Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

77. Memorandum of a Conversation Between President Gronchi and the Ambassador in Italy (Luce), Rome, May 21, 1955¹

Rome, May 21, 1955

I called on President Gronchi at his office in the Quirinale this morning at my request. I told him that I wished to extend my congratulations on his election to the Presidency, and to pay my respects prior to returning to the United States next week.

The conversation, which he began on a note of grim courtesy, lasted an hour and ended very cordially. We discussed the following:

1. U.S. Press Treatment of Gronchi.Gronchi consumed the first half hour in complaining very sourly against U.S. press reaction to his election and inaugural speech. He pointed out that when he had first become President of the Chamber he had had some contact with the American press. However, since that time he had been ignored completely. He made it quite clear that the burst of attention he was now receiving was both belated and unfriendly and that he felt abused and completely misunderstood. He thought that the foreign press had created a poor climate in which to establish confidence between nations. He pointed specifically to an unfriendly article in the last issue of Time (of which he had a copy of his desk), and also mentioned with pain articles in the New York Times and other papers. He said that there should be some way whereby these reporters could receive better and more accurate information, and suggested that it might be helpful if, for example, a friendly article was written in Time. After I thought he had talked himself out on the subject, I tried (with little success) to give him the “facts of life” concerning the free press in the U.S., mentioning that a long series of U.S. Presidents had frequently complained about unfriendly reporters or reporting by the U.S. press. I said that although he would be seven years in the Quirinale, it would probably not be seven months before the U.S. press reaction would become very favorable, especially when the ambiguity concerning his views on foreign affairs and the opening to the Left were cleared up, as no doubt they would soon be.

I said that there could no be question that the American Government and people fully shared his well-known desire to improve the workingmen’s lot in Italy, and to raise the living standards of the country. I said that since the end of the war, we had given great sums of aid with the intention not only of strengthening the defense posture of Italy, but also of raising the general standard of living. There should be no doubt in his mind or on the part of Italy as to where the U.S. stood with regard to bettering the economic conditions of the common people. A misunderstanding, if it still existed, probably arose from the frequently referred to “opening to the Left.” The American Government and people did not believe that Marxism or Communism was the best way to solve economic problems. History has proved that Communist experiments, where tried, had not lightened the economic burdens of the masses, but rather had increased them. I said that, for example, the increase in the standard of living which has taken place in Yugoslavia could certainly not be attributed solely to Yugoslav Marxism, but that very large amounts of aid from the West had been responsible in great part for the improvement of the Yugoslav economic situation.

2. Gronchi’s Views and Philosophy.Gronchi then proceeded to set forth his political views and philosophy.

He said that he could not understand how anyone could believe that he, as a Catholic, would ever support the PCI. As a Catholic, he was antipathetic to Communism on religious, ethical and moral grounds. This naturally led to antipathy to Communism on political grounds. He made no mention of economic antipathy, and it is plain that on this score he does not feel keenly against Communism. He said that his antipathy did not apply to the PSI since there were not the same ethical and religious objections to that Party.

He said that as a Catholic, he must find the best way to work with those forces which would best guarantee the raising of the whole economic standard of Italy, and left little doubt that the Socialists were to be included among these forces.

Turning to the present government situation, he said that so far as the present Quadripartite government was concerned, it was not suited to the goals he had in mind. The reason was that the Quadripartite formula “included people who sought forms of government which could not be reconciled with the economic advances necessary to the Italian people.” He said that he was speaking specifically of the PLI (Italian Liberal Party). He considered that the Liberals’ point of view did not allow them to accept programs for social progress which the DC must present to the people if the Communist strength is to be reduced in Italy, and that plainly this latter objective was basic for Catholics.

Gronchi then said that the situation was clear: the DC must present an economic plan which should not be a vague one “hovering in air,” but an exceedingly concrete one with concrete objectives. He said that amongst these objectives were the relief of unemployment, reforestation, etc. (The points he enumerated seemed to be those contained in Scelba’s economic memorandum on the first phase of the Vanoni plan which he brought to Washington, and outlined to the President and the Secretary.)² Gronchi thought that after the Sicilian elections the DC leaders should present such a plan to the whole Quadripartite. It could then immediately be seen who was in agreement and who was in disagreement. He believed that the PLI would be in disagreement.

