Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

72. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

Taipei, February 2, 1955—6 p.m.

511. Department’s 421,² 422,³ 423.⁴ Upon receipt Department’s 421, I decided to do as subsequently instructed in Department’s 423 re United States position statement on off-shore islands. While asking yesterday afternoon for urgent appointment with President, I gave Acting Foreign Minister verbatim text of actual statement⁵ so he could prepare personally a careful translation into Chinese for use when I saw Chiang (I talked with President for hour and quarter this morning with Acting Foreign Minister as interpreter.)

After going over text in detail Chiang asked me to explain phases “under present circumstances” and “at this time” (in third numbered paragraph Department’s 421). Did they mean that we would do thus and so now but not in the future? I replied I should not attempt to read anything additional into the statement, but added my personal view was that these phrases were intended to relate our policy to specific conditions, such as existed today, rather than to hypothetical circumstances which were unforeseeable and might never occur. At same time I did not regard statement as applying solely to present situation. President asked that I request further clarification from Department.

Next point on which Chiang laid stress was whether effect of Congressional resolution would continue after ratification of Defense Treaty. I did not comment on this.

Third item President raised was importance of some United States public statement at same time Chinese announced Tachen evacuation. He appears to have sent further instructions to Foreign Minister Yeh in this connection. I referred to paragraph (number 4 in Department’s 421) in US statement just given him and asked if he had received details from Yeh of what Secretary Dulles said. He indicated his information was meager. Said I am so sad few actual details at hand but could envisage essential considerations. First, Senate would be willing to leave large authority in hands of President as Commander in Chief, but would not easily yield any of its power over international agreements. Also there was question of relative advantages of formal announcement re 1 or 2 islands and more general position which might avoid appearance of inviting Red aggression on any islands. I supposed military men should favor second alternative. I also reminded President that conversations in Washington had gone through several phases during past two weeks. What had seemed definite at one point might necessarily have changed subsequently in light of new developments. I repeated that while I believed these remarks pertinent they were not based on intimate knowledge of details.

Under above circumstances and view fact defense pact hearings now in progress and should not be jeopardized, I recommended acceptance of position statement I had just given him as satisfactory basis for requesting US aid in Tachen evacuation. I suggested he not insist on further explanation of phrases mentioned above, adding that when good faith is absent no use of words can bind a nation but when good faith present, as in this case, one need have no concern over details of wording.

President expressed appreciation of my remarks and quoted Chinese proverb to effect one never asks friend to do the impossible. He now understood US would not mention Kinmen and Matsu in public pronouncement but urged appropriate statement be issued nevertheless. He expressed hope US might agree to some mention of Kinmen and Matsu in Chinese statement on Tachen withdrawal but I gave him no encouragement at this point.

President then mentioned present Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference⁶ and expressed concern over reported proposal Free Chinese give up all of offshore islands in return for ceasefire. He asked US to put UK straight on this point. (I made no comment but cannot imagine US agreeing to reported Commonwealth scheme.)

Finally President said that after Tachen evacuation he was considering proposal in security council condemning Soviet aggression against China. Revival of this project⁷ would represent effort to label actual aggressor in fighting of last five months.

Rankin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2–255. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 9:20 a.m. Repeated to USUN eyes only for Lodge, by the Department as Telegram 390 to New York, February 2, 1955.
2. Document 69.

3. Telegram 422 to Taipei, February 1, reads as follows:

   “Your 499 [Document 68] crossed our 421 which sets forth definitive US position. We are now considering what kind official statement can be made here consistent with position taken in 421 in the event President Chiang responds favorably to issuing statement recommended to him by Yeh. You will be further advised.” (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1–3155)

4. Telegram 423 to Taipei, February 1, instructed Rankin to deliver formally in writing that portion of telegram 421 to Taipei which was marked as a statement. (Ibid., 993.72/2–155)
5. A copy is ibid., Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83.
6. Held in London, January 31–February 8.
7. The reference is apparently to a resolution originally proposed by the Republic of China at the Fourth Session of the General Assembly in 1949, resubmitted in revised form in 1952, further amended, and adopted by the General Assembly on February 1, 1952, as Resolution 505 (VI), which declared that the Soviet Union had failed to carry out the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945. For the resolution, see U.N. document A/2119, p. 4; for the treaty, see Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 585.