Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

170. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 26, 1955, 11:30 a.m.¹

Washington Colon, March 26, 1955, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Situation in the Far East.

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dulles
• Under Secretary Hoover
• Mr. MacArthur
• Secretary Wilson
• Deputy Secretary Anderson
• Admiral Radford
• Colonel Randall (USMC)

Secretary Wilson said he had asked Secretary Dulles to meet with him to discuss the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaction to Mr. Wilson’s memorandum of March 22² on the subject of how to improve the military situation in the Far East in the light of the situation now existing in the Formosa area. Secretary Wilson then circulated a draft memorandum from the JCS to him.³ (Since this was a draft memorandum, we were requested at the end of the meeting not to take copies with us.) In essence, the draft memorandum contained “suggestions” on steps to improve the situation and exercise a greater deterrent effect against Chinese Communist action in the Formosa area. There were the following three specific suggestions around which the discussion centered:

1. Inform the Chinese Communists and also the Chinese Nationalists through diplomatic channels that the US would join in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

2. Make a public announcement to the effect that further proposed reductions in the strength of US military forces were suspended indefinitely because of the situation in the Far East.

3. The JCS should take such further steps as are necessary to ensure the defense of Formosa.

The draft report of the JCS indicated that its suggestions and views were based on the assumption that atomic weapons would be used. General Ridgway had not concurred in this assumption, but from the draft paper it was not clear what General Ridgway’s views were since he did not express a definite assumption with corresponding views. Also, General Ridgway had suggested that instead of secretly notifying the Chinese Communists through diplomatic channels as to US determination to defend Quemoy and Matsu, the US should make known publicly its views and position with regard to the situation there. In other words, General Ridgway’s proposal did not specifically recommend that we take a position to defend Quemoy and Matsu, but it did not specifically say that we should not.⁴ But, he seemed to imply that we should clearly and publicly state our position.

In a general discussion that followed, Secretary Wilson said there were two courses of action which seemed open to us. On the one hand, should we speed up taking certain actions which might bring the situation to a head? Such actions might include letting the Chinese Nationalists operate against the airfields build-up and against Communist shipping that was bringing in strategic supplies, etc. Or, should we let the situation go along very much as at present for a period of, say, sixty days, during which the Bandung Conference would take place and we might be able to get the European situation straightened out. Secretary Wilson said his reaction was against making any public statement or using diplomatic channels to say that we would defend Quemoy and Matsu. He felt that any public statement that we were suspending the proposed reduction in our force levels because of the situation in the Far East would stir up a very considerable turmoil in the Congress and in this country. He said that as a practical matter he could take steps which would prevent the further reduction of forces during this immediate period, but that he doubted the wisdom of a public declaration in this sense. He discussed briefly the difficulties the Army has encountered in reducing to the proposed force levels, and pointed out the problems which are connected with such reductions if hostilities subsequently occurred. Secretary Wilson said that if hostilities occurred he would not immediately increase the Army but would concentrate on stepped up aircraft production. Admiral Radford replied that this would not be sufficient and that both aircraft production and the Army would have to be increased simultaneously. With respect to the proposed force reductions, Admiral Radford said the President’s presentation on the force levels as well as his own and Mr. Wilson’s had made clear that it was predicated on the international situation not deteriorating. Since the force levels had been established, the situation had deteriorated very markedly in the Far East. Therefore, the Chiefs felt (as was pointed out in the draft paper) that the situation justified force levels at a higher level than had been contemplated in the Administration’s plans.

Secretary Dulles then said that the very basis of all his thinking is how we can best prevent a war from developing in the area. Commenting on the JCS draft, he indicated that he doubted that the President would wish to approve suggestion 1, above, since this would involve his taking a position immediately on the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, whereas he believed the President did not wish to take this decision until a situation occurred which would clearly indicate that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu were related to the defense of Formosa. With respect to suggestion 2 above, the Secretary felt, and Admiral Radford strongly concurred, that such an announcement that we were suspending the reduction of our forces would do more than anything else to impress on free world opinion that we are serious in our intention to defend Formosa. It should also aid in convincing the Communists of the seriousness of our intention and might result in more free-world pressure against the Chinese Communists. He said that such a statement would bring our actions into conformity with what we are saying. He also approved of suggestion 3, above, that we should take steps to increase the ability to defend Formosa. However, he asked Admiral Radford if such steps involved action against the Chinese Communist build-up on the mainland, particularly with respect to airfields. Admiral Radford replied in the negative.

