Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

243. Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow)¹

Saigon, [November 17, 1960].

SUBJECT

• Record of Conversation with President Diem

1. President Diem called at 1630, 17 November, for me to come to the Palace immediately. As this was the first time his summons had been so urgent, I left and awaited my interpreter there. In the absence of an interpreter, I was immediately shown to the President’s office. He came in shortly and he was visibly troubled and apparently hurt. He spoke in English until the arrival of the interpreter—which he had never done before. This was the first time I had seen the President since the coup.

2. The President said he had called me because he wanted me to know his feelings on the recent attempted coup. He asked several times that I communicate these views to my superiors.

3. Mr. Diem advised me that the GVN does not foster any anti-American movement. It would, of course, not be in the interest of GVN to do so. However, the GVN cannot conceal these facts from the people:

a. The campaign of disparagement that many foreigners, including the Americans, during the past months have echoed and amplified.

b. …

c. After failure of the coup, foreigners, including members of the American Community, expressed regret that the rebels had not won.

4. The President reiterated to me that he was “fed up” with the attitude of the “free world” during the coup and his one consolation was the steady support he got from MAAG. He especially asked that I report that he had received this support from Gen. O’Daniels, then Gen. Williams and now me.

5. He stated that the GVN believe the correct position of all concerned would be to listen not only to the demagogues and rumor mongers, but also to the GVN and give credence to its reports as well.²

6. The President mentioned that he was very sorry that his repeated requests for military aid, in the form of an increase in the strength ceiling to 170,000, had not received more consideration from my government. With the increase in Viet Cong strength and attacks, he considers this increase to be absolutely necessary. If the communists continue to increase their pressure, both military and otherwise, this will extend the length and intensity of the conflict and require even more men.

7. He then again spoke critically of the so-called intellectuals and demagogues who circulate criticisms and clamor for reforms, but have no useful suggestions for reforms when they are asked for them.³ Nevertheless, this irresponsible talking by these people has sufficient influence on the population to cause damage to the government and the nation. Mr. Diem said he would like to send Mr. Thuan to Washington to apprise the American government of the exact situation and to defend him and the falsely accused members of his family as this has evidently not been done by the U.S. Embassy. However, he cannot spare Thuan’s services at this time.

8. Mr. Diem then turned to military subjects. He discussed the officers of the army at some length, particularly the senior officers. He described their capabilities and their shortcomings, and his desire to reorganize the officer corps to promote esprit and to narrow the gap separating officers from NCO’s and soldiers. I counseled him to be as lenient as possible in dealing with his generals. I pointed out that he needs their support and assistance in the difficult days ahead, particularly in unifying the army in the face of the communist threat. However, I told him I, as an army officer, could not condone rebellion against a government and felt that those actually guilty should be punished as provided by law.

9. We then discussed the organization of the Civil Guard. The President stated that Province Chiefs have to have some troops and that these men, who are mostly military, have a better insight into the situation than military commanders, as they know the political as well as the military aspect.⁴ He said that he did not see how he could put the Civil Guard under the RVNAP general staff. I then presented my views, previously stated, on the need for clear command lines through military channels, with the military commanders having full authority for the military phase of operations and the Province Chiefs handling non-military problems. I also stressed the need for an effective intelligence system from the village level up to a Central Intelligence Agency. (The next day Mr. Thuan told me that the MAAG plan for a more responsive command structure with direct lines of command had been approved by the President. He also stated that the decree transferring the Civil Guard had been approved.)

10. President Diem then discussed Mr. and Mrs. Nhu. He said that Mrs. Nhu and her husband have been unjustly accused of corruption to include illegal transactions and that these accusations have been repeated and spread abroad by newspaper reporters, many of whom are Americans. Mr. Diem then explained that Mrs. Nhu is a very sick woman who is suffering from a rare disease. He said that he had told the Ambassador of her illness. He also stated that she is so ill that she cannot do the things of which she is accused and that she constantly suffers headaches with only her faith keeping her going.⁵

Lionel C. McGarr
Lieutenant General USA

1. Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 65 F 115, 350 Internal Political Affairs, Vietnam—GVN—November Coup 1960. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that this memorandum was discussed at a Country Team meeting on November 22. McGarr sent a telegraphic summary of this meeting to CINCPAC and for information to ISA in telegram MAGCH–CS 1494, November 21. (Ibid., Vietnam–GVN–Nov. Coup (military messages))
2. A marginal note at this point apparently in Mendenhall’s hand reads: “There is no question that more and more VN’ese are against entourage, arbitrary gov’t, lack of coordinated effort against V.C, lack of some press freedom, corruption and arbitrary action by GVN functionaries. Does Diem have any dope to refute this?”
3. A marginal note in the same hand at this point reads: “see note to ¶5.”Another note reads: “Look in the mirror, Diem.”
4. A marginal note at this point in the same hand reads: “But many of these mil. Prov. Chiefs are just the ones who drove the people to more and more free labor.”
5. A marginal note in the same hand at the end of this memorandum reads: “On other hand get impression from Wash that they losing interest and patience with Diem and indicate they want change—but have no constructive suggestions. We must first give Diem a chance for 6–12 months to take steps needed in his own interest[;] if he doesn’t start things going shortly he’ll be lost no matter what we want. More troops aren’t the only answer.”