Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

139. Summary of a Conference on the Army Missile Program, Washington, August 12, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹

Washington, August 12, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

• The President
• Secretary Wilson
• Secretary Brucker
• Secretary Quarles
• Admiral Radford
• General Lemnitzer
• Major Eisenhower

The Problem:

The problem, as defined by Secretary Wilson, breaks down into four areas:²

(1) The IRBM or Thor–Jupiter problem.

(2) The need of the Army for 500-mile tactical missile.

(3) The Army’s request to modify the Redstone with a lighter warhead and modified guidance system to permit it to fire about 500 miles.

(4) The potential development of a lighter missile for Army use, having a solid propellant.

The problem of concern to the President was that of the Redstone improvement. He stated that it had been alleged that the Army had no requirement for a “several hundred mile missile” and that he felt the idea worthwhile for flexibility and economy. He was concerned, however, as to the value of improving the Redstone.

Discussion:

The discussion that followed centered on the following matters:

(1) Weight and practicability of the Redstone. Technical problems involved, such as propellants.

(2) Roles and missions allocations of 1956.

(3) Cost of Redstone improvement.

(4) Emphasis placed on tactical support by the Air Force.

(5) Relative accuracy of Redstone vs. IRBM.

(6) Wisdom of the concept of “time of greatest danger.”

Generally the positions taken by those present at the conference were as follows:

(1) Secretary Wilson—There is some question as to the value of a 500-mile missile to the Army mission. However, working on the basis that the value be recognized, the Redstone has the following serious defects:

a. Heavy and bulky

b. Poor propellant

c. Cost, $80 million for the Redstone project

d. Availability and cost of warheads, the smaller, the more expensive.

In view of the above, Secretary Wilson’s recommendation is the development of a solid propellant missile to deliver a 1500-pound warhead 200 miles, with a view to utilization of a 600-pound warhead, when such a warhead becomes available, which will permit a range of 500 miles.

(2) Secretary Brucker and General Lemnitzer—The Army feels definite need for a missile of the 500-mile range, not so much to reach out into the enemy territory as to provide security for the missile itself by placing it well to the rear to fire in support of front line troops. As to the improvements of the Redstone itself, the Army representatives had this to say:

a. The Redstone is not so awkward as is pictured. When fully loaded it weighs 57,000 pounds but it does not weigh that much in a mobile situation.

b. The Russians are developing a 500-mile missile which will give them a capability not possessed by the United States.

c. The project at hand will require no new breakthroughs for development but rather a modification of a remodified item back to its essentially original form.

d. Costs by Army estimates will amount to $50 million rather than the $80 million estimated by the Secretary of Defense. (The apparent conclusion to this discrepancy is that the Army figures do not include procurement whereas the Defense figures include both procurement and R & D.)

e. No additional missiles above the currently planned number will be requested. In other words, the total number of Redstones plus modified Redstones will not exceed the number of currently planned Redstones.

(3) Admiral Radford’s position. Admiral Radford’s comments centered principally around the roles and missions decision. He pointed out that the decision to limit the Army to 200-mile missiles was made initially by General White and General Bolte,³ and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this is still the official limitation. He states that the Air Force does not like to use the Redstone. He further states that if the Army develops a missile over the 200-mile range by present rules that missile will be taken over by the Air Force. Admiral Radford points out that the current IRBM with a minimum range of 300-miles can be so placed as to eradicate any possible gaps in the range spectrum.

(4) Secretary Quarles pointed out that the 1500-pound warhead is currently programmed for the IRBM.

(5) The President enunciated his views on several of these points:

a. He re-emphasized several times the unwisdom of taking a rigid view of missile ranges and of roles and missions of services.

b. He pointed out the real morale problem inherent in a service which feels that its talents are not being used to the utmost.

c. He expressed concern over the patchwork nature of the proposed Redstone program.

d. He pointed out the problem of the commander on the ground as regards the sometimes low priority given in tactical support by the Air Force. He further pointed out that current Air Force programs tend to take their cuts in tactical rather than strategic air. This fact is accentuated by the differences in the nature of the targets desired hit by the Army and Air Force. He stressed his disapproval of the concept of the “time of greatest danger,” adding that it had been a concept for several years. He pointed out that any building toward a peak would result in an uneven financing. He desires to achieve an evenness of financing as much as possible. (This was brought out in connection with the fact that Polaris would not be available as an Army substitute until after 1963.)

Decision:

The President’s final decision is as follows:

(1) The detailed planning and evaluation of all missile programs, such as the program tor the improvement of the Redstone, tall within the responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

(2) No service should feel that it is restricted within a rigid range ceiling. Specifically, the Army should not be denied a 500-mile missile on the mere basis that the missile possesses a range capability of over 200 miles.

John S.D. Eisenhower

Major, Infantry, US Army

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Major John S.D. Eisenhower, Acting Staff Secretary, on August 14. The source text bears the initials “D.E.” in the President’s handwriting. A cover sheet contains the following typed notation: “I believe John wants you to initial if correct.”
2. In a memorandum to the President, dated August 10, Secretary Wilson provided details on these same “four basic problems in working out a sound ballistic missile program for the Army.” (Ibid., Missiles)
3. Lieutenant General Charles L. Boité, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1953–1955.