Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

75. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 30, 1955, 10:50 a.m.¹

SV MC–7

Washington, March 30, 1955, 10:50 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Luce
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Assistant Secretary Hensel
  • Mr. Waugh
  • Mr. McCardle
  • Mr. Nolting
  • Mr. Jones (WE)
  • Mr. Tasca
  • Mr. Freund (WE)
  • Mr. Tesoro (WE)
  • Mr. Knight (WE)
• Italy
  • Prime Minister Scelba
  • Foreign Minister Martino
  • Ambassador Brosio
  • Minister Migone
  • Ambassador Magistrati
  • Minister Giustiniani
  • Minister Luciolli
  • Minister Canali (Interpreter)
  • Sig. Ortona
  • Sig. Grillo
  • Sig. Perrone-Capano

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Far East Questions

Following the Secretary’s restricted meeting with Premier Scelba and Foreign Minister Martino (see Memorandum SV MC–6),² a further meeting of a more general nature and with more persons representing both sides took place. This meeting began with an account by the Secretary of his impressions following his return from Bangkok and his visits to neighboring countries.³ He said he returned with a considerable sense of foreboding. The Chinese Communists gave every indication of reckless ambition and aspirations. They felt that their conquest of the Chinese mainland, their achievement in the Korean war of driving the UN forces back from the Yalu and their occupation of Tibet in 1951 were great successes. The conclusion of the Korean armistice had helped Ho Chi Minh gain his great victory over the French and now Chinese activity was directed at the Formosa straits and they had already been successful in bringing about the evacuation of several of the small offshore islands. They had held UN prisoners of war illegally and in their opinion the U.S. had done little about it. The Chinese Communists rebuffed a special UN mission sent to Peiping to discuss this question. The Security Council’s invitation to the Chinese Communists to come to New York was rejected in an unfriendly manner. Several friendly governments have sought to obtain their assurances that they would not seek to take by force Formosa or the Pescadores islands (which we have a treaty to protect). Not only have they rejected these confidential approaches outright but have also in public declared repeatedly and in violent terms their intention to take the islands by force if necessary. They repeated these threats when the offshore islands were recently evacuated. The position is very difficult. The U.S. is committed to defend only Formosa and the Pescadores which have a very distinctive legal status and strategically are part of the island chain extending from the Aleutians through Okinawa to the East Indies. The question of how to defend Formosa is a military and tactical matter which may or may not require preventing the capture of Quemoy and Matsu. Our concern is about Formosa itself, particularly in view of the Chinese Communists’inflated opinion of their own recent successes. We fear that they will attack. Chou En Lai recently stated that there would be war with the U.S., that 100 million Chinese might be killed but that this would leave 500 million and that this was enough for them. This was an indication of the utter disregard for human life of the Chinese Communists. President Eisenhower was resolved to be patient and not provocative, but firm. The U.S. hoped the situation could be worked out without hostilities.

Prime Minister Scelba thanked the Secretary for his account and proceeded to comment that the principal problem was what line should be defended and did this include Quemoy and Matsu? Would the loss of those two islands weaken the defense of Formosa? From talks he had had in London and Ottawa the opinion seemed general that the defense of these islands was not strictly necessary and that the U.S. might get into a war over them which would automatically lead into the third world war. He thought the problem was one not so much of substance as of form, that is, finding a way of getting out of the islands in circumstances that would not appear to constitute a retreat before Chinese Communists’threats. All with whom he had spoken were in agreement that the Chinese Communists cannot be permitted to conquer Formosa, since this would be a great blow to the strength of the West and would weaken the will as well as the defense capabilities of other countries in the area. However, they were concerned regarding the possibility that the U.S. may become too completely committed to the defense of Matsu and Quemoy.

