751G.00/6–2354: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
priority
Secto 510. Repeated information Paris 489, Saigon 202, Phnom Penh 8. Re Secto 499.1 Tep Phann, Cambodian Foreign Minister, Sam Sary and Son Sann, members of the Cambodian delegation, talked with Heath today.
They expect to see Pham Van Dong shortly, probably today and anticipate the latter will meet their demands for withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Cambodia but on condition that (1) Cambodia solemnly engage not to permit foreign bases on its soil; (2) nor any foreign military personnel for training or other purposes and (3) accept a severely limited arms import program for Cambodian defense forces, in short the “neutralization” of Cambodia. Tep Phann said that his inclination was to refuse these conditions and hold out for unconditional withdrawal of Viet Minh forces. He and other members of the delegation had no illusions as to the value of a Viet Minh or a Chinese Communist guarantee of Cambodia’s neutral status and/or of a Communist convention of non-aggression. He felt certain if Cambodia accepted such an arrangement the Viet Minh would promptly start new efforts of subversion and infiltration, probably followed before very long by another invasion overt or covert.
Before taking such a stand, Cambodia would need to be assured of continuing adequate American arms aid and a training mission, French or American. They would want to know what were the prospects [Page 1228] of forming a Southeast Asian Mutual Defense Pact and whether it might involve Cambodia’s providing a military base.
Heath said that the delegation was without instructions to discuss the matter or to give the assurances and information requested. He reminded Tep Phann, however, that during the past three years the bulk of the arms and equipment of the Cambodian army had been furnished gratis by the United States and deliveries were still going on. He remarked that as far as he knew no detailed new request for American arms aid had been presented by the Cambodian Government and suggested that it would be very difficult to decide now just what kind of military program and equipment Cambodia would need until one could see how the conference was going. The delegation would, however, immediately report the Cambodian delegations request to Washington. Meanwhile, he personally recommended the Cambodian delegation should refrain from making any precise engagements which would tie their hands. He remarked the sudden Communist change of conciliatory attitude toward Cambodian position had, inter alia, very likely been motivated by Communist desire to forestall Cambodian appeal to the United Nations under Chapter 7 of the Charter and also to prevent Cambodian participation in a possible Southeast SEA defense pact.
Comment. I believe that if we were to give some general assurance to Cambodia and its delegation here that the United States would provide arms aid directly and would consider providing a training mission, providing the French do not offer one, Cambodia might, at least for a time, hold fast to its demands for unconditional withdrawal of Viet Minh forces. If the Communists refused unconditional acceptance of Cambodia’s position, Cambodia might then decide to appeal to the Security Council.
Please instruct urgently.2