80. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1
526. Off-shore Islands. Deptels 418,2 433,3 434,4 439.5 Text US statement quoted Deptel 434 was handed to Acting Foreign Minister Shen6 this morning. Only question that arose was why reference to US assistance at Tachen was now limited to evacuating civilians7 but Shen and I agreed that this probably need not make any practical difference.
[Page 209]Shen is redrafting Yeh’s proposed statement (Deptel 418) to conform with President Chiang’s wishes. Revised draft probably will be quite similar but shorter and tighter. Technical reason for delay in this connection appears to be that Chinese Government considers it has received no definitive reply to request that reference to Kinmen and Matsu be included; also insertion of “which Government of US deems essential” being held in abeyance until previous point clarified. Foreign Ministry had been led to believe US reply might be awaiting Secretary Dulles’ return to Washington.
I told Shen I felt US position quite firm that no mention be made of any specific islands and that “US deems” is essential. I remarked that in actual fact these two points were of no more than psychological value and in retrospect would seem unimportant. He assured me their draft would be cleared with Department before issuance and expressed appreciation having US statement before him to aid in his drafting. I noted that although US text had been approved by President, its issuance naturally contingent upon satisfactory (to US) Chinese statement.
Shen said both Minister Yeh and he set great store by issuing two statements simultaneously, since this would strengthen effect and demonstrate full agreement between two governments. If US statement delayed some time after Chinese it would appear as afterthought.
This morning Shen saw President briefly and relayed substance of Deptel 434 which I had conveyed to him orally yesterday. Chiang instructed him to pass to me following for Department’s attention:
- 1.
- Now that Reds have rejected Security Council invitation, US-Chinese cooperation and coordination particularly important.
- 2.
- Does Red step (1) alter US views re timing of Tachen evacuation, of announcements in that connection or of formal mention of Kinmen and Matsu?
- 3.
- What is US view in same detail re Red action and what course do we contemplate?
I replied that there could be no alternative to agreeing with point (1) and that (3) was matter for reply in due course, but I felt sure answer to point (2) was no, particularly view Deptel 439 of which I gave substance to Shen. I said time was of essence.
Hollington Tong8 was lunching with President today. I saw him just before he went there and asked him to pass on essentials of above with stress on necessity of quick action.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2–455. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 7:55 a.m. Passed to USUN by the Department at Rankin’s request.↩
- Document 62.↩
- Document 74.↩
- Document 78.↩
-
Telegram 439 to Taipei, February 3, reads in part as follows:
“Inform President Chiang urgently that Chinese Communist attacks against Tachens and implications of Chinese Communist arrogant rejection Security Council invitation emphasize necessity for immediate decision as to redeployment from Tachens. A new situation for both US and Chinese Governments might be created if decision should be delayed.” (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2–355)
↩ - Shen Chang-huan, Political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.↩
-
This misunderstanding was due to an error in the transmission of telegram 434; see Document 85. A copy of the statement given to Shen on February 4 is in Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83. The second sentence reads as follows:
“It has requested the aid of the United States forces in the evacuation of such civilians as desire to leave those islands.”
↩ - Ambassador of the Republic of China to Japan.↩