Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 289
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)
Subject:
- Indochina Phase of Conference
Participants:
- M. Jacques Roux, Chief of Far East Section of French Foreign Office and Member of French Delegation
- Philip W. Bonsal
I lunched with M. Roux today. Our discussion of (a) Chinese Communist participation in the invitation to the Vietminh and (b) the chairmanship of the Indochina phase of the conference have been covered in a separate memorandum.1
M. Roux said that although the conference would open with only the nine participants which had been agreed upon, it seemed to him certain that the other side, following the line taken by Molotov and by Chou En-lai in their recent speeches, would propose that other Asian powers be included, particularly India, Indonesia and Burma. We might take either one of three positions:
- 1)
- reject the Soviet proposal and urge that the conference be kept to nine;
- 2)
- accept the Soviet suggestions on condition that Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand be also included, or
- 3)
- propose that the other states of the general Southeast Asian or South Asian region be invited to the conference as (a) observers of the Indochina phase, i.e., the discussions to see whether an armistice is possible as a prelude to restoration of peace in Indochina and later (b) as guarantors and controllers of the armistice and of whatever political arrangements including elections may eventually be agreed upon.
I did not comment other than to say that our conception of the two phases of the Geneva Conference had been that the two sides in the conflict would be represented and that neutrals would not be included. M. Roux said that the British are apparently very anxious to get the Indians in.
I referred to the oral explanation of the possible French position with regard to an armistice in Indochina given by Ambassador Chauvel to Mr. Achilles and Mr. Allen yesterday.2 M. Roux said that the French Delegation is rather uncertain in this matter at present stating that it has not yet received definitive instructions from Paris, [Page 703] i.e., M. Bidault has not been told what the attitude of the cabinet may be. M. Roux recalled the divergence of views within the cabinet (Pleven, Jacquet, Reynaud, Faure, etc.). He also told me that General Navarre currently favors a cease-fire as soon as possible.
I said that from the point of view of our Delegation, it was most important that we receive a full statement of the position which the French Delegation plans to take on substantive matters regarding Indochina so that we could refer this position to Washington and seek instructions as to the attitude which our Delegation should take in regard to it.
He understood this and said that he would do his best to see that we receive such a paper just as soon as possible.
I took occasion to say that obviously it was of the greatest importance that the politico-military position of our side be made to appear as strong as possible if we were to have any prospect of success at the conference. I said that for example, the enemy must be left in no doubt that we are actively engaged in preparations for next year’s compaign, i.e., that replacements, reinforcements and additional equipment, etc., are being forwarded in accordance with our preparations, if possible, even beyond the previously estimated requirements of the Navarre Plan. He agreed fully and pointed to the fact that reinforcements and replacements will be sent out to Indochina.
Turning to the international aspects of reinforcement of the position of our side, Roux wondered whether the five-power staff agency which had been established some time ago might not serve as a nucleus for the formation of the defensive coalition which we had in mind. Its terms of reference would have to be expanded and its membership possibly increased. I said that I was not in a position to speak with authority but that I understood in part from the press that this idea was being actively explored.