Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

173. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense¹

Washington, 27 March, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Improvement of the Military Situation in the Far East in the Light of the Situation Now Existing in the Formosa Area.

1. Your memorandum of 22 March 1955,² subject as above, requests the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to an improvement of the U.S. military situation in the Far East in the light of the situation now existing in the Formosa area.

2. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have decided that certain simple actions might have a deterrent effect which is desirable from a U.S. and world standpoint and that, in any event, these simple actions should precede any more extensive and expensive military moves on our part. These actions follow:

a. The United States, through diplomatic channels, advise both the Chinese Communist Government and the Government of the USSR that it will join the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of the offshore islands with all means available.

Note: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps arrived at the above after carefully considering a public statement to the same effect. They concluded that the Chinese Communists might consider a U.S. public statement, even from the highest source, as propaganda rather than as a firm statement of intent, since Orientals operate in that manner themselves. Furthermore, a direct public statement would give the Chinese Communists no opportunity to save face and might well harden their determination to attack.

With reference to advising the Communists through diplomatic channels of U.S. intentions, they feel that the United States, by also notifying the Government of the USSR, would probably force consultations between these two governments and, as a result, not only might get an indication of Soviet reaction but also would avoid a possible later accusation that the United States had not given the USSR an opportunity to consult with the Chinese Communists.

b. Simultaneously with the above, make public announcement that the present reduction in military forces is suspended indefinitely due to the situation in the Far East.

c. Publicly direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take all steps necessary to protect Formosa.

3. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army does not concur with the views expressed in paragraph 2 above. The question as to whether or not the United States will defend the Quemoy and Matsu Island groups is essentially a political decision because of the overriding importance of the political and psychological factors involved, and therefore must be answered by the President. Militarily, the loss of any or all of the coastal islands would not vitally affect the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. If the decision is to defend these coastal islands, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army believes that a public announcement should be made at the earliest practicable date, of authoritative U.S. intentions with respect to use of its armed forces in their defense and concurrently, a public announcement that further reduction of U.S. armed forces will be suspended immediately and indefinitely.

Note: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been formally notified that a decision has been made to consider any attack on Quemoy and the Matsu Island group a prelude to an attack on Formosa. If such a decision has been made, the initiation of implementing actions necessary to evidence a real intent on the part of the United States to oppose Chinese Communist operations in the area is at once required.

If the decision is not to defend the islands, or simply to defer decision, then no public announcement of intentions should be made.

4. It is obvious that suspension of the present reduction in military forces would require increased expenditures, the amount of which would depend upon the time the suspension must be sustained. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these expenditures would be warranted in view of the gravity of the situation.

5. In the Enclosure to this memorandum³ an attempt is made to answer your specific questions. This form is preferred in our reply in order to point up in this memorandum what are felt to be the simple essentials of the present situation. You will note that the answer to the question designated as (e) reflects the divergent views expressed in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

6. The views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as outlined above, are predicated on the assumption that U.S. forces engaged in combat will be authorized to use atomic weapons as necessary against military targets. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army does not concur with the foregoing assumption and would substitute the following:

In the event of an all-out attack by Chinese Communist forces against any Chinese Nationalist controlled territory, the successful defense of such territory would be dependent upon the employment of U.S. armed forces. Such a defense could be executed with, or without, the employment of atomic weapons, though execution with non-atomic weapons would require a much greater force build-up and greater time, and it might be that time would not be available.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford⁴
Chairman

1. Source: JCS Files, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) Sec. 20. Top Secret.
2. Document 161.
3. Not attached to the source text and not found.
4. The source text, a carbon copy, bears a typed signature.