Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

173. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, May 24, 1956—1:51 p.m.

1390. Dept is concerned by indications some Europeans do not have clear picture US attitude and policy Euratom. While Dept’s basic stance remains that US should stay in background, addressee Missions should at their discretion seek appropriate occasion prior Venice meeting² to clear up any such misunderstanding in minds FonMins and other prospective Venice participants, drawing upon following reaffirmation US policy:

1. US supports European effort create integrated nuclear community because of:

a. Possible decisive contribution revival general integration movement, thereby helping tie Germany organically to the West, and hence major step toward increased strength and unity Atlantic Community.

b. Submergence Franco-German rivalry through creation of intimate common interest in field nuclear development; FYI this of particular importance in relation possible moratorium on military uses. End FYI.

c. Integrated organization with necessary control powers would provide best opportunity system of safeguards against diversion in one major area of world where nuclear development likely in near future.

d. Common program merging scientific and industrial potential of Six appears offer best chance rapid development nuclear industry in Continental Western Europe.

2. Totality of these objectives can be adequately met only through exercise by common Six-country organization of governmental powers in nuclear energy field. Furthermore, US could enter into direct relations with a multi-national organization of this sort only if organization has effective common authority and responsibility and is thus able to undertake commitments like those now undertaken by national governments, in particular as concerns safeguards.

3. US recognizes that a major objective of Six nations is to achieve position of competence in nuclear field in which they can compete with US and UK on basis equality and in which their common program would not be vulnerable to action from outside. US regards pursuit of this objective, within framework of safeguards provided by institutions with common authority and responsibility, as constructive contribution to collective strength of increasingly self-reliant partners in Atlantic Community.

4. As already made clear to Europeans pursuant Deptel 2797 to Bonn March 30³ (also sent other action posts), US could make available substantially greater resources and adopt attitude of substantially greater liberality towards real integrated community possessing effective common responsibility and authority than would be possible for countries separately. If Six Ministers at Venice take decision to proceed with creation such as Euratom, we would be prepared in response European initiative to begin concrete discussions at early date with representatives of the Six-country group re nature and substance future US relationship with integrated Community.

5. While recognize that Venice meeting probably will not deal with important substantive questions (a) ownership of fuel and (b) possibility member states going outside Euratom to obtain nuclear materials, Dept greatly concerned implications compromise on these points. If Euratom is to meet test of common authority and responsibility and not amount to mere coordinating mechanism with certain control responsibilities, our view is that it must have authority over fuel which if not ownership, is as complete as if Euratom owned fuel. Compromise in Euratom draft which would permit under certain circumstances member states make separate arrangements to procure material outside Euratom channels seems to strike at heart of Euratom concept which is six-nation atomic community. Six nations should be informed now as they approach task of drafting implementing treaty that failure to meet foregoing points in a fashion consistent with basic philosophy Euratom may in light para 2 above, raise problems with respect future ability US to cooperate substantially with Euratom.

6. We understand two major issues in relation Euratom likely arise at Venice concern military uses therein and link to Common Market:

a. Military Uses. FYI. We consider desirable discourage atomic weapons production in countries not now producers. Atomic weapons moratorium would also postpone day when Germans raise discrimination issue and seek end WEU ban on production in Germany of nuclear weapons. Therefore US views favorably moratorium proposed Spaak letter (Luxembourg’s Colux D–48⁴). However, in view delicacy French internal problem this subject, with Cabinet split and Pineau consequently likely to go to Venice uninstructed, we are concerned that expression at this time of US view would do more harm than good. End FYI. Therefore, official posture US officials at this time should be to leave this matter for Europeans themselves to decide.

b. Common Market Tie. Germans, in particular, and Dutch and Belgians to lesser degree, assert Euratom by itself is insufficient step toward integration. Strauss, German Minister for Atomic Energy Matters, would even condition German ratification of Euratom on simultaneous ratification of the Common Market by Germany’s partners. US sympathetic desire Six countries establish Common Market though we have not completed study Common Market report. However, we would certainly hope that approval of Treaty for Euratom, which of such immediate importance, would not be held up until complex and doubtless lengthy Common Market negotiations concluded. FYI. Additional reason for US opposition to link is indication that chances for French ratification of Common Market are presently far more uncertain than for ratification of Euratom. End FYI.

7. There are some indications that British, who favor OEEC approach, and some Germans and other Europeans as well, may endeavor to use OEEC work to undermine Euratom effort. Such British suggestions as OEEC chemical separation plant tend to reduce apparent technical advantages of Six-power approach and can be used by opponents of European integration to argue Euratom not urgent. Also understand that full US cooperation OEEC work has been misinterpreted as indicating US “preference” OEEC over Euratom. Such inference incorrect. US has cooperated OEEC work in capacity as Associate Member OEEC and because we believe OEEC has role to play as framework for broad cooperation in nuclear field among Atlantic nations. US of course does not participate Euratom discussions and does not wish diminish European leadership this field; however, movement for effective Euratom has full US support for vital political and security considerations mentioned para 1. above.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/5–2456. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cleveland and Schaetzel and approved by Murphy. Also sent priority to Paris, Bonn, Rome, Luxembourg (for the Embassy and the CSC Mission), and The Hague and repeated for information to London; Paris was requested to inform USRO for information.
2. The Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC countries were scheduled to meet at Venice, May 29–30. See Document 175.
3. Document 164.
4. This despatch of May 8 transmitted the text of a letter dated April 26 from Spaak to the Foreign Ministers of the other five ECSC countries, offering a proposal for dealing with the problem of the military uses of atomic energy. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/–856)
5. The various Embassy responses to this telegram, which reported generally favorable reactions on the part of European leaders to the U.S. position, are ibid., 840.1901.