Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

117. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 18, 1955—7 p.m.

1345. For the Secretary. In view of speculative nature of following telegram and current importance of subject, I am sending this only direct to you for such dissemination as you may see fit.

There has been no noticeable change in Soviet public attitude on Formosa issue since downfall Malenkov and current line seems to be that laid down by Bulganin in his Supreme Soviet speech,² particularly the phrase that the Chinese people “count on help from their true friend, the great Soviet people”. There has been no elaboration in press on subsequent statements as to exact meaning of word “help”. As we have already reported, Soviet reticence and restraint on occasion fifth anniversary of Treaty of Mutual Assistance with CPR³ was noticeable in all treatment of question. Compared with Soviet reply signed by Khrushchev, Bulganin and Molotov, greetings from CPR leaders were about four times as long and effusive.⁴ Whereas CPR greeting included reference to Chinese Communist determination to “liberate” Formosa and American sins et cetera, Soviet reply was confined to generalities concerning their mutual friendship and solidarity. Likewise we have learned from west [western] diplomats who attended Chinese celebration that Russian toasts and remarks were careful to avoid any mention of Formosan issue. It might be noted in this connection that neither Khrushchev nor Voroshilov, titular head of state, attended reception. Specific reference to obligations under 1950 treaty was noticeably avoided in Soviet statement and comment.

There has been, if anything, a drop-off recently in attention given in Soviet press to Formosan issue. Your New York speech briefly carried today in Tass despatch from New York with emphasis on determination of US to defend “with its Armed Forces” not only Formosa and Pescadores but “positions and territories connected therewith”, but with no direct comment as yet. There is thus nothing that I have seen recently which would make any clearer real Soviet intentions in regard to Formosan issue and particularly the vital question of what action, if any, they would take in event of hostilities between US and CPR. Soviets continue to choose their words with extreme care and to avoid any implication that they would regard 1950 treaty as operative in event of hostilities. On the other hand they are giving full moral, political and psychological support to current Chinese Communist campaign on Formosa and are faithfully backing all CPR public positions. Soviets are following developments with closest attention and their irritation with British attitude is apparent and was probably cause of Molotov’s direct personal attack on Churchill in Supreme Soviet speech.⁵ They also have displayed rather hurt surprise at Nehru’s recent statement re Chinese Nationalist participation in proposed conference.⁶

I think we can accept as certain that during Khrushchev’s visit last October to Peking,⁷ subject of Formosa was discussed. We, of course, know nothing of exact details of what, if any, arrangement was reached at that time but judging from subsequent developments, it would appear that Soviets may well have agreed to support Chinese political positions but with no commitment whatsoever as to direct Soviet involvement. It is possible that the concessions to China in agreements signed,⁸ including step-up of Soviet assistance in Chinese industrialization program (which may have been factor in recent revision of Soviet economic plans), were integral part of arrangement. It is likewise conceivable that Malenkov and his supporters viewed with some concern even degree of political and diplomatic support involved in any such arrangement. Whatever may be the Soviet intentions at this juncture—and I am reasonably convinced that they do not lightly regard possibility of war in Far East—the extent of their public solidarity with Chinese position is in itself risky and may dangerously encourage Chinese.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–1855. Secret. Received at 1:12 p.m. Sent to Secretary Dulles, who left Washington on February 18 for Bangkok, via CINCPAC. A copy bears the notation that it was seen by the Secretary. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 426)
2. Of February 9; printed in the New York Times, February 10, 1955.
3. Signed at Moscow on February 14, 1950; for text, see UNTS 226:5.
4. The messages, dated February 12 and 13, are printed in People’s China, March 1, 1955, pp. 3–5.
5. Extracts from Foreign Minister Molotov’s speech of February 8 are in the New York Times, February 9, 1955.
6. According to the New York Times, February 16, 1955, Pravda had that day quoted Nehru as having said that he saw no reason why the Chinese Nationalists should not be invited to a conference on the Formosa problem.
7. Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and then-Deputy Premier Bulganin visited Peking in September and October 1954 for the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
8. Sino-Soviet statements issued on October 12, 1954, included a joint declaration on Sino-Soviet relations and international affairs; a joint declaration on relations with Japan; and communiqués announcing agreements on new Soviet credits and economic aid, the transfer to China of the Soviet share of four mixed companies, the completion of new rail connections between the two countries, new arrangements for Sino-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Port Arthur. For text of the statements, see Documents on International Affairs, 1954, pp. 321–328.