169. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 25, 1955, 5:34 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Operation Oracle
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, European Affairs
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Key, Assistant Secretary, International Organization Affairs
- Sir Leslie Munro, Ambassador of New Zealand
- Mr. R.H. Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
. . . . . . .
The Secretary replied that it was extremely difficult to appraise the situation accurately: We were dependent on aerial photographs which in the past had taken three or four weeks to be evaluated. Now the time has been cut down to six days, which, however, is still too long. This time lag has perhaps given an appearance of greater buildup than has actually occurred. The present situation is that work of a military nature is going forward methodically but without indication of any last-minute haste. It looks, therefore, as if the Chinese Communists would not start an attack until everything had been well prepared. Nevertheless, the capabilities are there and it [Page 399] would be possible for operations against the offshore islands to start on short advance notice. Possibly the signs would not be clear until two or three days before the actual attack. On the other hand, an attack might be preceded by a long, protracted bombardment. Nobody could tell for sure, but a guess would be that no attack would take place until after the Bandung Conference is ended.
The Secretary mentioned that earlier today that he had spoken with Mr. Cameron, correspondent of the London News Chronicle, who had recently been in Peking. Cameron had been deeply impressed by the inflexible determination of the Chinese Communists to take Formosa. This determination was so widespread and deep that he could not see how the Chinese could abandon the idea. There was, therefore, not much reason to hope that the Communists would not make a military attack.
. . . . . . .
With respect to artillery bombardments directed from the mainland, the Secretary observed that of late these had been of a sporadic and not very serious character.
Ambassador Munro asked for the Secretary’s reaction to Mr. Eden’s decision. The Secretary replied that the message2 had only just been received and had not yet been studied, but he would say that he was disappointed with it. He added that it would seem that perhaps Sir Anthony does not feel to the same degree as do we that presentation of the case in the Security Council might have a deterrent effect on the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Munro agreed. The Secretary feared that once the Chinese Communists return from the Bandung Conference, they will proceed with an attack. In the meantime, we will have lost a valuable opportunity to act because of British opposition and fear that a debate would provoke the Chinese Communists.
The Secretary said that before coming to a final decision as to the course which we would wish to take he would wish to speak to the President. Both … and the Secretary felt that if the Security Council is to proceed with operation Oracle before April 1, notice would have to be given not later than Monday, March 28, bearing in mind that the Security Council was meeting on the Gaza item on Tuesday, March 29.
The Secretary agreed to get in touch with the Ambassador as soon as we had come to a decision.