Office of the Historian

279. Telegram From the Chargé in the Republic of China (Cochran) to the Department of State1

Taipei, June 28, 1955—5 p.m.

952. During long final interview with General Chase last night,2 President Chiang again raised subject his intention reinforce his [Page 616] troops on offshore islands by one division.3 Said he hoped Chase understood his position (in over-ruling him). Chase reassured him on this point. President continued matter had two aspects:

(1)
Military, in that if attacked, and US not to intervene, and forces thus to be without adequate air and naval support, troops would need the additional division to help morale and convince them they could indeed defend islands successfully; and
(2)
Political, in that if public and military learned US and MAAG opposing transfer this division, would deduce we thinking of not defending islands (with inference we might urge another Tachen-like withdrawal). Latter particularly important because since last Robertson visit both public and military now fully aware US not committed aid in defense Matsus and Kinmens.

Chase expressed qualms regarding ability Chinese furnish adequate logistic support. Chiang replied that he did not plan to move the division immediately. Chase then suggested division’s officers down through battalion level make reconnaissance island in interim and prepare alternative plans for division’s role in defense. As for basic decision, Chase said Admiral Stump informed that we had made known our views frankly but that in view President’s decision nothing more to be said.

At President’s request, Chase promised convey Chiang’s ideas and comments to General Taylor.

Cochran
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/6–2855. Secret. Passed to CINCPAC and CNO by the Department at the Embassy’s request.↩
  2. General Chase retired from active duty on July 31.↩
  3. Chase reported in telegram 150730Z (MG 7954) from Chief MAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, June 15, that he had just learned of Chiang’s intention to send an additional division to Quemoy and that he had already stated his opposition to the move and intended to do so again in an interview with Chiang the following day. He commented that the five divisions currently on the island were more than adequate, that their logistic support was already a difficult problem, and that the shift would increase the proportion of Nationalist Army combat strength on Quemoy, Matsu, and the Pescadores from over 30 to almost 40 percent. (JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48))↩