Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

241. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 17, 1960—8 p.m.

1096. Our 1093.² Since “People’s Committee Against. Rebels and Commies” obvious GVN creation with various officials holding its offices, it is apparent my protest to Secretary State for Presidency Thuan November 16 about Committee’s implication Americans behind coup (our 1091³ has not dissuaded government from pursuing this tack. It is possible that conversation with Thuan led GVN to direct Committee to associate French and British with Americans in support of coup so that Americans would no longer be solely pinpointed by GVN-inspired line.

I feel particularly concerned about leaflet language because its terminology re “colonalists and imperialists” is same as that which Commies use in attacking free world. We are not sure what is meant by “slanted version of victory” given by “colonialists and imperialists” but reference is possible to large number of US correspondents stories reporting extensive dissatisfaction with “family rule”.

Difficult determine GVN motives in inspiring this attack on US but two hypotheses arise:

1. May represent crude effort shift dissatisfaction of people away from GVN to us and other western powers.

2. May constitute tactic which is designed to try prevent us from bringing further pressure on Diem to make drastic political changes in order win support of people. GVN thinking under this hypothesis may be that, if US is put on defensive about alleged role in coup, it will be intimidated from making further demands GVN make changes.

Whatever GVN’s exact motivation this bears all earmarks this is Nhu–Tuyen maneuver to vent their anger against US for having criticized their regime and not having backed them 100 percent.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11–1760. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to Phnom Penh, Vietiane, Bangkok, Paris, London, and priority to CINCPAC for PolAd.

2. In telegram 1093, November 17, the Embassy transmitted to the Department of State the text of a pamphlet which the so-called “People’s Committee Against Rebels and Communists” distributed on November 17. The pamphlet reads as follows:

   “In recent attempted coup d’état on Nov 11, 1960 the rebels and political profiteers have gotten support of group of American, French and British colonialists and imperialists.

   “Plot has failed. Colonialist and imperialists have been unmasked and, out of spite, gave slanted version of victory achieved by army and people who heroically fought rebels and lackeys of imperialists and Communists.

   “Thus do not let your judgment be influenced by colonialists’ and imperialists’ propaganda lies. Let’s maintain our determination in unmasking them and their lackeys.

   “People’s Committee Against Rebels and Communists.” (Ibid.)

3. Durbrow reported in telegram 1091, November 16, that in response to Saigon rumors—some apparently officially-inspired—about American involvement in the abortive coup of November 11/12, he had seen Thuan that morning and expressed his concern that such intimations would adversely affect American-Vietnamese relations. Thuan promised to look into the situation. (Ibid.)

   Colby discusses the Americans who were in contact with coup leaders in Honorable Men, pp. 163–165.

   In an interview with a Department of State historian held January 6, 1984, Colby described the role of an American in touch with civilians rebel leaders as follows: “Just by having an American at the rebel center was a signal that the Americans were at least receptive to the rebellion, and were not totally opposed to it. Now intelligence people normally say well no, we’re just there to acquire information, but, as I’ve pointed out in my book on certain other things … there are times in which the perception of support may exist, even though there isn’t any support. And that’s an inherent problem in the collection of intelligence, that sometimes you’re going to give an impression that you’re somehow interested in supporting as distinct from just knowing what’s happening and those are two different things. In my mind and in my talks with my officer I was convinced that I made clear to him and that he would pass the messages honestly, that we were not supporting, that we had our hands off this one, which was our policy. We had our hands off, I mean that was the Ambassador’s policy. We were not supporting the government against them, and we were not supporting them against the government. He was only there to find out what was happening…. And I think that was made clear [to the rebel leaders.]’ At another point in the interview Colby stated that he had later told Nhu that he “didn’t think he [the American] had gone over the edge. He was a little enthusiastic, but I think I held him within reasonable limits.” (Department of State, PA/HO Files, Vietnam Interviews)