Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

213. Airgram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 3, 1960.

G–196. Evidence is mounting that Diem is becoming increasingly conscious of deterioration in his political position and several straws in wind indicate certain actions being taken in effort arrest this trend. Some of these actions antedate or were obviously decided upon before my frank talk with Diem on Internal political situation Oct. 14, while others appear have been decided since that time. Following is summary (in addition steps reported our G–79, August 25²) of actions indicating greater awareness actual situation and at least some effort improve political atmosphere:

1. Diem announced in late August suspension agroville program. While he attributed this move to inadequate resources to carry out both this and other programs, we are convinced primary motivation was political one of desiring to avoid further stirring up of peasants by this controversial program during period prior Presidential elections next April. Since agroville program could be beneficial from both security and social standpoints, we suspect Diem will-revive it at time he considers politically appropriate. He has stated on several occasions that in few months when advantage of agrovilles became known to bulk of peasantry, they will urge Govt to build more. This attitude also reflects a more mature political judgment.

2) In State of Union message Oct. 3, Diem for first time publicly admitted that GVN organization and working methods have not been proper and stated Govt had decided to change them (G–147³). SecState for Presidency Thuan stressed to Emb significance this development and subsequently told me Oct. 11 Diem now realizes necessity for taking political measures to win popular support (our G–163⁴). Word has apparently gone out through various channels to stress Govt’s decision make changes in organization and working methods since, for example, Saigon chapter of NRM picked up this idea in motion sent to President on occasion Republic Day.

3) Decree. was issued October 7 establishing Internal Security Council and meetings this body have subsequently been held (our G–169⁵ though unfortunately no publicity yet given to Council’s establishment. Diem apparently still intends establish centralized intelligence agency but has yet located person considered satisfactory to head it. In talk with Parsons and me October 18,⁶ Diem indicated awareness necessity of having trained intelligence personnel at village level.

4) GVN announced October 18 four cabinet changes⁷ including key ministries of Defense, Interior and Information. We believe caliber new officials represents improvement over outgoing ones, but remains be seen whether Diem will delegate adequate authority to them.

5) President National Assembly Truong vinh Le told Parsons and me October 19 National Assembly would be permitted play more active role than previously. Thuan had earlier told me he and other ministers had been directed by Diem to appear before Assembly to defend budget. These appearances have not yet occurred but may still take place as Assembly’s consideration of budget is just getting under way.

At well-attended press conference October 24 Le Truong Quat, new Chairman Socialist Alliance (minority bloc in Assembly), announced program which includes adoption of law on freedom of press, demand for increased prices for agricultural products (especially rice), elimination of Government officials whose actions have widened gulf between Government and people and improved information program, particularly in rural areas. Quat stated freedom press statute would be adopted in months, not years, and repeated this later to Embassy Officer. Embassy Officer also told in talk with Nguyen Thai, Director of Vietnam Presse that Quat’s program was proposed with permission Ngo Dinh Nhu. Thai also said in response query that program was presented by “opposition” bloc because it would look better politically if Government appeared to be conceding points to opposition. In view these indications as well as fact that Quat is close to Ngo Dinh Can, we believe program he has proposed, especially press statute, likely soon be adopted though not until April 1961 session of National Assembly.

6) According Thuan, Minister Agriculture Dong and Vice President, GVN actively studying question of raising price which peasants receive for paddy (our G–163).

7) Diem in talking with Parsons and me criticized poor rural administrative organization. Indicated special effort under way to send better personnel to country-side and stressed importance building “infrastructure” at village level.

8) In same conversation, Diem expressed intention activate constitutional provisions for establishment National Economic Council, members of which will be popularly elected by various economic groups.

9) Diem also stressed need and activity in organization, training and assisting youth of country. In recent weeks we have noted increased publicity on sports, artistic, and other types competition among youth, indicating GVN realization of desirability of offering frills as well as goading youth to security and other duties.

10) Saigon Prefecture announced October 21 that cabarets would henceforth remain open until 2 a.m. Some months ago restriction of closing at midnight was imposed and brought about considerable grumbling. New step is evident concession to popular feeling indicating some relaxation of puritanical atmosphere Ngo family has tended generate.

11) Diem’s October 26 message to people contained appeal for unity and active participation by all in struggle against Viet Cong but did not include any concrete gestures for purpose bringing about unity behind Government (our 905⁸).

Conclusion

We believe above indications are sufficient demonstrate that Diem has become concerned about political situation and is seriously making effort to regain popular support. It is too early however to state however all of indicated steps summarized above are sincerely intended and will actually be carried out or whether some of them may merely prove to be window dressing designed to try to fool us Americans as well as discontented Vietnamese circles. Moreover, while above steps certainly look in right direction, it is questionable even if they are all carried out that they alone will be sufficient to reverse present political trend. Remains to be seen whether Diem will take really dramatic measures in time and of scope apparently required to bring about a real change in political tide.

Nevertheless it seems evident that there has been some change in Diem’s political attitude and thinking in recent weeks and we therefore have more hope than earlier that in this atmosphere he may take the political measures which are desirable in his own interest for preservation of his regime.

Durbrow⁹

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.11/11—360. Secret. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd, Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, London, Paris, Canberra, and Singapore.
2. See footnote 3, Document 187.
3. See footnote 3, Document 205.
4. In this airgram, October 17, Mendenhall reported that Thuan assured him in a discussion on October 11 that Diem had revised his view of the internal political situation in Vietnam and realized the necessity for taking political measures to win popular support. Thuan did not specify what measures Diem proposed to take, but he informed Mendenhall that the United States would be pleased by them. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/10–1760)
5. Dated October 20, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10–2060))
6. See Document 207.
7. See footnote 5, ibid.
8. In telegram 905, October 27, the Embassy summarized Diem’s speech of October 26 as described above, but noted that Diem did not make any “concrete gestures” at unifying the country in the fight against the Viet Cong. (Department of State, Central Files, 851K.4711/10–2760)
9. Mendenhall’s name is typed below Durbrow’s on the source text, apparently as drafter.