286. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Blair House, Washington, July 3, 1955, 7 a.m.1
I said that following our talk at the State Department on Friday,2 I had talked at length with Mr. Menon. I said I find it very difficult to make progress with Mr. Menon because he was so vague. U Nu asked what he had sought. I said nothing very specific, but in general he wanted to bring about a quick solution of the existing differences through negotiation. I said that I was convinced that only trouble would come from attempting to bring present issues to a head by negotiation at the present time. A lapse of time was needed to make problems more manageable. If the Chinese Communists really wanted to be accepted and dealt with as respected members of the community, then they would have to take time to persuade others that they had decent intentions. At the present time, the record was overwhelmingly against them. They had been aggressors in Korea and were so found by the United Nations. They had promoted the fighting in Indochina. They had threatened to use force to achieve their objectives in the Taiwan area. They had held our prisoners in a manner which every impartial student of the subject recognized was a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. They were holding United States civilians against their will. In this atmosphere, little could be accomplished. On the other hand, the future was largely for the Chinese Communists themselves to make. The American people were traditionally willing to forget and forgive; and no doubt in time the Chinese Communists, if they were really capable of, and disposed to, acting decently, could win a considerable measure of acceptance. This, however, was a question of their own character and will and of time; and meanwhile I saw no possibility of a negotiated solution of major issues. There were marginal issues which might perhaps be dealt with on a negotiated basis as, as I had indicated we were prepared to discuss, a cease-fire in the Formosa (Taiwan) Straits.
U Nu said that he was well aware of the fact that the American people were generous and friendly in character. He hoped, however, that negotiations could proceed in the interest of peace. He again spoke of direct negotiations between the Chinese Communists and [Page 630] the Chinese Nationalists with reference to a cease-fire, pointing out that the Chinese Communists took the position that there was no “firing” between them and the United States, but only between them and the Chinats and that therefore the matter was essentially a domestic issue to be discussed merely between the two of them. U Nu said that he was again cabling to Chou En-lai to get confirmation of the fact that they would indeed be willing to sit down and negotiate with the Chinats. I said that if they were willing to talk with the Chinats at all, why would they not be willing to do so in the context perhaps of a conference including others. I pointed to the fact that although the fighting in Indochina was considered by many to be essentially a civil war, nevertheless the participants had sat down at Geneva with others, such as Soviet Russia, the UK and the US, which were not participants in the civil war.
I mentioned again the matter of the flyers, pointing out that while I did not formally connect the handling of the flyers with the Taiwan matters, nevertheless, obviously, the Chinese Communists’ conduct with reference to the flyers affected the atmosphere.
I referred to the direct negotiations going on at Geneva between the United States and the Chinese Communists, and said that there was a possibility that the level of these talks might perhaps be raised. U Nu indicated he thought that would be a good idea.
I again emphasized the importance of maintaining peace for a time during which it could have a curative effect.
I spoke briefly of the Geneva Conference and problems of disarmament. I felt that the main issue was whether any agreement could be properly policed. I spoke of my experience under the Treaty of Versailles, in the making of which I had participated.
U Nu expressed his warm appreciation of our hospitality.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.90B11/7–355. Secret. For another description of this conversation, see U Nu, U Nu: Saturday’s Son (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 250–251. U Nu states that Dulles “volunteered the information that recognition of the People’s Republic of China could not be withheld forever” and that he suggested to Dulles raising the consular-level talks with the Chinese to the ambassadorial level.↩
- July 1; see Document 282.↩