Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

137. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the President¹

Washington, August 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Limited War in the Nuclear Age

1. The continuing importance to the United States of an ability effectively to deal with limited war is an issue which has constantly recurred in the Planning Board. Usually it has been raised by the civilian Planning Board members of non-military Departments, such as Mr. Bowie of State or Professor Elliott of ODM. Assistant Secretary Sprague of Defense has also shown concern.

2. Just recently I received interesting personal memoranda from two military representatives at the Planning Board table: Lt. General Farrell (the JCS Adviser) and Captain Morse,USN (the AEC Observer). These memoranda, coming from military men of demonstrated ability again focused attention on this issue of limited versus all-out war. I attach these memoranda (in abridged form):²

a. General Farrell’s thesis is that predominant reliance on increased firepower, essential as this element is, tends to obscure the need for other elements in conducting hostilities.

b. Captain Morse points to the effect upon the Soviets, and especially upon our Allies, of our becoming more and more the possessors of a vast deterrent power which we may be less and less inclined to use.

3. The issue of how best to deal with limited hostilities is a continuing one, to which an exact answer is difficult. In times of international tension and financial strain, the necessity for enhanced capabilities to deter global war takes priority. Nevertheless, many of us working on policy issues feel that continuing attention should also be given to the U.S. capability to deal with hostilities short of general war. The importance of this capability is recognized in our existing basic national security policy.

4. My suggestion is that some way be found to elevate in the highest councils the need for such continuing attention, without calling for increased financial expenditures. There may be many ways to bring about this elevation of attention.

5. One way might be for the President to constitute a top level Council Committee and give to it terms of reference so that this issue would receive continuing attention and not be brushed aside in the years ahead. Such a Committee might consist of two representatives from State, two representatives from Defense, and one from CIA, with an eminent retired officer as Chairman and with Mr. Bowie—in his new function at the Harvard Center for International Affairs—as a member or a consultant. One course which such a Committee might pursue would be periodically to present studies of existing U.S. capability effectively to deal with assumed local hostilities starting in trouble spots (such as Korea, the Offshore Islands, Syria, Indonesia, Indo-China, Thailand, Israel, etc.).³

Bobby

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler. Top Secret.
2. Neither printed; the unabridged versions have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

3. In a memorandum to Cutler, dated August 9, Frederick M. Dearborn, Jr., commented in part as follows: “Although I do not have much official background on this subject, I have been disturbed ever since Dien Bien Phu about the effect of the deterrent policy on our capability for limited war.” He noted that he did not agree with General Farrell and Captain Morse in detail but, “I thoroughly agree to the need for further examination of the problem.” Dearborn went on to provide specific examples of the kind of contingency study he would like to see undertaken. (Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, Chron—Dearborn)

   Dearborn became a consultant on the White House staff in late April 1957 and was appointed Special Assistant to the President in June 1957. The origins of his appointment and his prospective duties are detailed in a memorandum from Cutler to the President, dated March 20 (Ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Cutler), and in a memorandum from Cutler to Robert K. Gray, Special Assistant in the White House Office, dated April 9. (Ibid., Herter Papers)