Admiral Radford said he understood that diplomatic efforts to reduce the possibility of hostilities through UN action had failed, and he inquired whether this understanding was correct. Secretary Dulles replied that the British were opposed to pressing forward with a resolution in the UN and that he was in touch with Eden on this matter. He felt it was important to take some further step in the UN, but while the present prospect of UK agreement was not bright, we were continuing our efforts.

Secretary Wilson then said that he thought the Chiefs, when they reconsidered the memorandum on Monday,⁶ might drop suggestion 1, above, and rely on the Congressional Joint Resolution as the basis of our position. They might then go ahead to develop suggestions 2 and 3 above.

Admiral Radford then said he was seriously disturbed by the build-up of the Chinese Communist airfields which would enable them to attack Formosa and do great damage. This airfield build-up was not related to action against the offshore islands, but to action against Formosa. He believed that we must be in a position to prevent this build-up. He felt that we should tell the Chinese Communists that if they did not cease the build-up, we would consider the build-up as an active preparation for war and would be forced to act accordingly. Secretary Wilson said he did not feel that the improvement of airfields could be considered as an act of war, and pointed out that we were constantly improving and strengthening airfields in various parts of the world. Mr. Anderson said to Admiral Radford that as he understood him, Admiral Radford did not believe the situation could be stabilized in the Far East without hostilities and without the Chinese Communists getting a bloody nose. Admiral Radford concurred that this was his view. He went on to say that if, as he believed, hostilities would take place in the Far East, the US might initially receive a set-back if the Chinese Communists were permitted to go on with their build-up on the mainland. Any such initial setback would lead immediately to a Congressional inquiry of the Pearl Harbor type as to where the responsibility lay for the set-back. Therefore, it was important that the record be clear that the US, in the light of a pre-Pearl Harbor type of situation where an attack might be expected, had taken every precaution and every action to ensure the security of its forces prior to an attack.

Secretary Wilson then said he would like to refer to a point Secretary Dulles had brought up earlier in the conversation. This was how, if Formosa was vital to US security, we could hold the island regardless of Chiang Kai-shek. He noted that the JCS draft paper had indicated that we should not commit further forces to Formosa other than possibly an additional air wing. Secretary Dulles had stressed that the great danger was the defection of certain of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa, and had suggested that the stationing of a division there might be a determining factor in preventing such defection. Admiral Radford said he did not believe a division could prevent 24 Chinese divisions from defecting. Secretary Wilson and Secretary Dulles replied that it was not a question of 24 divisions defecting all at one whack, but the fact that certain leaders might be tempted to defect. The presence of a US Division might prevent this situation from arising. Admiral Radford then pointed out that a Marine division could be deployed there but that it would raise all kinds of questions, including: the permission of Chiang Kai-shek; the construction of semi-permanent quarters which would be expensive; the problems raised by the introduction on Formosa of a good many thousand American soldiers who were paid far in excess of the Chinese Nationalist troops and would take away all the girls; and the fact that once the division was stationed there, it would probably have to be kept there for an indeterminate and long period of time. Secretary Wilson believed that despite these problems the Chiefs should take a very hard and careful look at this question, since he was inclined to agree with Secretary Dulles that it might have considerable merit. Also, he would be prepared to recommend the deployment of some additional air wings to the Pacific.

The meeting adjourned with the understanding that Secretary Wilson would be in further touch with Secretary Dulles next week on this matter, after the Chiefs had reviewed their draft paper, which Admiral Radford indicated would undergo a number of draft changes as well as some of the changes which would stem from the present meeting.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3–2655. Top Secret. Another memorandum of this conversation by Colonel Randall was sent to Secretary Dulles with a covering memorandum of March 28 from Randall. (Ibid., 793.00/3–2855) The time of the meeting is from Randall’s memorandum of conversation.
2. Document 161.
3. Not found in Department of State files, but see Document 173.
4. General Ridgway stated in a memorandum of March 26 to Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens that information he had received the previous day appeared to establish that the President had made a decision that any attack on the Quemoys or Matsus would be considered the preliminary to an attack on Formosa, thus automatically resulting in U.S. participation in their defense. Ridgway had therefore concluded that: “the recommendation I had intended to make in the strongest terms, to wit, ‘that United States armed forces NOT participate in the defense of Quemoy or the Matsus, regardless of the scale of attack’, would no longer be proper, since decision by proper authority had already been made.” (United States Army Military History Institute, Ridgway Papers)
6. March 28.