396.1–GE/4–654: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
982. Repeated information Tokyo 593. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Following is text of letter dated April 6 from Foreign Minister Pyun to Secretary Dulles which Pyun has requested me to telegraph to Secretary. Signed original being forwarded by pouch through Ambassador Yang.
(Begin Text)
My dear Mr. Secretary: There are strong indications some of Asian neutrals headed by India will get into Geneva conference to be convened [Page 73] on April 26, 1954. Considering fact that, in UN meetings, US delegates openly invited India to any extended discussion of Asian problems other than Korean one, from which they were then seeking to exclude India, and that Indo-Chinese question contemplated to be handled simultaneously with Korean problem in proposed Geneva conference is certainly Asian problem earmarked for extended discussion, it is quite foreseeable neutrals will insist on coming in and succeed in doing so, with no opposition even from US, ostensibly for their participation in discussions of Indo-Chinese question only.
It is true this Government does not feel called to raise any objection to neutrals participation on Indo-Chinese question, if it were treated by separate conference. As it is, Indo-Chinese question will be bundled up with Korean one by being simultaneously handled in same conference. It is, therefore, clear this Government’s opposition to neutral participation stands, unless simultaneous treatment of Indo-Chinese question is replaced by consecutive treatment to be given after Korean question has been dealt with with finality.
Now picture is complete, Mr. Secretary, complete, I am sorry to say, as Communists limned. Communists wanted to have it as round-table conference. And it is going to be round-table conference. Communists wanted to have Soviet Union come in as neutral. And now Soviet Union is coming in as sponsor, a thing never hoped for even by most sanguine of Communists. In addition, Communist China will be only standing member, beside four sponsor nations, thus achieving prestige and status of semi-sponsor. Communists insisted on dealing with Korean and other Asian problems. And here Indo-Chinese question is to be simultaneously handled with Korean one. Communists wanted to let in neutrals to do their errands, and now they are all coming in. Communists disliked freedom of participant nation not to be bound by majority-supported decision it does not endorse. And now principle of freedom is completely ignored.
Furthermore, Mr. Secretary, history will have it that it was Indo-Chinese car of conference hitchhiked by Korea; that political conference on Korea as stipulated in armistice and defined by UN had died at Panmunjom preliminary conference and consequently Geneva conference was one mainly on Indo-Chinese question conducted in a manner satisfactory only to Communists and at time Communists might have chosen themselves; that four sponsoring nations and one other standing member constituted composite tribunal, as it were, before which poor Korea stood as trembling defendant.
In short, Mr. Secretary, scheduled Geneva conference is very likely to prove cruel travesty of what free world wished armistice—provided [Page 74] political conference on Korea to be. There is every danger and even indication it will all end up in legitimizing loss of Korea and Indo-China to free world and thus virtually handing rest of Southeast Asia over to Communists. I do not believe I am speaking for interests of Korea alone, oblivious to those of free world as whole. For my part, I refuse to alienate destiny of my country from that of free community it belongs to. I likewise refuse to believe that what is fatal to my own nation could be of benefit to rest of free world.
As you already know, we will, however, go along with our allies in matter of Geneva conference, only if we are supported by assurances as to means of counter-balancing enemy build-up meanwhile and thus not endangering our security while being pulled around by conferences. To be more to point, ROK forces should be so expanded and strengthened that we can afford to attend Geneva conference and, for that matter, any conference without fearing of slipping into indefensible military position.
With best regards, My dear Mr. Secretary, I remain, yours sincerely.
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