Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

197. Telegram From the Ambassador in Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

Bonn, October 30, 1956—1 p.m.

1647. Reference: Department telegrams 1160, 1161.² In accordance with instructions reference telegrams discussed with Chancellor yesterday afternoon German attitude towards EURATOM. Referring to my letter October 3³ based on Department telegram 900, I emphasized importance United States attaches to government ownership fissionable material as provided in our own Atomic Energy Act. Chancellor appeared to be already convinced by my letter and agreed it was rather absurd that some Germans were taking attitude against government ownership when United States with its deep commitment private enterprise system has as late as 1954 reaffirmed principle government ownership fissionable material. He assured me we need have no worry on this point, that he was quite prepared to yield on this issue and as he remarked in passing Strauss was now occupied with other matters.

Although Chancellor seemed to require no further arguments, I reminded him of fact that in March and in May I had conveyed to V. Brentano United States views in regard to our readiness to deal more favorably with 6-nation atomic energy authority than on bilateral basis with any constituent nations. Emphasizing this point, I expressed my personal opinion that Germany would get ahead more rapidly with its own atomic power development through EURATOM than by any other means. As in the case of my argumentation about ownership, I was clearly forcing an open door.

While the Chancellor said he was ready to yield on the question of EURATOM, he made it plain that he felt the French demands in regard to Common Market were such that they could not be met by the Germans on points involving relation between employer and employee. These were matters, he said, which were beyond the competence of the Federal Government. He looked forward, however, to his conversation with Mollet in November and seemed to believe the difficulties could be overcome. But as the French-German disagreement on Common Market was beyond my competence I pursued [did not pursue] this topic further.

In discussing briefly developing situation in Hungary and Poland, Chancellor made obvious comment that Russia had lost prestige all over the world whatever might be eventual outcome in Hungary and in the whole world, situation was in a state of flux. He expected no demonstration or uprising in Soviet Zone.⁴

Conant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/10–3056. Confidential. Repeated for information to Luxembourg, Brussels, The Hague, Paris, Rome, and London.
2. Neither printed, but see footnote 4, supra.
3. See footnote 3, Document 188.
4. In telegram 1216 to Bonn, November 2, the Department stated that it was “encouraged by general tone Chancellor’s conversation with you and especially by his apparent confidence in his ability deal with Strauss on question ownership and supply fissionable materials.” The Department also noted that in regard to Common Market issues, it did not believe it appropriate for the United States to intervene. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/10–3056)