Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1–GE/4–654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Seoul, April 6, 1954—6 p.m.

985. Repeated information Tokyo 595. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference Embtel 982.¹ Pyun’s latest letter is basically another recital Korean misgivings, real and imagined, re Geneva Conference combined with reiteration of demand for response re expansion ROK forces as basis decision on ROK attendance Geneva. Substance of letter also summarized by Pyun at his weekly press conference this morning although without referring to fact further letter sent. His press comments concluded on note that if US assures increase in ROK military power to status matching military power in North Korea which allegedly being greatly increased daily, ROK Government would attend Geneva Conference.

While I doubt whether further attempts satisfy Pyun on his numerous grievances against Geneva would be particularly helpful, I believe we should seek give Rhee and Pyun early reply re extent to which US prepared support build-up ROK forces (Embtel 951, March 30).² In particular, clarification of naval and air expansion to accompany 20 division program already seems somewhat overdue. I recognize that reply concerning ROK build-up far from easy since it may involve simultaneous consideration such matters as US redeployment plans, question of retaliation should Communists violate armistice, and speculation concerning Geneva Conference results. Nevertheless failure to reply probably capable being seized upon by Pyun as pretext refuse to attend on ground US withholding implementation of Rhee–Dulles agreement last August.

As for 15 to 20 additional divisions, although Rhee’s disappointment when we refuse this request may be considerable, further delay in replying may only raise false hopes and thus aggravate our relations. In other words trouble over this phase perhaps unavoidable in best of circumstances.

Briggs

1. Supra.
2. Not printed. In it, Ambassador Briggs reported that in conversation on Mar. 30 President Rhee had implied that the Korean Government was not planning to boycott the Geneva Conference, but said that it was difficult to make plans in the absence of knowledge on U.S. intentions regarding his request for an additional 15 to 20 divisions and on U.S. policy should, after 90 days of the Conference, Korea still not be unified and the Chinese Communists remain in North Korea (396.1–GE/3–3054).