Editorial Note

In a memorandum to the Secretary of State, June 23, Under Secretary Smith indicated that “the question of our present or eventual disassociation from Geneva Conference decisions and the reduction of our participation to a quasi-advisory or observer capacity” raised some very important policy considerations. He felt that any settlement reached at Geneva would “establish a new balance between Communist power of aggression and free world power of resistance.” He said it was “the objective of U.S. foreign policy to make that equilibrium as favorable as possible to our side, to minimize the possibility of further defeats in this area, and to localize the present one as far as possible.” Smith thought that any settlement coming out of the Conference [Page 1227] would “reflect the inability of our side, notably France, Viet Nam, and the U.S., to reach an acceptable basis for continuing the fight to hold the Tonkin Delta against a Communist advance” and asked if the United States would “guarantee that settlement, or do we disassociate ourselves from it?” He felt that the United States had no other choice than to accept reluctantly “the general results of the military defeat which is the dominant theme of the present phase of the Conference” and that “it should be our endeavor … not only to obtain through diplomatic united action as good a settlement as possible, but also to see to it, by participation in the guaranteeing of the settlement, that the other side is not tempted by the weakness and disunity of the opposition to violate the settlement reached.” (396.1 GE/6–2354)

For the complete text of the memorandum, see volume XIII.