78. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State1

4345. 1. I had an hour’s private conversation with Scelba on May 23 before signing PL 480 agreement.2

2. Scelba expounded at length on US press reaction to Gronchi election and inaugural speech which had been interpreted in “uninformed and superficial fashion”. Scelba believed that US press should have had sense enough to know that Gronchi election would not mean change in Italian foreign policy since “a nation cannot change its foreign policy in 24 hours”. He called for more “serenity” in press treatment.

3. I replied with references to freedom of US press and stressed that Italian Government’s alarm over American public opinion alarm should have taken into consideration that “US policy also could not change towards an ally in 24 hours.” I agreed that “more serenity” all around would be helpful.

4. Scelba said Gronchi would be constitutional President and that his character was such that he “cannot develop sustained political work”.

5. Scelba indicated there would be “clarification of programs” and Cabinet reshuffle after Sicilian elections. He hoped that present Quadripartite formula would last as it had been very successful. He was critical of Malagodi’s attitude on agrarian pacts question which he said was heart of disagreement between PLI and other members of coalition. Scelba thought that agreement on all other questions, including oil and investments, could be made with coalition partners. He hoped that wisdom would prevail regarding agrarian pacts, and that Malagodi and his clients (big landowners and Confindustria) would finally see they have to “give something for fear they will lose everything”. Scelba said that latter would occur if Quadripartite were smashed, since remaining choices would either be government supported by Nenni Socialists or dissolution of Parliament in preparation for new elections.

6. Scelba admitted that there were difficulties attached to Cabinet reshuffle and mentioned Pacciardi as example. He said appointment of Pacciardi would provoke violent Communist reaction.

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7. Scelba went on to say that “experience has shown that Communism in Italy can only be overcome on economic and social plane”. He said he had made it plain in Washington that DC s would have to receive economic aid in order to formulate program which would attract Nenni Socialist voters to Democratic center and win Communist voters away from Togliatti. I assured Scelba that US had always been, and would continue to be, hopeful that Italian Government would take all means at its disposal to put through successful economic program in Italy.

8. Scelba then alluded to SOF and said that foreign press and Social Communist speculation on deployment of US troops in Austria would make passage of SOF most difficult but not impossible. He said that SOF would pass, but there might be criticism of government for “acting on American orders”. I assured him we had every confidence that Italy would resolve question according to Italy’s best interests and not on basis of foreign press speculations or Social Communist criticism.

9. Finally Scelba said he hoped I would convey to President and Secretary Italy’s strong allegiance to NATO and also fact that only real danger Italy now faced was going to elections without economic program which would appeal to left wing voters.

Luce
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/5–2455. Secret.
  2. Reference is to a surplus agricultural commodities agreement signed on May 23, 1955, under P.L. 480.