Gronchi said that he thought that there must be “distensione” not only between the East and West, but also between rich countries and poor countries. Rich countries could use all of their labor potential, but the poor countries could only use part. The U.S. must understand this difference. He said that in rich countries there would be room for a Liberal Party, like the present Liberal Party in Italy but that in poor countries there was not room. In Italy there was room only for Conservative Democrats. Unfortunately, the Liberals here were not Conservative Democrats. They represented interests which were stubbornly against economic progress. The most controversial point between the DC and the PLI was the limit of State intervention in private business. He himself did not believe in destroying private interests, but he did believe in pressing these interests hard to make them act in favor of economic programs. Gronchi said that he believed that land reform and general agrarian reform were slowed up in those countries where the Liberals and private interests had too much influence in government. The responsibility for social progress must be assumed by the State, and pushed by the State in the face of such Liberals. For example, Gronchi pointed to the Gappugi bill (for the expropriation by the State of factories which management left idle or closed down claiming they were no longer profitable). The PLI was opposed to such a bill, but Gronchi felt that if private enterprise could not or would not keep factories in operation, then the State must intervene, in order to avoid further unemployment. Gronchi offered as another grave example of the difficulties created by the PLI, the agrarian pacts question³ which has several times threatened to break up the Quadripartite.

Gronchi then said that when an economic program was presented by the DC s to the Quadripartite, it was not possible to get the Liberals to go along—which he thought they would not—then it would be necessary to dissolve the Quadripartite and go to a DC government supported by the PSDI and the PRI—a tripartite government. When I asked him where such a government would get its vote of confidence and majority, Gronchi replied that the votes could come from any party (floating vote concept), provided that it did not result from concessions which were against Italy’s best interests. (I assume Gronchi was referring here to foreign policy questions.) Gronchi said that this situation was no longer a question of theories, but one of practical necessities. He said that it was plain that the present Chamber could not last long, and that the country must go to the next elections with a concrete economic program which could deprive the Communists of voters, and was the only practical way of fighting the Communists. Gronchi said that a Government program of anti-Communism was counter-productive since PCI makes effective political capital by saying to the people “every time the DC s hit us (the PCI), they mean to hit you (the workers and voters).”

3. Gronchi on the “Opening to the Left”.Gronchi said that he wished to make it clear that an “opening to the Left” was now absolutely necessary, but that he did not mean an opening to the “political Left,” but rather to the “economic Left.” He said that it was important to secure the support of the PSI parliamentarians and voters on the basis of an economic program, thus driving a wedge between the PSI and the PCI. Gronchi stated the time had not come, however, to bring the PSI into the government, but that it was desirable to create the conditions in which the PSI and its voters could join the democratic forces.

He said that he could see no situation in which the PCI could come into the government. He reminded me that he had told me over a year ago that since Italy is a Catholic country, the PCI will never be in a position to come into the government. A program directed at separating the PCI and the PSI was not to be misunderstood as coming to terms with the Communists.

4. United States Position. I told Gronchi that the U.S. had no prejudicial interest in particular men or formulas. Rather the U.S. was interested in a democratic government whose policies would keep Italy in the Atlantic Alliance and in making progress along the road of economic improvement. I said I was sure that any program which the Italian Government put up to relieve the basic economic problems of Italy would be sympathetically viewed in the United States. I said that one of the difficulties was plainly where the funds for such a large program would come from, and that we certainly all hoped they could be found in Italy. Certainly Italy had means and resources which had not yet been adequately used in the solution of its own problems.

5. Gronchi and Foreign Affairs. Reverting to foreign affairs, Gronchi said that his task as President of Italy would not be easy, but that it could be made lighter. “If the U.S. had faith in me it would have faith in my policy.” He said that without mutual confidence, then there could be no fruitful collaboration and a free democratic policy could not be advanced. He repeated that he though he was deserving of confidence as a Catholic and as a democrat. In this connection, he said that it was now his desire to interest himself deeply in foreign affairs, and that he intended to exchange views frequently and informally with foreign Chiefs of Missions. He said that his desire to have such exchanges would naturally be held “within the limits of his authority.”

I told President Gronchi that I would welcome such discussions, since I was sure that nothing but good could come from such exchanges of views.

6. The Future Situation. I told President Gronchi that I would be leaving next week, and that I would not be back until about the middle of July. I would be spending my vacation in my country house where I would only have access to newspaper information. I wondered what his present guess would be regarding the situation on my return.

Gronchi replied that in June there would be a clarification in the DC Party, which he believed would amount to a general acceptance of his views. If that did not occur, then there would be a new government situation.

7. Aviation Gasoline Tax and SOF. I also thanked President Gronchi for his action in signing the decree on the aviation gasoline tax exemption. I also mentioned that in light of the Austrian Treaty, the passage of SOF by the Chamber of Deputies had assumed a certain urgency. He said he was well aware of the matter.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.11/5–2455. Secret. Drafted by Luce. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 2411 from Rome, May 24. Paolo Canali, Diplomatic Adviser to Prime Minister Scelba, served as interpreter.
2. For the records of the meetings held during the Scelba visit, March 27–30, see Documents 70–75.
3. The agrarian pacts question centered around the length and terms of contracts issued to sharecroppers, leaseholders, and copatrons. An analysis of the issue was sent to the Department in despatch 1419 from Rome, January 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 865.16/1–1455)