280. Editorial Note
At a meeting of the National Security Council on June 30, during a briefing of the Council by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, there was intermittent discussion relating to China. According to the memorandum of the discussion,
“Mr. Dulles discussed developments noted on the airfields in Communist China, the transfer of additional jet bombers and MIG 15’s to Communist China, and the similar transfer of four Russian submarines and two destroyers. Mr. Dulles also called attention to [Page 617] the rapid strides being made by Communist China in improving the road and rail network from the interior to the coast opposite Formosa.
“At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles’ above comments, the President said that the Burmese Prime Minister had made a very odd remark to him at lunch yesterday. He said that the Chinese Communists were getting absolutely nothing from the outside world that they were not obliged to pay for. Mr. Dulles said that this was probably true even of what they obtained from the Soviets, but the significant question was the price. The President replied that he understood that all the trade of Communist China was in goods, not cash. Secretary Dulles called attention to the existence of a Russian loan to Communist China. Mr. Allen Dulles acknowledged the existence of this loan, but said that CIA believed that it was pretty well exhausted. He added that the Chinese were selling rice in order to get rubber from Ceylon, despite the grave food shortage in Communist China.”
After some unrelated discussion,
“Secretary Dulles interrupted to say that he wished to put a question to Admiral Radford. Secretary Dulles said he understood that the Chinese Nationalists were preparing to send another division to reinforce the troops already on Quemoy. We had opposed this move but had apparently been overruled. This was a serious matter, in Secretary Dulles’ view, and the United States had a legitimate right, based on the exchange of notes in connection with the mutual defense treaty, to prevent such moves. Secretary Dulles believed that this Government should give very serious attention to this matter.
“In reply, Admiral Radford pointed out that no precise time had been set for the transfer of this division; nor, indeed, had U.S. authorities in Formosa agreed to such a move. The Generalissimo had simply insisted that the division would be sent. Secretary Dulles again stressed the right of the United States to block the move. The President said he would like to be kept informed of developments in the affair.”
At the conclusion of Director Dulles’ briefing, the discussion reverted to China:
“Dr. Flemming said that he wished to revert to Mr. Dulles’ analysis of the build-up of Chinese Communist air capabilities in areas opposite Formosa. He asked Mr. Dulles if his remarks should be taken to indicate that the Chinese Communists could launch an attack on the off-shore islands or Formosa with little or no notice. The President answered that of course they could if the attack were launched from the air.
“Dr. Flemming then inquired whether any intelligence available to the U.S. indicated the likelihood of a Chinese Communist attack in the immediate future. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that the build-up to which he had referred in his briefing had been a very gradual build-up, and that there were no intelligence indications of the likelihood of an attack in the near future.
“Admiral Radford was inclined to take some issue with Mr. Dulles’ reply to Dr. Flemming. He pointed out that the build-up was [Page 618] something less than gradual. Work on the five new airfields had all begun towards the end of March or the first of April of the present year. Moreover, it was proceeding rapidly and urgently. The Chinese were even resorting to the use of pre-cast concrete slabs for the runways on these fields. Finally, all of them would be ready in another month or six weeks.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, July 1; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
Burmese Prime Minister U Nu visited Washington from June 29 through July 3. For his conversations with Secretary Dulles concerning the Taiwan situation, see Documents 282 and 286.
The discussion above concerning a Soviet loan to the People’s Republic of China apparently refers to a long-term credit announced on October 12, 1954; see footnote 8, Document 117.