209. Telegram From the Ambassador in Thailand (Johnson) to the Embassy in Vietnam1
236. Eyes only for Ambassador from Parsons. There follows draft message from me to Department copy of which I am taking to Hong Kong. If it meshes well with your thinking and your reports on talks during my Saigon visit please send it as from me to Department and usual addresses.2 Please correct any errors of fact or make minor editorial changes without ref to me. If you disapprove message or have major changes to suggest advise me at Hong Kong or Tokyo. Draft follows:
“While a 40 hour visit is hardly adequate basis for firm judgments on situation in Vietnam, I had benefit of contacts not only with Durbrow and country team but also with President Diem, Thuan, Mau, President Le of National Assembly, with Ladejinsky, with British, French and Australian Ambassadors. Conspicuous omission was the popular Vice President, Tho, which in itself is indication of delicate and tense situation in which increasingly beleaguered regime struggles bravely and stubbornly. This struggle is of course the anti-communist struggle for3 on economic front progress is still being made and people have probably never been better off.
As Mau said there are two factors with which President Diem must contend in governing, namely commies and oppositionists, a term which I would regard as including elements ranging from apathetic or intimidated peasantry in contaminated areas to unhappy corvee laborer agroville transplants to businessmen conscious of Can Lao exactions to intellectuals and politicians who consciously oppose.
First factor can only be dealt with by firm enduring resistance and counter measures not only in military but also other fields because there is no possibility of converting Viet Cong guerrilla fighters [Page 612] and agents. Diem has concentrated on first factor almost exclusively up until recently and focus has been predominantly military.
Second factor can be dealt with but has not been as yet, at least not adequately. This is Achilles heel which communists will inevitably seek exploit in their declared purpose of overthrowing regime within time limits they have dared to specify. Thus, obviously, to cope with the first factor, second must be handled effectively. Thus far it does not appear Diem will admit this to foreigners or even to his confidants but his evident preoccupation suggests he may be admitting it to himself. I therefore believe that Ambassador Durbrow’s recent representations were as essential as they were painful. If our Vietnam program of aid can be criticized in any fundamental way in future, it may be because we have thus far been unable to persuade Diem that in long run our extensive aid can only be effective if his regime regains active loyalty of Vietnamese people and thus achieves essential unified support of all non-communist elements. I hasten to add this is no criticism of Embassy or U.S. agencies which have so long been painfully aware of disinterest and even alienation of important elements. Ambassador Durbrow has played thankless but courageous role and has yet retained ear of President who does not like to listen.
Ladejinsky who is more deeply discouraged over non-handling of second factor than he was at time my last visit seven months ago and said he had asked many key Vietnamese what they regarded to be basic problem in country. Responses were all to same effect most succinctly expressed by friend who said ‘It is that we do not have dialogue between government and people; we have only monologue’. In my view this is no mere cry of frustration by Diem’s interlocutors but a reflection of a fundamental defect of his concept of government. In a sense this defect is a weakness of his strength, the willingness to stand alone if need be and fight which produced miracle of 1954–1955. If now in different circumstances it proves that he is inherently incapable of adapting and of doing those things which are needful in political, psychological and social fields, then indeed we must revise downward our estimates of republic’s future under Diem. As he is only leader in sight, as he does have other great, one could say heroic, and indispensable qualities, we should in my opinion press upon him insistently in every way and at every interval which we deem not likely to be counterproductive elements of recent Embassy–Department effort. While awaiting Durbrow’s considered and authoritative estimate of effect of his representations, my own hunch is that he made a dent. Diem’s sensitivity, his unwonted references to brother Nhu by name, his effort to prove he had acted effectively in this general field, all could mean that points made to him are revolving around in his head. Unfortunately his eventual actions might [Page 613] prove to be halfway measures and far short of dramatic steps needed to catch attention of people.
My recommendations then would be that in regard to factor one, the direct resistance, we continue to follow present Embassy–MAAG judgements with their increased emphasis, according to my understanding, on counter-guerrilla training and organization.
As regards as yet unresolved question of raising ARVN force level by 20,000 I would merely note at this time (A) Laos situation if it worsens could dictate need to do this and more for both military and morale reasons and (B) French Ambassador while apologizing for a comment on something for which we pay strongly, advocated to me that we agree to augmentation. (Understand MAAG reviewing the question of the 20,000 for submission to country team.) In regard to factor two whole tenor of this message reflects my concern that regime may well be at eleventh hour and we must press hard to persuade Diem to save himself and Vietnam again by regaining his people.”
- Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 65 F 115, 030 Visit: Tours 1959–61 (Eyes Only) A-Z. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- This telegram was sent to Washington as telegram 882, October 23. It was repeated to Toyko for Parsons. (Ibid., Central Files, 110.15–PA/10–2360)↩
- In telegram 882, “since” is substituted for “for”.↩