Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

85. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, February 4, 1955—8:32 p.m.

444. Your 526.² One line our 434³ unfortunately omitted in code room.⁴ Proposed U.S. statement does not limit U.S. assistance to evacuation civilians. You should insure Chinese authorities understand clearly our assistance offer applies to removal military forces as well as civilians.⁵ Correct version first paragraph proposed statement reads as follows:

“The Government of the Republic of China has announced it will redeploy its military forces from the Tachens, a group of small islands 200 miles north of Formosa, to other positions. It has requested the aid of United States forces in protecting and assisting the redeployment of these military forces and the evacuation of such civilians as desire to leave those islands. The United States Government has given orders to the Seventh Fleet and other United States forces to assist in this operation.”

Necessity of excluding any reference to Quemoy and Matsu in official statements both Governments has been made unmistakably clear in our 421,⁶ 422,⁷ 433⁸ and 441.⁹ You should reiterate decision in terms which will preclude further questions on this score.

We agree that timing of statements should be carefully coordinated and that they should be issued almost simultaneously. U.S. statement is drafted as reply to Chinese statement, making it necessary that Chinese statement slightly precede. However we would expect to have firm arrangement to release agreed statements few minutes apart.

Answers to numbered points last paragraph your telegram as follows:

1. Importance cooperation and coordination emphatically confirmed.

2. Chinese Communist rejection Security Council invitation in our view makes Tachens move more urgent. It does not affect decisions re Quemoy and Matsu.

3. U.S. position re New Zealand item in Security Council following Chinese Communist rejection not yet formulated. Exchange of views with various interested governments contemplated including of course Chinese Government.

We know that in this emergency you need ready and direct access to President Chiang. We note delay of about 24 hours (your 511)¹⁰ apparently occurred after you received our 421 before you saw Generalissimo. You reported in your 521¹¹ that President Chiang could not see you until following day to be informed of our 433. From your 526 it appears that scheduled appointment did not take place and that you found it necessary to deal indirectly through Shen and Hollington Tong as to our 439¹² as well as our 433.

We have mentioned this apparent coyness of Gimo to Yeh and believe it stems from Gimo’s desire to await additional advice from Yeh. Acting Secretary has suggested to Yeh that he urge Gimo be available for direct conversation.¹³ In that connection it will be appreciated if you will try persuade Gimo that Yeh has made extraordinary effort to assert Gimo’s view regarding need for public reference to Quemoy and Matsu. Yeh said he now informing Gimo urgently there is no possibility this will be done. Yeh and Koo expressed belief possible now Gimo will make request by note for assistance in evacuation Tachens and might refrain from any public statement. We would have no objection to this procedure if he prefers it. In that event U.S. would plan make unilateral statement along lines text already communicated to you.

Re paragraph 5 our 433 Admiral Carney stated at State–JCS meeting this morning present Seventh Fleet deployment and alert basis could not be maintained more than 24 hours longer and asked authority to change present Fleet disposition tomorrow if orders for Tachens operation cannot be issued by then.¹⁴

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2–455. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Murphy; cleared in draft by Murphy and Robertson. Repeated to USUN as telegram 409, February 5. (Ibid., 793.00/2–455)
2. Document 80.
3. Document 78.
4. See footnote 7, Document 80.
5. A copy of the corrected statement, given to Shen by Rankin on February 5 is in Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83.
6. Document 69.
7. See footnote 3, Document 72.
8. Document 74.
9. Telegram 441 to Taipei, February 4, summarized Robertson’s February 3 conversation with Yeh, recorded in Martin’s February 3 memorandum of conversation, Document 79. (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2–455)
10. Document 72.
11. See footnote 5, Document 74.
12. See footnote 5, Document 80.
13. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
14. According to a memorandum of the discussion at the meeting, prepared in the Department of State, Carney said that the fleet had been on the alert for 2 weeks, that this could not be continued indefinitely without a loss of efficiency, and that if he had no word by the next day, he would redeploy the fleet to Okinawa and Keelung until the negotiations with Chiang were nearing a conclusion. (Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)