Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

128. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Political Affairs, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations (Martin) to the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Timmons)¹

Paris, November 10, 1955.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy on European integration

I was glad to get your memorandum of October 27² with its reexamination of the policy contained in the Rome message of May 30.³

I think I fully understood the distinction to which you draw attention between cooperation and integration, well made in this message, though I do not understand its application in this connection. The message does not refer to choice by Europeans in pursuing “integration” or “cooperation” but “of institutional means” which I would assume includes freedom to choose whether to do any particular thing by integrated or cooperative arrangements. I am glad this still is the policy line though it leaves us still at a loss to understand policy behind our strong objections to Spaak desire have observer from OEEC Secretariat at Brussels Steering Group meeting.

To come back to the distinction which of course has political importance to us as far as our preferences are concerned, though we would not, I gather, intervene. I have the feeling that as things are now developing, it may be difficult, so far as Brussels is concerned, to make this distinction in a way which will be clear to everyone concerned. In fact, discussing this question Friday night with Ambassador Dillon, he expressed very strongly the view that what will come out of the Brussels meetings would be considered integration by some and cooperation by others and it would probably be impossible to be sure which it really was most. I think this is probably right unless there is a major shift in direction there.

In this connection you may be interested in comments made by Ambassador Bruce, who dropped in for a very pleasant visit last week. He had spent the weekend at a wine tasting festival with Spaak, and while in Paris had seen quite a lot of Monnet, of course. He asked both of them whether the present US policy of lying low on European integration and saying and doing nothing except as asked was sound, or whether we should become more active. He reported that the reaction of both of them was most emphatic that we should continue to stay entirely in the background.

He also reported that Monnet hoped to have a meeting of his committee before the end of this month. His present plan was to attempt to get them to endorse a piece of legislation providing for a really supranational nuclear authority which they would then take back and have passed in substantially identical form in their various parliaments. In particular, he anticipated this would solve the German problem as there could be no opposition in the Bundestag to the proposal, for Adenauer is already for it and Ollenhauer⁴ is a member of his committee. I think we both felt that this was a rather typical example of Monnet’s remoteness to the world of practical politics. Tuthill,⁵ with whom I discussed this when he was here Friday, agreed fully that it was no such simple problem.

I might add that Tuthill indicated that the principal problem in Germany seemed to be lack of knowledge of what was involved in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly in terms of its military consequences. Until Conant has had a chance to spend several long sessions educating people like Erhard, and they in turn have had a chance to talk to others both in and out of the government, he does not foresee any reasonable German position emerging.

Dillon, by the way (we had quite a discussion of atomic matters as the only other guest was Stassen and he seems almost as much interested in peaceful uses of atomic energy as disarmament), said that his informants, including Monnet, had indicated a principal cause of the German reluctance to proceed at Brussels was assurances given by U.S. industrial firms to German industry about their ability to provide the Germans with what was necessary to get ahead with peaceful exploitation. Frank Nash and Frank Pace, of General Dynamics, had been particularly active. Thus it is not a matter of just the AEC line of the past summer. Tuthill also confirmed this.

Edwin M. Martin
Deputy Chief of Mission

1. Source: Department of State, RA Files: Lot 58 D 374, General—Economic Integration. Confidential.
2. Document 125.
3. Reference is to Document 95.
4. Erich Ollenhauer, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. John W. Tuthill, Economic Counselor of the Embassy in Germany.