171. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
4929. For Ambassador from Secretary. Please deliver following message to Eden:
“Dear Anthony: I rather expected the Soviets to veto the Resolution but I must confess I did not expect that you would. In deference to your views we will hold up immediate action but you should know that the President and I doubt that circumstances will permit of indefinitely leaving the matter moribund in the Security Council. Moreover, if fighting should break out on the China coast I have grave doubts that with the Soviet in the chair we could in the month of April secure the rapid action which would then be required of the Council.
I am surprised that you feel our agreed Resolution2 looks as though it was designed solely to confirm Chiang’s position in the offshore islands. The purpose of the Resolution to stop fighting was thoroughly gone into before we both and New Zealand agreed to it and you will recall that our minute of understanding of January 263 said that, unless otherwise agreed, we would make every effort to prevent any amendment of substance to the Resolution as it had been painstakingly agreed.
If now you believe the language should be amended in order to lay the emphasis elsewhere then I would welcome your suggestions.
Our purpose in seeking this further step in the Security Council is to use that solemn forum to create and rally the forces of world opinion so that those forces will become a moral deterrent to the breach of the peace by anyone in the China area. This is not an academic matter. Nor is it a desire just to make a speech. The risk of [Page 405] hostilities is very real and if they do break out there can be no assurance that they will not become extended. That is what we want to prevent. We fear that at Bandung the ChiComs will get what they consider a green light for violence unless there are some counteracting opinions.
I can understand your desire to foresee every future step should the Resolution fail. In a situation as serious and uncertain as this I think that is impossible. It will have to be left to events and future agreement between us and our other friends. Moreover, as you have seen from my last message to you we are willing to defer a vote on the Resolution. The important thing is that it would be on the table so that later we could move more rapidly in the Council if need be and meanwhile we would have made clearer to the world our purposes.
Already now, but I trust not, it may be too late to do what we had hoped before April first. Please let me have your suggestions urgently so that we may try to reestablish agreement for the future. Faithfully Foster”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3–2655. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 42.↩
- See Document 43.↩