Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

69. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, January 31, 1955—8:08 p.m.

421. Eyes only Ambassador Rankin. Refurtels 496 and 497.² Deptel 417.³

1. The following should be conveyed immediately to President Chiang and he should be informed that it has the approval of the President. You are cautioned to exercise the utmost discretion in handling it. (We are disturbed over broadcasts and press reports this morning attributed to a high American source Taipei which undoubtedly have come to your attention.)

Begin Statement:

2. The Government of the United States has not altered its essential position as set forth to Foreign Minister Yeh in Washington. The United States remains steadfast in its resolve to associate itself closely with the Chinese Government in maintaining the existence of a free China against the growing menace of communist aggression. The presence of US Fleet units in the area and a US Air Wing on Formosa is concrete evidence of the intention of the United States Government in this respect. The Senate is considering on an expedited basis the ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty and has moved the hearings up from February 7 to February 2.

3. Congress has by overwhelming vote authorized the President to employ the armed forces of the US as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories in that area now in friendly hands as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. Under present circumstances it is the purpose of the President to assist in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu against armed attack if he judges such attack is of a character which shows that it is in fact in aid of and in preparation for an armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores and dangerous to their defense. An attack by the communists at this time on Quemoy or Matsu which seriously threatened their loss would be deemed by the President to be of this character.

4. Our assumption of responsibility with respect to defense of “related areas” is unilateral as fully explained to Minister Yeh by Secretary Dulles. Also our reasons for confining public statements, both US and Chinese, to language of US Congressional Resolution were explained to Minister Yeh by Secretary of State Dulles.

This document is a Top Secret statement of present US position which must not be divulged by the Chinese Government.

End Statement.

5. In presenting foregoing to Chiang you should bear in mind that in conversations with Yeh (Deptel 417) Secretary said any formal Chinese statement should avoid implication of agreement or commitment between United States and Chinese Governments. United States responsibilities as to “related area” were unilateral. There was no agreement as to related area, and United States might have to deny any implications to contrary. Chinese unofficial sources could speculate, but there should be no official statement on either side as to understanding re defense of related area. Secretary felt impossible to draw absolute geographical line or to specify which islands were important to defense of Formosa and which were not important. Relative defensive importance of islands could change. Any significant communist buildup in area would be regarded by United States with concern.

6. This Government recommends that President Chiang consider immediate request to US for aid to which we would respond affirmatively and then promptly issue announcement of Chinese decision to withdraw and regroup military forces on Tachens, in the form of Yeh’s draft as amended (our 418).⁴ Note that last paragraph of Deptel 418 is a generalized statement of US position which we feel is helpful to Chiang in his public relations. Foreign Minister Yeh has now authorized us to let President Chiang know that we have seen this draft.

7. FYI there is now pending in Security Council action calling for cessation of hostilities in the Formosan area. Our allies who are promoting this are anxious that we make no provocative statements that might be ascribed as the cause of the failure of any such proposal, if this should occur.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1–3155. Top Secret; Niact. Cleared with the President by Acting Secretary Hoover, according to a memorandum of February 1 from Scott to Goodpaster. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area) Drafted by Murphy, Phleger, Robertson, McConaughy, Bowie, and Merchant. Also sent to USUN eyes only for Lodge.
2. See Documents 59 and 60.
3. See footnote 6, Document 61.
4. Document 62.