Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

79. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 3, 1955, 4:30 p.m.¹

Washington, February 3, 1955, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Off-shore Islands Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. George Yeh, Foreign Minister
• Dr. Tan, Minister of Chinese Embassy
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for FE
• Mr. McConaughy, Director for CA (latter part of meeting)
• Mr. Martin, Deputy Director for CA

After stating that he had cabled to Taipei our draft statement² on withdrawal from the Tachens, Dr. Yeh referred to the Chinese Government’s desire to include specific mention of Quemoy and Matsu in their draft statement. Dr. Yeh said that his draft³ had been rejected by President Chiang. He had suggested that the negotiations on the wording be transferred to Taipei and be carried out between Ambassador Rankin and the Generalissimo.

Mr. Robertson reminded Dr. Yeh that the Secretary had explained we could not include Matsu and Quemoy in our statement as we did not wish to pinpoint any particular territory. He said that the President was opposed to mentioning any territory by name but made clear that we will defend certain related areas. Mr. Robertson also stressed that we were talking about redeploying Chinese forces from the Tachens, not withdrawing. Mr. Robertson said that the Chinese should not wait until a large-scale attack had begun on the Tachens before beginning redeployment. In case of such an attack the U.S. forces might not be able to assist in the redeployment. If the redeployment were carried out now, it could be described as strengthening Chinese military positions.

Dr. Yeh said that the Generalissimo understood that the United States would not refer to Quemoy and Matsu in a public statement but the Chinese Government would make a unilateral statement in which they would refer to Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Robertson said that the U.S. might have to repudiate such a statement. He emphasized that this was not merely his word but the Secretary had said the same thing on January 28. Mr. Robertson read the final paragraph from the memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Dr. Yeh of that date.⁴ The Secretary had said then that he wished the Chinese to avoid naming Quemoy and Matsu in their formal statements. While it was the present intention of the U.S. to assist in the defense of these islands, there was no agreement with the Chinese Government or commitment between the two Governments. The U.S. Government might have to deny any implications which might appear in a public statement of the Chinese Government that the U.S. had such a commitment. Mr. Robertson said that in view of what the Secretary had told Dr. Yeh on January 28 he could not understand how the Generalissimo could make a unilateral statement mentioning Quemoy and Matsu.

Dr. Yeh said he did not say that the Generalissimo would make such a statement; there was no intention to make such a statement unless the United States agreed to it.

Mr. Robertson repeated that we could not agree to it. The Secretary had made this clear. He could not exceed what the President had said and what Congress had authorized.

Dr. Yeh then asked if the President’s statement still stood.

Mr. Robertson said yes. The statement which we planned to make with respect to withdrawal of the Tachens, however, would of course not be made until the Chinese decided to redeploy and asked us for assistance.

Dr. Yeh asked Mr. Robertson to inform Ambassador Rankin that he, Dr. Yeh, had requested the U.S. Government to authorize inclusion in the Chinese statement of specific mention of Quemoy and Matsu and that Mr. Robertson had said this would not be possible.

Mr. Robertson reminded Dr. Yeh that it was the Secretary who had said on January 28 that it would not be possible.

Dr. Yeh said that he felt our draft statement on withdrawal from the Tachens did not help much since it did not include the names of the two islands. The problem was to offset the bad effect on morale in Free China of an announcement on withdrawal from the Tachens and he did not feel that the statement would be effective in this respect.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the statement indicated that the U.S. Government would extend assistance to the Republic of China in defending related positions and territories now in its hands, which was a broader statement than one which would include the names of the two islands.

Dr. Yeh then turned to the situation in the United Nations. He thought there might be a period in which new efforts would be involved to get the Chinese Communists invited. London and other capitals might attempt to inject new elements and the UN cease-fire item might be protracted for weeks or months. In this connection, he wondered whether it would be advisable to pull out of the Tachens. He had mentioned this to the Secretary briefly and the Secretary’s reaction was negative. Dr. Yeh thought that it would have a bad public effect to withdraw from the Tachens before a cease-fire.