Quemoy–Matsu

The Secretary replied that he appreciated the statesmanlike presentation of Premier Scelba, continuing that occasionally the U.S. found that its European allies were so taken up by European problems that they could not give proper weight to problems of Asia. The U.S. is not only an Atlantic but a Pacific power as well and our interests lie to an important degree in the Pacific world. The U.S., in the treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government, has in fact drawn the line such as suggested by Premier Scelba, beyond which the Chinese Communists cannot go without encountering our active defense. This encompasses only Formosa and the Pescadores which Scelba had indicated would be acceptable. President Eisenhower had said he had no intention of enlarging the treaty area. The problem thus was [as] to whether the coastal islands were essential to defense of Formosa. Militarily, the islands were important. Although perhaps not indispensable, they do block the exits from the two most likely staging ports for an invasion of Formosa or the Pescadores. Psychologically, the effect of evacuating Quemoy and Matsu could be serious on the 350,000 Chinese Nationalist soldiers who would be called upon to bear the brunt of any major assault on Formosa. The U.S. does not have enough ground forces available to assign to the defense of Formosa. We cannot depend wholly upon sea and air since, should the defending forces be seriously affected by subversion, only a token force of actual Chinese Communist troops would be needed and these we might not be able to prevent landing. This is a question we cannot discuss publicly but it gives us grave concern.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. would not fight for Quemoy and Matsu if it were clear that the Chinese Communists did not intend to attack Formosa after it had taken those two islands. This was not yet the case and the Chinese Communists had given thus far no such indication. The U.S. had a greater degree of knowledge than other countries regarding the situation in the Formosa area and it was necessary to repose confidence in the decisions which were necessarily President Eisenhower’s in this matter.

NATO Discussion Mentioned

Premier Scelba remarked that there was no disagreement on the necessity for holding Formosa but only on how this should be done. He then stated that the concern of the Secretary regarding the psychological effect of an assault of these two islands might be resolved by a joint declaration by a number of countries that Formosa would be defended and that any attack on Formosa or the Pescadores would be a cause for war. However, judging the situation from a very great distance, it appeared to the Italian Government that the Chinese forces were not in a position to assault the American defense forces supporting Formosa, but might risk an attack on Matsu and Quemoy. This question might be discussed in NATO with a view to achieving a joint declaration of several powers of the type he envisaged. Premier Scelba observed that the absence of such declarations in the past had often led to war (he cited the ambiguity of England’s position in 1914). Should such a declaration be made at this time, he felt that an outbreak of war could be avoided.

The Secretary said that this was a valuable suggestion though he was not sure the North Atlantic Council was the place in which to debate it. Possibly, the forthcoming informal meeting of the permanent representatives in Paris in June might provide an occasion. He asked whether Premier Scelba had any indication whether the United Kingdom would be willing to go along in any such declaration. Premier Scelba replied that he had not discussed this in specific terms but that he was sure the United Kingdom agreed that Formosa could not be yielded. This was however a question of vital concern to other powers than the great powers and also to NATO which is interested in avoiding as well as in preparing for war. The Secretary said that he appreciated the Premier’s suggestion and would give it careful thought.

The Secretary then said that another factor to bear in mind is whether the French would bring up the question of North Africa at the North Atlantic Council meeting. Mendès-France had raised the possibility of so doing on the occasion of his visit to Washington and the Secretary had discouraged him from so doing since some NATO members were not happy about being embroiled in this question. He asked what Premier Scelba’s thoughts were on this. Prime Minister Scelba replied that they had no particular thoughts on the subject, but that they agreed it was better not to complicate the situation in the North Atlantic Council.

Recent Italian Bilateral Talks

The Secretary asked whether the Premier had any observations from his talks with the French, Turkish and British leaders.⁴ Foreign Minister Martino replied that with Mendès-France all main problems had been discussed, the most important being Western European Union. Leaders of both countries agreed on the necessity for strong efforts to bring about early ratification and agreed in principle on the armaments pool, although on Italy’s part subject to certain reservations (for example, they did not agree on the pools of OSP). Italy did, however, agree on the standardization of arms, on the common production of arms, etc. Other bilateral questions affecting only Italy and France were discussed. They reached agreement on some of them but not on others. Regarding the Mediterranean area it was agreed that Italy and France should make a joint effort to consolidate their common defense. Italian-Yugoslav relations following the Trieste settlement was discussed with the French and it was agreed that it was necessary in this sector to exercise care to avoid mistakes prior to the entry into force of WEU. Close consultation among the allies was needed. Regarding talks with the East, Mendès-France talked of suggesting an East-West conference for May, but made it clear that he did so only because he thought that WEU would be ratified and in force by that time.

