Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

172. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 14, 1956¹

Washington, May 14, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary of State
• Mr. Strauss, Minister for Atomic Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany.
• Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, German Ambassador.
• Mr. Smith—S/AE
• Mr. Timmons—EUR/RA
• Mr. Holt—EUR/GER

Minister Strauss stated that the German Government now has its atomic program laid out. Plans for atomic research and research reactors are now underway. Germany must regain the lost ten to fifteen years and hopes within six or seven years to be able to compete with Great Britain and France in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Ambassador Krekeler added that Minister Strauss has come with a desire to place three orders with American firms for research reactors, has brought a German draft law on atomic energy, and hopes to arrange for training German technicians in the U.S.

The Secretary commented that it might be some years before the use of atomic energy became commercially profitable. Some people are over-optimistic in this respect. Of course, atomic energy for power has been proved to be technically feasible, but refinements are necessary before general commercial use will be profitable. One cannot operate on a profitable basis now except in a few spots in the world where production costs of other sources of energy are relatively high. Mr. Smith added that it was anticipated that within fifteen years Western Europe could produce atomic energy on a commercial basis whereas in some areas of very high cost power production of atomic energy might already be commercial today.

Minister Strauss estimated future German atomic energy requirements as follows: As of 1954, German electrical energy use was 70 billion kilowatt hours. By 1970 Germany would use 170 billion kilowatt hours. The estimate is based upon an assumption of 5% expansion in the economy annually. 145 billion kilowatt hours of the requirements of 1970 could be met by usual sources of power but the additional 25 billion kilowatt hours must presumably come from atomic power. 1970 is only fourteen years away. Minister Strauss expressed interest in the 20,000 kilogram program of the President. The Secretary stated that the quantity for countries might vary but the conditions would be the same for all. Detailed procedures were being worked out.

Minister Strauss mentioned that the German Government had already the draft of the EURATOM Treaty to be presented at the meeting of the Six Foreign Ministers on May 29 in Venice. At the meeting Germany would prefer not to face the alternative of only an OEEC or a EURATOM organization. Mr. Strauss recalled the statements by Mr. Murphy and Mr. Hollister at the OEEC Ministerial meeting in Paris in February 1956 favoring both the OEEC and EURATOM, indicating that they could be combined and that a political solution would be necessary. Germany certainly does not want to leave Britain outside. It would be good to have Britain associated with EURATOM as a “broker”.

The Secretary stated that the US looks with favor on whatever projects tend most effectively toward a unified Europe. If one were to ask why, he would point out that the President had tried to give the answer by saying that the divisions within Western Europe have brought Western society close to the point of extinction. Recurrent wars have killed off some of the finest men, brought the economy to frequent ruin and torn down Europe’s moral stature. The greatest task confronting post-war statesmen is to reconstruct Europe on a more permanent basis. There is no other way which will leave anything left at all in Europe.

Formerly the US was not concerned but we are now involved. Two world wars have cost us something and we are entitled to have some interest in the matter. The Secretary stated that the US understands that dictation to European countries would be counter-productive but as members of the Western Community, we are entitled to have some views. We had lost hundreds of thousands of men and hundreds of billions of dollars as a result of wars starting in Europe. We cannot sit aside and say nothing while the structure which has been the world’s greatest war hazard is being rebuilt. Dictation is bad but an attitude of indifference would also be a false approach. The sympathy and support of the US will go to that program best calculated to draw together the Western European countries. It doesn’t matter whether the plan is political, economic, or of other form. One will recall that the recent Council of Ministers of NATO at Paris agreed that ways should be explored to draw European nations more closely together. Whatever can be done within NATO is fine, but sometimes smaller groups are useful to accomplish particular purposes. The President’s speech in London in 1951 on European reunification indicates the conclusions Mr. Eisenhower had drawn before he became President.

The Secretary said that the more European nations try to work together, the more we can help them.

Minister Strauss said that he knew the Secretary’s position on assistance to an integrated community of countries, that Ambassador Conant had presented to the German Government an Aide-Mémoire on the subject.² In proceeding toward European unity certain achievements could already be listed, such as the Coal and Steel Community. Germany would like now to combine the two next steps, EURATOM and the common market. Of course, the German Government realizes that whoever demands the common market immediately as a condition for EURATOM would sabotage EURATOM because it would not be acceptable but real integration necessitates economic integration, and it must be followed by military and political integration. The German Cabinet decided to say yes at Venice for EURATOM but also to require that the countries represented take the first step toward a common market. Whoever wants EURATOM must be ready to begin to create a common market. The German Government expects that it will take twelve to fifteen years to achieve a common market, nevertheless a first step must be made and carried out simultaneously with EURATOM. There would be many difficulties in the German Cabinet and in the German Parliament in approving EURATOM if there is no link with the common market.

The Secretary commented that the US is all in favor of the common market idea. The Preamble of the Marshall Plan spoke of a common market in Europe. With the common market Europe would be a third world force along with the US and the Soviet Union. If Europe does not have a common market, it will remain weak. It maintains itself at present by a cartel system with artificial markets and high costs. On the other hand, if a common market is made an absolute condition for unity in atomic power development, Europe may end up with nothing.

The Secretary said that Minister Strauss might think that controls required in EURATOM would destroy free enterprise, but we do not think so. There is no reason why EURATOM should be socialistic. The problem is how to have controls to insure that atomic energy is being used for peaceful purposes. Because of the by-product of plutonium, the efficacy of controls will be most important. It is our thought that the larger and more responsible the safeguard organization the more control will be facilitated. This would be better than multiple controls of many individual countries involving complicated policing. It is appalling to contemplate a multiplicity of uncontrolled national atomic developments leading to multiplying atomic weapons programs. If you set up a pattern allowing the thing to spread on national lines there will be the danger of irresponsible action. While certain nations are capable of the responsibility there are other places in the world without the necessary sense.

Minister Strauss commented that he agreed with the Secretary that there should be a common market, an exchange of information on atomic developments, joint research programs, standardization and all kinds of control through registration, but that the German Government does not want to see EURATOM own fissionable materials, have a purchase monopoly, nor does it want to compel exchange of patent information. The German Government would feel differently about EURATOM if the European counterpart of the Atomic Energy Commission were an instrument of a European Government. However, without a European Government a European Atomic Commission like that of the US would be bad. The Secretary commented that EURATOM would constitute such a European control.³

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Holt.
2. Apparent reference to the aide-mémoire presented by Conant upon the instructions of the Department; see Document 164.

3. Telegram 3400 to Bonn, May 28, summarized the major points covered in the various conversations between Strauss and Department representatives regarding the German atomic energy program. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.62A11/5–2856)

   In telegram 4333 from Bonn, May 23, the Embassy evaluated the Strauss visit in part as follows:

   “It appears to us that Strauss wished to take advantage his trip to Washington to find out for himself to what extent US might lend material atomic assistance to Germany on bilateral basis and how strongly US Government actually feels about giving preference to EURATOM over bilateral arrangements. His request for bilateral deal primarily followed example other CSC countries and does not necessarily denote bad faith on his part since from his point view he had everything to gain if US accepted even part his proposals and nothing to lose.” (Ibid., 840.1901/5–2356)