396.1 GE/5–554: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
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Secto 110. Repeated information Paris 203, London 123, Saigon 34. Department pass CIA and Defense. Re Secto 106 repeated Paris 201, repeated London 121, repeated Saigon 33.1 Tentative French proposal contained reference telegram was orally outlined to Achilles and Allen by Chauvel. We are asking French for written text proposal as approved by Cabinet and warning them time required obtain US Government decision on whether support their proposal after text received. Believe outline in reference telegram provides basis urgent preliminary consideration Washington. Request instructions soonest.
Meanwhile, preliminary USDel comments follow:
- 1.
- Unless or until we have firm support in the United States for some other solution we are not in a position in Geneva to prevent the French from making such a proposal, which is far below a successful prosecution of the Navarre plan.
- 2.
- Draft proposal, if accepted by French Cabinet, would provide somewhat better French initial position than might have been feared.
- 3.
- Distinction drawn between Vietnamese situation one hand and that Laos and Cambodia on other, is valid and should be useful negotiating point.
- 4.
- Key element of draft proposal is that cease-fire should take effect only when “adequate military and administrative controls under supervision” have been embodied in armistice conventions, and when control machinery has been established and is in place. It is perhaps encouraging that proposal is predicated on a long if not indefinite delay in negotiating the armistice conditions and that French believe they can justify this to French opinion on grounds that the conditions are essential for safety of French troops themselves. On the other hand, we must realize that pressure will be very great for hasty conclusion of an agreement.
- 5.
- French statement they are not excluding “possibility of conference calling on opposing forces not to undertake new military operations [Page 697] during negotiations” makes it clear that once discussions of armistice have begun there will be real danger of military operations slacking off into what may be in effect de facto cease-fire prior to agreement on control conditions.
- 6.
- If the French in effect take the Laniel statement2 as their starting point this is probably the best initial French position that could be expected, given the present French mood.
- 7.
- Allen’s suggestion that working out of armistice details might be left to combatants themselves is obvious echo of Nehru proposals3 and would seem dangerous in that it might weaken US capacity to influence negotiations.
- 8.
- In view firm position we taking in Korean negotiations on UN supervision it would seem advisable for us urge French accept UN auspices for control machinery if it is decided we should support French proposal.
- 9.
- We doubt whether French would in fact remain firm in negotiations for satisfactory controls, and believe they would slide rapidly toward almost inevitable Communist counter proposal of immediate cease-fire without controls. Important element in blocking French capitulation will be, as French have suggested, the degree to which we on our part can strengthen the French hand by increasing Communist uncertainty as to possibility of US intervention and by achieving success in organization some form South East Asian coalition.
Our soldiers have never told us the minimum we can accept. If we knew this I am confident I can persuade the British to go along with us.