Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

161. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Washington, March 22, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Improvement of Military Situation in the Far East in the Light of the Situation Now Existing in Formosa Area.

The determination of the Chinese Communists to destroy the Nationalist Government and incorporate Formosa and the off-shore islands into the Chinese Communist political system has been publicly reiterated and is now reflected in the increasingly tense Formosa situation. Because of the Chinese Communist mentality and the announced U.S. policies regarding Formosa, the Pescadores and the offshore islands, there exists a real probability of war with Communist China.

If the U.S. could take some steps or measures at this time to clarify the seriousness of its intentions, then possibly the Chinese Communists would be deterred from actions which would lead to war.

In analyzing the problem at this time the following assumptions can be made:

(1) That diplomatic efforts to obtain a cease-fire and to separate the off-shore island problem from that of Formosa and the Pescadores seem to have failed.

(2) That the Chinese Communists will continue to probe the real intentions of the U.S. by increasing military actions against the offshore islands.

(3) That the Chinese Communists estimate that the loss of Quemoy or the Matsus would produce critically adverse psychological effects on Formosa and that large segments of the Chinese Nationalist armed forces might subsequently defect through Communist bribes, blandishments and subversion.

(4) That the Chinese Communists are likely to believe that U.S. political considerations, both domestic and international, will inhibit the U.S. from reacting militarily to attacks on the offshore islands or at least from using atomic weapons, should they attack, and that consequently they would soon be able to take over Formosa.

(5) That there is evidence of increased effort on the part of the Chinese Communists to obtain additional supplies of POL, ammunition and other strategic war materials. Ships now known to be loading or en route to Communist ports with such material pose a related problem.

(6) That there is evidence of a build-up of force around both Quemoy and the Matsus and the Chinese Communists are known to be improving their air fields in the vicinity.

(7) That the Chinese Communists have or are likely to soon have sufficient military strength in the area to take Quemoy or Matsus or both unless the U.S. comes to the assistance of the Chinese Nationalists. (This point should be checked with the best intelligence available and a time schedule of possibility stated.)

In the light of the foregoing the Joint Chiefs are requested to examine the current and prospective situation and to recommend:

(a) What additional measures can be taken to strengthen the Chinese Nationalist military position and to have available in the area sufficient Chinese Nationalist-U.S. military power to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking Quemoy and the Matsus.

(b) What additional deployments of U.S. forces could be made that would:

(1) help convince the Chinese Communists that the U.S. really means to intervene if the loss of Quemoy or the Matsus is threatened,

(2) be of immediate value in the event the U.S. did become involved in war with the Chinese Communists.

(c) What moves could be made in other areas that would bring the Chinese Communists to believe that the U.S. is really serious.

(d) The timing and conditions under which it would be desirable or necessary to blockade Communist China in order to reduce its military potential.

(e) How the U.S. should clarify its real position in order that the Chinese Communists are not misled in regard to U.S. intentions.

These recommendations should indicate:

(1) That which can be done within presently planned force levels and rate of expenditures.

(2) That which is desirable but which cannot be done without increased force levels and rate of expenditures.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the above matters are requested as a matter of urgency, if possible by 25 March, in order to develop Department of Defense recommendations for discussion with the Secretary of State and presentation to the President not later than 28 March.

C. E. Wilson

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Conferences on Formosa. Top Secret. The source text was sent to Goodpaster with a covering memorandum dated March 23 from Colonel Carey A. Randall, USMC, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, stating that Wilson had written it as a result of conversations with the Secretary of State on March 21 and with the Armed Forces Policy Council on March 22. A note in Goodpaster’s handwriting on Randall’s memorandum reads: “President briefed on the attachment 24 Mar. 55. Indicated he thought this was already being done. G.” A copy of Wilson’s memorandum, sent to Secretary Dulles with a covering letter of March 23 from Randall, is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–2355.