While I don’t think there is much to be gained by holding up aid
entirely, I do think that it is worth considering whether something
other than full release would not be justified in the present
circumstances.
Meantime, I am having my staff give this some thought and we may have
some ideas to provide you on your return from Europe.
Tab A
Washington, November 7,
1960.
Memorandum From the Deputy Director
for Operations, International Cooperation Administration
(FitzGerald) to the
Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security (Bell)3
SUBJECT
- Re-examination of Vietnam Aid Program
A cable to Saigon has been prepared which would inform the USOM of the Coordinator’s approval of
an FY 1961 aid level of $110 million
of nonproject assistance and up to $25 million for project sector
planning purposes. Although it was prepared in ICA and has been cleared with the
Department and U/MSC, further reflection has convinced me and the
officials of the Office of Far Eastern Operations directly concerned
that re-examination of the decisions embodied in this cable is in
order.
The consensus of U.S. intelligence is that without prompt, clear and
measurable improvement in the quality and direction of Vietnam
political leadership, that nation is doomed to collapse. Without
such improvement in the quality and direction of Vietnam political
leadership, the assistance proposed for FY 1961 may be completely wasted. The presently
proposed FY 1961 program is in no way
related to any
[Page 674]
action
program addressed to the effective resolution of this central
political problem. Under these circumstances, we are not prepared
without further consideration to commit the U.S. to make this
assistance available and, by so doing, give up a significant means
of influencing the quality and direction of Vietnam political
leadership at this critical time.
The seriousness of the present situation is graphically set forth in
the Special National Intelligence Estimate 63.1–60 of August 23,
1960.4 The report states that discontent with the
Diem regime is rapidly
mounting. If not checked, the SNIE
concludes, it will “… almost certainly in time cause the collapse of
Diem’s regime. We do not
anticipate that this will occur within the period of this estimate
(the next year or so).5 However, if
Diem is not able to
alter present trends and if the situation deteriorates
substantially, it is possible during the period of this estimate
that the government will lose control over much of the countryside
and political crisis will ensue.”
The SNIE stresses the stepped-up
terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare of the Communist Viet
Cong and the heightening of long standing political grievances
against the government which have now become increasingly urgent and
articulate. Criticism of Diem’s leadership within urban groups and government
circles has been mounting. The acute restiveness of politically
conscious groups in Saigon, stemming from their progressive
disillusion with the corruption and anti-democratic posture of the
present regime, has separated the Government from the best elements
of the nation.
The startling military and political inroads recently achieved by the
Communist Viet Cong, despite the intensified military efforts of the
Diem regime and
heartening progress of the Vietnam economy reinforce the official
intelligence estimate that the proper corrective is to be sought not
alone in military action but in prompt political adjustments and
correctives by President Diem. Unfortunately, however despite the fact
(emphasized by the SNIE) that the
crucial need is to meet the insistent, growing criticism directed
against the alleged corruption in the President’s family and in high
officials, the pervasive influence of the secret Can Lao and
Diem’s virtual one man
rule, President Diem has
chosen, with active U.S. support, to concentrate I almost
exclusively upon the strengthening of the Vietnam military I
organization to sustain his collapsing regime.
On October 14, 1960, Ambassador Durbrow read and then handed to President Diem a memorandum in French
calling on him, to take immediate, effective steps to liberalize his
regime.6 Among
[Page 675]
the suggested political actions were admitting
members of the non-Communist opposition into the cabinet; permitting
the cabinet to assume some genuine responsibility; altering the
present secret character of the Can Lao Party; authorizing the
National Assembly to investigate any agency of the Government and
publish its findings; asking the National Assembly to establish
requirements for behavior of public servants; encouraging the
National Assembly to take wider legislative initiative and to
broaden the area of public debate on all bills; warning that every
public official may be required to declare his property and sources
of income; reducing the present controls over the press; permitting
election by villages of at least some of their own officials; and a
variety of economic actions designed to enhance the Government’s
support in the rural areas.
Ambassador Durbrow’s démarche
of October 14, 1960, closed by suggesting that as many as possible
of these political actions be announced dramatically to the people
of Vietnam in President Diem’s message which was scheduled for October 26.
Diem was urged to make a
ringing statement in an effort to obtain the support of all
non-Communist elements for his Government and thus to create the
national unity essential to winning the fight against the Viet
Cong.
Assistant Secretary Parsons’
assessment of Diem’s
beleaguered regime (Embtel 882,
received October 237) called attention
to a fundamental defect in Diem’s concept of government, namely his strength of
personal conviction and willingness to stand alone, but his refusal
to communicate with others.
“… In a sense this defect is a weakness of his strength, the
willingness to stand alone if need be and fight which produced
miracle of 1954–1955. If now in different circumstances it
proves that he is inherently incapable of adapting and of doing
those things which are needful in political, psychological and
social fields, then indeed we must revise downward our estimates
of republic’s future under Diem.”
Mr. Parsons
concluded:
“… whole tenor of this message reflects my concern that
regime may well be at eleventh hour and we must press hard
to persuade Diem to
save himself and Vietnam by regaining his people.”
But in his October 26 message, however. President Diem failed to respond to
Ambassador Durbrow’s
démarche.8 Instead of the hoped for call to
national unity, instead of positive political action responsive to
the demands of the democratic-minded, anti-Communist elements of the
population. President Diem
merely reiterated his concern with the Viet Cong military threat and
warned against the
[Page 676]
dangers
of Utopian solutions to Vietnam’s problems. It would be difficult to
envisage a more disappointing response to Ambassador Durbrow’s démarche. Mr. Parsons’ prophecy that,
“Unfortunately his (Diem’s)
eventual actions might prove to be halfway measures and far short of
dramatic steps needed to catch attention of people,” was all too
sadly confirmed.
The economic assistance program bears directly on these problems. In
the course of his telegram, Mr. Parsons said:
“If our Vietnam program of aid can be criticized in any
fundamental way in future, it may be because we have thus
far been unable to persuade Diem that in long ran our extensive aid can
only be effective if his regime regains active loyalty of
Vietnamese people and thus achieves essential unified
support of all non-communist elements.”
To commit the United States now, without further consideration, to
make available the balance of the $135 million of FY 1961 economic assistance when the
strong probability is that this assistance cannot be effective would
be unwise. Moreover, by this action the United States would give up
one of its most significant means of influencing President Diem.
We believe that the urgency of the situation requires an immediate
and drastic re-evaluation of United States policy toward Vietnam.
Among the judgments which must be made is whether or not a further,
prolonged exchange with President Diem will be effective. Mr. Parsons suggests that such an
exchange might only produce: “halfway measures … far short of the
dramatic steps needed to catch attention of people.” If this
assessment is correct, it would seem advisable for the United States
to promptly consider the alternatives that exist to the present
leadership.
