Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

127. Telegram From the Ambassador in Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

Bonn, November 4, 1955—6 p.m.

1468. At request of Foreign Minister von Brentano I saw Minister Strauss² this morning and explained position US Government as set forth in aide-mémoire presented to von Brentano last week (re Embtel 1406, November l³). Strauss said there was no question of desire of his government to have European cooperation in field of atomic energy. The problem was what way would be chosen. He mentioned Brussels discussions⁴ and also discussions of larger group of nations in OEEC.⁵ He also pointed to difficulties presented by Brussels proposals because of their complexity and the length of the treaty which would be a book. Furthermore, he felt drastic provisions about depriving private companies of patent rights was a serious objection. He spoke at some length about German attitude towards French desire to push European cooperation in the field of atomic energy as contrasted with French attitude towards EDC and other schemes of European cooperation discussed in the last years. I gathered he felt his government and Germans in general resented eagerness of French to cooperate in this field as contrasted with their delaying tactics in EDC and other efforts European cooperation. He set forth his own views as to the desirability of working towards a European political assembly with representatives elected by the people of all the six nations, this assembly to create a community with definite but restricted powers, starting with reduction tariffs and agreement for freedom of movement of population within the six countries.

He said that if such a truly European supranational community were created, the Germans would be ready to give to it powers in the field of atomic energy.

He implied that, though they would explore OEEC and Brussels approaches to atomic cooperation, they would be inclined to be reluctant to proceed along latter limited route unless there was some evidence of French desire to move towards bigger goal of European political community with limited powers.

(Do not believe too much significance should be attached to Strauss’ emphasis on agreement on ultimate goal of political integration and apparent neglect of Common Market approach, since he is not wholly familiar with details of negotiations. Believe government position as reported fourth paragraph Embtel 1177, October 13,⁶ basically unchanged.)

In discussion of the atomic energy problem in general and the forthcoming legislation from Bundestag, I pointed to misunderstandings that seem to exist in certain German industrial circles in regard to the special nature of atomic energy. I pointed out that the reprocessing of fuel elements was a necessary part of the production of atomic energy and this reprocessing produced plutonium which is an atomic explosive. I further pointed out our treaty with Belgium required this reprocessing to be done by the US emphasizing our belief in the importance of the control of such highly dangerous material. Strauss indicated he would be glad to have me see Erhard, which I propose to do next week, in view of Economic Ministry’s key role in Brussels negotiations.

While Strauss was aware of the basic facts and their significance, there is evidence that Erhard’s Ministry and some German industrialists are playing down the fact that atomic explosive material is produced as a consequence of production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and are saying that there is no need for more control of this industry than of electricity. Furthermore, judging from conversations with certain industrialists here, believe there is some misunderstanding in industrial circles as to likelihood of early conclusion between FedRep Government and US Government of bilateral treaty for power reactors along the lines of Belgian treaty. If in fact this prospect is as distant as I assume it would be helpful to the case for a European approach if this misunderstanding could be eliminated when I see Erhard. I am not referring to standard bilateral for experimental reactor which I assume can go forward without trouble.⁷

Conant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/11–455. Secret. Repeated for information to Luxembourg, Brussels, Paris, and London.
2. Franz-Joseph Strauss, Minister for Atomic Questions.
3. See footnote 5, Document 123.
4. Reference is to the ongoing deliberations of the Intergovernmental Committee on European integration in Brussels. The Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC countries met at Noordwijk in the Netherlands on September 6 to discuss an interim report by Spaak on the progress of the Intergovernmental Committee.
5. The OEEC Council met in Paris, June 9–10, and discussed, among other matters, the resolution adopted at Messina on European integration efforts.
6. See footnote 2, Document 121.
7. In telegram 1332 to Bonn, November 9, the Department supported the general line which Ambassador Conant took with the Germans as summarized in telegram 1468 and offered the Embassy some guidance on how long it might take to negotiate a power bilateral with the Federal Republic of Germany. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/11–755)