Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

282. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 1, 1955, 2:27 p.m.¹

Washington, July 1, 1955, 2:27 p.m.

SUBJECT

• 1. MDAP Agreement with Cambodia.
• 2. Lessening of Tension in the Taiwan Area.

PARTICIPANTS

• U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma
• U Thant, Secretary to U Nu
• James Barrington, Ambassador of Burma
• The Secretary
• FE—Walter S. Robertson
• FE—William J. Sebald

[Here follows discussion of item 1, “MDAP Agreement with Cambodia.”]

U Nu raised a question about our attitude towards Chou En-lai’s proposal for direct talks. The Secretary said that he had publicly replied to Chou’s suggestions and he wished to make clear that we would be willing to have direct talks on limited matters of concern to our two countries, with the understanding that no recognition is involved. Some five intermediaries, however, have been attempting to explore these problems further. We have therefore postponed action until such time as all possible information has become available. Some difficulties will be presented by discussions on when, how and where to meet, and the agenda. On the other hand, we are not willing in such talks to deal with the interests of third parties. Reference was made to the direct talks already taking place at Geneva between our Consul General and the Communist Chinese representative there, these talks being limited to the civilian prisoners in China. U Nu said that Chou En-lai referred to talks at a higher level. There is a difference of opinion on one point: the United States desires to discuss a cease-fire when no firing is taking place between the United States and China.

The Secretary said that we had in mind talking about the possibility of avoiding armed clashes. We certainly would not talk about the disposal of Taiwan. What we want is to assure that the problems can be worked out peacefully. As for the substantive aspects of the problems we must await the evolution of time, for if substantive matters are forced, no decision can be reached under present conditions and an armed clash would surely result. The CPR wants to get Taiwan which they haven’t had for 60 years. Even the juridical position of Taiwan is in doubt. The United States also has an interest in Taiwan which we got away from Japan. Japan has merely renounced sovereignty over Taiwan which has not been disposed of by the peace treaty and not ceded to anyone. Consequently the United States also could assert a legal claim until Taiwan is disposed of by some means. We cannot, therefore, admit that the disposition of Taiwan is merely an internal problem.

U Nu said that the Chinese Communists are willing to have direct talks with Chiang Kai-shek regarding a cease-fire. They would be willing to receive representatives of the Chinese National Government in Peiping or to send a mission to Taipei. Chou En-lai said he was quite prepared to do this. The Secretary responded that we would not try to stop such negotiations but evinced some doubt that U Nu was correctly informed on this point. U Nu reiterated that he had discussed this matter with Chou En-lai, first at Bandung and subsequently at Rangoon.² He had then waited until his Embassy at Peiping could confirm again Chou En-lai’s willingness for direct negotiations before making any further communication on the subject. He hoped that the Secretary would find it possible to persuade the Chinese National Government to have such talks although he understood that pressure would not necessarily cause Chiang to follow our advice. The Secretary commented that both parties had publicly refused to have talks of the kind envisaged and that U Nu’s proposal represented a new departure. U Nu underscored the fact that the United States would not be a party to such discussions, which would be considered an internal affair.

The Secretary referred to our treaty relations with Formosa and explained that we are in a position to assure the CPR that they will not be offensively³ attacked. He pointed out that the fighting had almost stopped except for a few rounds a day. In general the situation has quieted down. He referred to Chiang Kai-shek’s desire to use his air power to interfere with the buildup of the Chinese Communist air power opposite Taiwan and spoke at length of our refusal to give our consent to such action. In response to U Nu’s question regarding a general lack of Chinese Communist planes, pilots, etc., Mr. Robertson spoke of the buildup of Chinese Communist air strength as well as the continued violation of the armistice in North Korea. The Secretary referred to the problem of disarmament when no arrangement under which the Communists can be trusted appears feasible. He said that this was the greatest obstacle to carrying out agreements with the Communists.

U Nu thought that it would be advisable to divide the talks into two parts: (a) direct talks between the Chinese Communists and Taiwan, and (b) direct talks between the United States and the CPR on a higher level and on an agreed agenda. The Secretary again expressed doubt regarding the offer for talks between Taiwan and the CPR, but U Nu reaffirmed what we had previously said. He commented that he had offered to visit Taiwan but that Chou En-lai had asked him not to go.

Reference was made to the prisoner problem, the Secretary saying that it is difficult to know just where we are in view of the conflicting information which we receive.

The Secretary asked U Nu whether he thought the CPR wishes to avoid fighting. U Nu said that he cannot read their minds but had learned a lesson in the Korean war. He had then felt the Chinese would not intervene. He said that the Secretary had stated in a speech that the United States would interfere if there were intervention in Indochina, but that the Chinese had nevertheless intervened. The Secretary read the relevant excerpt from his speech of a year ago.⁴ He had actually said, in effect, that if Red China were to send its army into Indochina it could not do so without grave consequences.

U Nu said that fear of war apparently does not deter the Chinese Communists. On the other hand they made it plain to him that they understand that the United States is not bluffing. He also felt that the Chinese Communists likewise are not bluffing. The mere threat of war therefore, would not act as a deterrent.

The Secretary spoke at length regarding the necessity to be patient and to let time take care of some of these problems. He felt that there will be an evolution in both places, i.e., on the mainland and on Taiwan, and that we should not force the issues because to do so would cause a break and only war would result. He pointed out that the Chinese Nationalists, too, are impatient and feel that they must attack the mainland. We have used our influence in that respect and have obtained an agreement from them that they will not attack. If the CPR is not willing to let time contribute towards a solution, the situation will eventually lead to war. He felt that it does not make sense to push things too fast as with time the situation in that area will change, although we do not know how at this time. He recalled that President Rhee also desperately wishes to unite Korea. We also believe Korea should be united, but not by force. We stopped any movement towards use of force by withholding ammunition, equipment and supplies. In Germany, a similar situation exists: Adenauer agreed to give up force as a means to reunite Germany. In consequence, it is not understandable why the Chinese Communists should be allowed to take territory by force while they preach peace. They wish peace only on their terms. To our way of thinking, if peace means anything it means the renunciation of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter. He felt that we should allow the situation to evolve for in this way these divided countries will eventually be united. He hoped that the Chinese Communists would be patient. If they are not, they will bring about the consequences of force.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/7–155. Secret. Drafted by Sebald. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) For the one revision made on the source text by the Secretary, see footnote 3 below.
2. Premier Chou visited Rangoon in mid-April on his way to Bandung.
3. The word “offensively” is added on the source text in Dulles’ handwriting.
4. Reference is apparently to the Secretary’s address of June 11, 1954, before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, pp. 971–973.