Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

76. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, May 5, 1955—noon.

4082. As indicated in Embtel s 4026 and 4047² election of Giovanni Gronchi as third President poses serious problems for U.S. policy in Italy for the following reasons:

(1) Gronchi is one of the prominent CD’s who has for a long time championed leftward orientation in Ital politics. He is linked in the public mind with effort to wean PSI membership from alliance with PCI and his past maneuvers indicate he would have been capable making deal with Nenni in bid for premiership. In pursuit his ambitions Gronchi generally believed capable however dealing with either or both sides political spectrum. He has traded on his nuisance value as chronic dissenter with little following and somewhat obscure convictions. He is acutely aware of his leftist reputation but he seeks appropriate occasions to disavow any intention associate self with Social-Communists and pays strong lip service to Western solidarity.

(2) Gronchi’s election stems from resistance of right wing CD elements to Fanfani’s efforts to organize party as instrument for own purposes. Alignment in CD party against Fanfani, similar to that at Naples congress, was able on secret ballot to exploit both PNM and MSI desire to smash quadripartite and long time Social-Communist benevolence toward Gronchi which of course he made no effort to disavow. When it became apparent Merzagora could not win last minute alternative such as Einaudi clearly offered little or no prospect of success. Fanfani element then quickly jumped on band wagon to conceal fact Gronchi could have won without Fanfani support because of large Social-Communist backing and thus to give appearance of CD unity and victory.

(3) Gronchi’s election points up existing tendency to greater state economic control and possible authoritarianism either of National Socialist or perhaps Socialist front type manipulated by Moscow both probably closely tied in with neutralism. The coincidence of the election of Gronchi who is associated in the public mind with the left together with developments in Austria and possible developments in Germany and the Far East tends to give support to the neutralist forces in Italy. Present international diplomatic developments undoubtedly will strengthen belief that Italy’s policy need not be completely dependent on the U.S. position.

(4) Prospects for immediate future would seem to be:

(a) If coalition parties hold firm Gronchi may either reject Scelba’s resignation or request latter seek parliamentary endorsement.

(b) If coalition does not hold or if Gronchi accepts Scelba’s resignation there is prospect Pella will be asked form government which may tide over readjustment period. He holds some appeal to Social-Communists because of “distensione” attitude in 1953 and would be acceptable to right because of economic orientation.

(c) Vanoni also possibility as monocolore government based on PSI abstention with benevolence from PRI and PSDI.

In view of confused situation I wish to re-emphasize recommendations in Embtel 4047 that we hold up any further action on PL 480 until it is seen whether Scelba is reaffirmed for time being or until nature of new govt is determined. I hope necessary cooperation can be obtained from various govt agencies in Wash to make this action effective. (Separate tel on this subject follows.) Delaying action on PL 480 should not be linked with Gronchi’s election per se but only to uncertainty status of govt following inauguration new President. Should be borne in mind those commitments made to Scelba in relation to specific programs he stated he had in mind.

In long run the bona fides of any future govt can only be tested by its willingness carry out foreign policy objectives of all preceding Ital Govts particularly principal commitments made by Scelba govt such as

1. Passage of SOF

2. Solution of Air Force gasoline tax question³

3. Fulfillment of NATO military goals, etc.

We will give further study benchmarks which will reveal the orientation and objective of any future govt and will recommend how these may be utilized in determining our future course here.

Luce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/5–555. Top Secret; Priority.
2. In telegram 4026 from Rome, April 30, Luce advised that Gronchi was a supporter of the “opening to the Left” strategy and that the United States should therefore adopt a cautious attitude in regard to commenting on his election until the policies he intended to follow became clearer. (Ibid., 765.00/4–3055) In telegram 4047 from Rome, May 2, Luce advised that the United States should delay all programs of benefit to the Italian Government until the new government’s position became clear. To achieve that end, Luce instructed that conclusion of current P.L. 480 negotiations be postponed. (Ibid., 411.6541/5–255) Gronchi was elected President on April 29, succeeding Luigi Einaudi.
3. U.S. efforts to convince the Italian Government to repeal its aviation gasoline tax are documented in telegram 2563 from Rome, January 16 (ibid., 765.5–MSP/1–1655); memorandum from Carney to Merchant, January 18 (ibid., 456.116/1–1855); telegram 2684 from Rome, January 24 (ibid., 033.6511/1–2455); and telegram 2796 from Rome, February 2 (ibid., 033.6511/2–255).