125. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Timmons) to the Director of the Office of Political Affairs, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations (Martin)1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy on European integration
Your memorandum of October 5 inquired whether the Department’s telegram to Rome 3849 of May 30, and particularly the first sentence of paragraph 5, still represents the Washington position.2 I assume that the principal point of that telegram, i.e. the distinction between “cooperation” and “integration”—which appears to us to be still valid—does not present any problem.
[Page 339]While the sentence to which you specifically refer is a truism if taken literally, it is open to varying interpretations. It was intended to convey the thought that decisions in Europe on such a fundamental political issue as the need for countries to surrender national power to federal institutions, can be effective only if they arise out of genuine and strong European convictions. I believe that there is general agreement in Washington and USRO to this extent. The implications which should be drawn from this with regard to the desirable extent and scope of U.S. action to influence such decisions have not been, and perhaps cannot be, spelled out in detail.
There are various unstated premises, however, which underlie our tactics, in addition to the substantive policies of the telegrams you cite, and it might be useful to mention these briefly although without attempting a precise formulation. We wish to encourage and support those Europeans whose views parallel those of the Department on the great importance of continuing progress in integration. At the same time we wish to avoid a series of pitfalls: over-commitment or inflexible commitment to a course of action that ultimately may not prove acceptable in Europe; U.S. involvement unnecessarily in details of European planning; U.S. public statements which are likely to be interpreted abroad as undue U.S. intervention or arouse more public antagonism than support. Naturally, we can never be sure in advance that any proposed U.S. action meets all these requirements but I think that they are the principal tactical considerations we weigh in the balance.
I would be glad to have any comment or reaction you may have to this line of thinking.
- Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 61 D 252, RA Correspondence 1955. Confidential. Drafted by Boochever.↩
- Edwin M. Martin’s memorandum was attached to the source text, but is not printed. For telegram 3849, see Document 95.↩