The Foreign Minister said that in Italian talks with the Turks the latter showed themselves to be optimistic regarding their pact with Iraq. With the Turks, the Italians discussed much the same questions as they had with the French, and the same general agreements were reached.

Immigration

Premier Scelba then raised the question of immigration and urged that the Department examine sympathetically the proposals for expanding Italian immigration to the U.S. which were now before Congress. He mentioned particularly the possible use by Italy of unused quotas and he said that the effect of the McCarran Act⁵ was to discriminate against Italy and to damage Italian morale. He said this Act helped those who were campaigning against Italo-American friendship. The Secretary replied that he was aware of the importance of this question and that the Department was sympathetic to the bills under consideration. However, the Premier would appreciate that legislation was the special province of Congress. The Secretary observed that while it was not likely that any of the bills now pending would be enacted by Congress at this time, passage of one or more was not to be altogether excluded. We would take note of what the Premier had said, however, and he could be assured that we were sympathetic to Italy’s need to find migration outlets.

Psychological Warfare

Premier Scelba then raised the question of psychological warfare and stressed the necessity of not losing the initiative in the cold war against the Communists. He referred specifically to the importance of the normal exchanges of men and ideas across the Iron Curtain and said that in his discussions with Eden this had been particularly touched upon. Eden had agreed on the desirability of such exchanges. Premier Scelba said that Western countries should take advantage of any opportunity to increase such exchanges. The Secretary agreed on the importance of such exchanges and said this question was constantly under study. Regarding psychological strategy against Communism the Secretary asked whether the Italians had any concrete suggestions to advance. Premier Scelba mentioned the Memorandum to NATO that Italy had submitted a year or so ago and he urged that the U.S. consider it once again. The Secretary said that we would go back to it, review our position on it and be prepared to discuss it further at the next NATO meeting.

Communiqué

The conversation then turned to the communiqué and after a few minor modifications were agreed upon this joint statement was approved.⁶ [4½ lines of source text not declassified] There was also considerable discussion of Premier Scelba’s opinion that the communiqué should contain some form of assurance that the U.S. would collaborate and participate in the Italian economic development program and not merely express its sympathy. The result of this finally was elimination of the word “sympathetic,” and a phrase assuring the Premier of the “continuing interest of the U.S.” in the economic field was introduced into the final draft.

The meeting closed with mutual expressions of gratification at the results of the meetings with the Secretary. Each side emphasized particularly the importance of getting to know leaders of other countries better through this type of meeting. Premier Scelba on his part said that Italy counted on the constant support of the U.S. and that the efforts of the Italian Government would not be less than the U.S. expected.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted on April 1; the drafting officer is not indicated.
2. Supra.
3. Dulles was in Bangkok for the first meeting of the SEATO Council, February 23–25. He then made brief visits to Rangoon and Vientiane on February 27; Phnom Penh on February 28; and Saigon, February 28–March 1.
4. See footnote 5, Document 70.
5. Reference is to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Public Law 414, enacted June 27, 1952; for text, see 66 Stat. 163.
6. The final communiqué, issued on March 30; the communiqué issued after Scelba’s talk with Eisenhower on March 28; and his address before the Senate on March 30 are printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 11, 1955, pp. 612–615. During their visit, Scelba and Martino also met with the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon on March 29 to discuss various military matters; and with Stassen at the Foreign Operations Administration on March 29 to discuss various economic issues. Records of the meetings are in Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Scelba Visit 1955.