the behavior of public
servants.
We also suggest that the National Assembly be encouraged
to take wider legislative initiative through the
introduction of bills sponsored by individual Deputies
or groups of Deputies, as well as to broaden area of
public debate on all bills, whether Government-sponsored
or introduced on a Deputy’s initiative.6
- (5)
- We suggest that you issue a warning that you may require
every public official to make a declaration, for possible
publication, listing his property and sources of
income.
- (6)
-
We suggest that you announce that, if the press will
take a responsible role in policing itself, the controls
exercised over it by the Government would be reduced. In
this connection you might wish to consider the
appointment of a committee, including representatives of
the press and some members of the opposition, to draft a
press code which the press would police. Within the
framework of such a code the press could be a means of
disseminating facts in order to reduce rumor-mongering
against the Government, malicious or not, much of which
stems from lack of information.
Providing timely and more ample information would also
help to reduce anti-Government rumors. Means to
accomplish this include freer access for the press to
responsible members of the Government, and frequent
public statements from the Presidency and fireside
chats, transmitted to the people by radio, sound film,
tape recordings, and through the press.6 The more these media are encouraged to
reach the provinces, the more effective will they be in
bringing the people closer to your Government by
providing a means of transmitting ideas from one to the
other.
- (7)
-
We would like to suggest that you liberalize
arrangements for Vietnamese wishing to study board, and
for this purpose make more foreign exchange
available.
We also suggest that you ease restrictions on the entry
into and departure from Viet-Nam of Vietnamese
nationals, in order to encourage Vietnamese well trained
abroad to return and make their contribution to the
development of their country.
- (8)
- We suggest that you consider some appropriate means by
which villagers could elect at least some of their own
officials. Such elections at the village level would be a
means of associating the population with the Government and
of eliminating arbitrary actions by local government
officials by demonstrating to them that they will
periodically be judged at the polls.
- (9)
- We suggest prompt adoption of the following measures for
the enhancement of the Government’s support in rural areas:
- (a)
- Take action which will result in an increase in
the price which peasants actually will receive for
paddy before the new harvest.
- (b)
- Liberalize the terms of credit extended to the
small rice farmers.
- (c)
- Continue to expand expenditures for agricultural
development and diversification, particularly in the
Mekong Delta area.
- (d)
- Institute a system of modest Government payment
for all community development labor whether on
agrovilles or an other Government projects.
- (e)
- Institute a system of limited subsidies to the
inhabitants of agrovilles during the period of their
readjustment. While the two situations are not
completely comparable, the subsidies helped to
bridge the period of adjustment for the settlers in
the High Plateau. This should help to develop a
favorable popular attitude toward the agrovilles by
covering some of the expenses incurred in moving to
and getting settled in the agrovilles.
- (f)
- Give appropriate and adequate compensation to the
2800 village health workers. These workers can serve
as an important arm of the Government in
establishing friendly relations with villagers.8 (g) Increase compensation paid to
the Self Guard Youth.8
- (10)
- We suggest that as many of the steps recommended above as
possible be announced dramatically to the public in your
message to the people on October 26. We would envisage this
message as a ringing effort to obtain the support of all
non-Communist elements for your Government and to create
national unity to win the fight against the Viet
Cong.
[Page 603]
Enclosure 2
ENGLISH TEXT OF NOTES ON NGO DINH NHU AND DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN
In addition to these positive moves, again as a friend and most
reluctantly, I feel that I should bring to your attention the
increasing discontent among various strata of Vietnamese society
with the role and alleged activities of your brother Ngo dinh Nhu and Madame Nhu. I repeat, I bring this
matter up most reluctantly since I have respect for Mr. and Mrs.
Nhu and I know how much
you count on his advice and counsel. I know personally of the many
contributions he has made to the success of your Government and I
know that he is equally desirous with you to maintain the
independence and integrity of Viet-Nam, as well as to advance the
fine progress which has already made in your country. We have
discussed this type of rumor before and I know that you have full
confidence in your brother. Nevertheless, the position that Mr. and
Mrs. Nhu hold in Viet-Nam has
become the basis for a large amount of criticism and discontent
against the Government. Unfortunately, whether based on fact or not,
this criticism has reached the point that question is no longer
whether these allegations are true or not. The fact that more and
more people are believing them is seriously damaging the prestige of
the Government. Unfortunately these rumors are also being used
against your Government by Viet Cong propagandists in the
countryside. Therefore, since it appears that these allegations are
assuming a larger and larger importance in the public mind and are
causing considerable discontent in the country, it might perhaps be
advisable to give serious consideration to transferring Mr.
Nhu to other duties. It
has been suggested that he might be given an Ambassadorial
assignment abroad. As you know, Mr. President, many Governments,
including my own, have from time to time found it necessary to
remove or transfer highly useful officials because of the adverse
image they have created.
In this connection we have also heard much criticism of the role and
activities of Dr. Tran Kim
Tuyen, who, according to a growing number of reports,
has come to represent a negative force in the minds of many. This
too constitutes a basis for serious discontent and resentment
against the Government. I personally know Dr. Tuyen and know of his abilities
and contribution to the work of the Government, but because of the
negative attitude about him which has developed, it might be well to
consider his appointment to a post abroad.
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I repeat, as unfounded as these reports and rumors may be, it has
often proven advantageous to other Governments to make transfers of
this kind.
