Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

196. Telegram From the United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Butterworth) to the Department of State¹

Luxembourg, October 26, 1956—1 p.m.

Colux 54. For the Secretary. The more I think about the German aspects of the current EURATOM–common market impasse the more fortuitous it seems that Conant is to see Adenauer on Monday, and the more desirable it appears that we make use of this exceptional opportunity by at any rate taking action along the lines of Conant’s and my joint recommendation contained in Colux 49² (repeated Bonn 39, Brussels 51).

Granted that we have assured the six community countries that we could and would accord EURATOM more favorable treatment than we would give to any one of the six and that this had good effect before Venice meeting in May, we must frankly take into account that negotiation beginning June of bilateral power agreements, and even recent Export-Import Bank announcement,³ has had result in Europe of depriving our assurances of effective purposeful meaning. Conant’s interview with Adenauer now provides us with retrieving opportunity at the psychological moment and of course Conant is uniquely qualified to make the Chancellor understand the whys and wherefores of ownership, supply, control problems, et cetera, and there is no doubt that he has been exposed to much misinformation and illusory misconceptions so widely held in German industrial and official circles supporting Strauss.

Accordingly, I venture to bring this matter to your personal attention and I am repeating this telegram to Conant because he has returned to Bonn and I had not consulted him previously re this particular message. I am also repeating it to Brussels since Spaak should be promptly informed on his return from Moscow regarding any steps we have taken vis-à-vis Adenauer. But I would suggest that we would leave it to him to notify any of the other participating countries as and when he thought desirable.⁴

Butterworth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/10–2656. Secret; Niact. Repeated for information to Bonn and Brussels.
2. Supra.
3. On October 16, the Export-Import Bank and the AEC issued a joint announcement indicating the Bank’s willingness to consider loans for the financing of nuclear power projects. The Department repeated the announcement in CA–3806, November 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 800.2614/11–156)

4. In telegram 1160 to Bonn, October 27, Dulles authorized Conant as follows:

   “I agree with your judgment that we should do what we can to strengthen Chancellor’s hand. You are therefore authorized when you see Adenauer Monday to take line proposed in Colux 49 on basis Deptel 3368.

   “You may in your discretion express to Chancellor our serious concern at way situation is developing.” (Ibid., 840.00/10–2656)

   Colux 49 is printed supra; telegram 3368 is printed as telegram 1390 to Brussels, Document 173.

   In Colux 56 from Luxembourg, October 28, Butterworth reported on a conversation which he had the previous day with Monnet. Monnet, who had just returned from Bonn where he had spoken with von Brentano, pointed out that the German Foreign Minister believed that the U.S. position on EURATOM had not been “authoritatively unambiguous” and that he would welcome an authoritative overriding statement of U.S. policy on that matter. Butterworth suggested that no matter how repetitious it might seem in U.S. eyes, von Brentano’s request could not be safely disregarded. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/10–2856) The Department replied in telegram 1161 to Bonn, October 28, that Ambassador Conant might wish to include in his talk with Adenauer a review of statements on U.S. policy toward EURATOM which had been made to the German Government over the past 6 months. (Ibid.)