Mr. Robertson recalled that he had told the Generalissimo and Dr. Yeh that the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly contemptuously reject the UN cease-fire proposal, just as they had now done. They couldn’t accept UN jurisdiction over Formosa any more than in the case of Korea. Dr. Yeh was reminded that he himself had said that Chou En-lai does not bluff. Mr. Robertson said that the best conditions existed now for redeployment of Chinese forces from the Tachens and evacuation of civilians. It would be highly desirable for the request to come now. If we wait until the Communists start to attack the Tachens, the President might feel that as no request for redeployment had been received we would not be in a position to help. If this happened the Communists would be given a great psychological victory, as they would be able to pound the Nationalists on the Tachens while the U.S. stood by.

Dr. Yeh asked if a request for U.S. assistance and withdrawal were made and granted, would the U.S. be ready to consult immediately as to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu?

Mr. Robertson said there was a top American Admiral⁵ on Formosa. The fleet was waiting on full alert basis. We were ready to start operations as soon as the Chinese made up their minds.

Dr. Yeh asked if we would be ready then to take steps to implement the strengthening of Matsu and Quemoy and begin consulting about it.

Mr. Robertson said that we would assist in bringing the forces from the Tachens to Formosa and from there they could be deployed to other positions. In our statement we would refer to assisting the Chinese in redeploying the troops to other positions.

Dr. Yeh said he thought redeployment was a euphemism for evacuation. He wanted to know if we were ready to formulate plans concerning Matsu and Quemoy.

Mr. Robertson said that was a military matter but in his opinion we were ready to discuss this.

Dr. Yeh asked if discussions had been held on this question.

Mr. Robertson said that as far as he knew the Chinese hadn’t asked for discussions.

Dr. Yeh asked whether the redeployment from the Tachens would be confined to withdrawal operations or would consultation also take place on defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Robertson said that in his opinion consultations could be held immediately on defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

Dr. Yeh said that he was glad to hear this but recalled no reference to this point in previous conversations.

Mr. Robertson recalled that the Secretary had said in the present situation the U.S. would aid in the defense of Matsu and Quemoy, although we would make no public statement on it. If conditions changed, we would not want to be committed. Mr. Robertson felt there would be an automatic need for consultations when the order went out for the withdrawal of the Tachens.

Mr. Robertson said he felt we would be missing the boat if we did not seize the present opportunity for redeployment. We had to work on a basis of mutual cooperation and good faith. Without these what was said in statements would make little difference.

Dr. Yeh said that we seemed to be stuck on the point of public announcement. He realized that there are U.S. domestic reasons for not making one. He then said the Generalissimo had a nice reaction to the President’s message.⁶ It had dispelled his fears. There was still the question as to how to meet the psychological impact of the announcement of the withdrawal from the Tachens. Dr. Yeh said he had been rebuffed by his own Government on his draft statement. He wanted to transfer negotiations to Taipei.

Mr. Robertson thought this would only compound confusion. Mr. Robertson emphasized that the negotiations could best be carried out between the Department and the Foreign Minister here. He assured Dr. Yeh there had been no change in U.S. intentions. He emphasized the unique support which the President’s message had received in Congress and the magnificent job the President and the Secretary had done to rally opinion. It was unfortunate that the Chinese were now hesitating.

Dr. Yeh asked what steps would be taken following rejection of the invitation to the Chinese Communists? What was the U.S. Government’s opinion?

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the invitation came from the UN and the Security Council would have to consider what steps would be taken. There had not yet been time for formulating U.S. Government opinion.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–355. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin and initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.
2. Transmitted in telegram 434, supra. The revised draft statement had been given to Minister Tan by McConaughy that day. (Memorandum of conversation by McConaughy, February 3; Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–355)
3. Document 62.
4. Document 50.
5. Admiral Pride.
6. Transmitted in Document 69.