70. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with Prime Minister Scelba, March 28
The Italian Prime Minister, Mario Scelba, the Foreign Minister, Gaetano Martino and two other members of his party, will call on you at noon, March 28 for an hour before the luncheon you are offering them. Biographic summaries are attached (Tabs A and B).2
Mr. Scelba has been in office for one year at the head of a quadripartite coalition government of the center. His government is not very secure, since the four parties together have only a small majority in Parliament.
Publicly, Mr. Scelba is expected, after considerable persuasion from us, to treat his visit to Washington as essentially a means of promoting good will between Italy and the United States. Hence he will regard his talk with you as a means of advancing Italian and his own personal prestige.
Mr. Scelba has, however, been planning a highly secret request to you for something like $330 million of direct economic aid for each of the next three or four years. His rationale is that the removal of the serious Communist threat in Italy can be accomplished by strong anti-Communist actions by the Italian Government. These actions, however, will be accepted by the Italian people only after the problem of large-scale unemployment is well on the way to solution. Mr. Scelba argues further that Italy has neither sufficient resources nor a strong enough Government to contribute significantly to the badly-needed economic development of Italy, and that the United States is the only source of the required funds. His request is over and above such current forms of assistance as our agricultural surplus program (PL 480) and pending loans from the International Bank. These he discounts.
We have strongly advised Premier Scelba not to present to you his emergency economic development plan, or a request for large-scale aid. Ambassador Luce has explained that it is unrealistic to expect large-scale aid from Congress [3½ lines of source text not declassified]. Nevertheless, Premier Scelba is likely to describe to you the political [Page 242] and economic difficulties in his fight against the Communists, and may leave with you a paper emphasizing the importance of his economic program and our aid.
[1 paragraph (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]
Since I believe that with all its weaknesses the present Italian Government is the best one in sight, I think we should avoid weakening Scelba’s position through a rebuff which might become known. I therefore suggest the following:
You might open the conversation by congratulating him on the Trieste settlement, the completion of Parliamentary action on the Paris Accords, and the signing of the Military Facilities Agreement (Base-rights) with the United States. You might then comment favorably on Italy’s remarkable economic progress as compared to both 1948 and 1938 (Tab D).3 You might note the anti-Communist actions Scelba has already taken, such as the eviction of Communist organizations from government buildings. You could then add that we appreciate that neither he nor we can be satisfied with the progress against the Communists and that much remains to be done to improve the Italian economy. With a few years of peace and with determination, further forward strides seem possible, and the U.S. hopes to continue in fiscal year 1956 to be of assistance in current forms to the extent Congress authorizes. We would be unrealistic if we thought Congress would return to the programs of large-scale economic aid of the Marshall Plan type. The U.S. is encouraged by the anti-Communist program announced by the Italian Government on last December 4 (Tab E),4 and believes that its prompt implementation would seriously weaken the Communist apparatus in Italy without a violent reaction.
I suggest that you then proceed to invite Premier Scelba’s thoughts on the international situation and recent developments. He will no doubt wish to exchange views with you on East-West relations, particularly steps that might be taken after all nations concerned have ratified the Paris Accords. In that connection he may suggest a worldwide disarmament conference, the objective of which we of course agree upon, but which we would not favor until there have been concrete results from the efforts going on under the auspices of the United Nations. You may also find occasion to say that we share Italy’s desire for European integration and hope Italy will, after the Paris Accords are in effect, resume its initiative in that direction.
Mr. Scelba will no doubt also wish to hear your general views on Balkan and Near Eastern affairs, as well as on the situation in the Far East. The Italians are sensitive to developments in the first two areas.
[Page 243]Mr. Scelba may also wish to report on his recent talks with the Prime Ministers of France, Turkey and Britain.5
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret.↩
- Neither attached to the source text.↩
- Not printed.↩
- For extracts from the communiqué of December 4, 1954, see Document 67.↩
- Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes visited Italy for 3 days beginning January 30; French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France visited Italy for discussions January 11–12; and Scelba visited London February 15–20.↩