Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/5–554: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

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Geneva, May 5, 1954—2 p.m.

Secto 106. Repeated information priority Paris 201, priority London 121, Saigon 33. Re Secto 89, repeated Paris 186.¹ Following is outline given this morning by Chauvel to Dennis Allen and Achilles of proposal which Bidault last night sent to French Cabinet for authorization to make when substantive discussion of Indochina starts:

1. Vietnam problem is purely Vietnamese with no question of partition, only military struggle for control of government.

2. Situation different in Laos and Cambodia which are victims of external aggression.

3. Under Berlin agreement purpose of Geneva conference is to establish peace in all three countries. To this end there should be a cease-fire guaranteed by adequate military and administrative controls under supervision. Cease-fire would take effect only when such guarantees had been embodied in armistice conventions, which might be different for each three states, and when control machinery had been established and was in place. Controls would be based upon Laniel’s March 5 conditions.² When cease-fire occurred, regular troops would be regrouped into delimited areas and all other forces disarmed. The control machinery would be “international” and would require considerable body of personnel.

4. After peace had been re-established by the cease-fire, political and economic problems could be examined.

In discussing this draft proposal Chauvel said French assumed Russians would propose immediate cease-fire followed by political settlement based on coalition and immediate elections, which would force West into position of opposing cease-fire. French public desire for cease-fire was emotional and French Government could defend its proposal, even though it would in effect delay any ceasefire for long time if not indefinitely, on grounds that conditions demanded were essential for safety of troops themselves. The continued resistance at Dien Bien Phu long after public opinion had discounted its fall had conditioned French opinion to believe its loss would not mean loss of war. He did not exclude possibility of conference calling on opposing forces not to undertake new military operations during negotiations. He assumed very lengthy negotiations would be necessary to reach any armistice agreement and felt that during this period Communist uncertainty as to united action or US intervention might be increased.

Allen inquired whether at some stage in proceedings working out of armistice details might be left to combatants themselves as suggested in Colombo communiqué.³ Chauvel did not like this idea but said it might be considered. In response to question as to whether he envisaged conference turning into indefinite Panmunjom Chauvel said it might turn armistice negotiations over to working group and adjourn to reconvene when warranted.

In response to Achilles inquiry as to whether “international” meant “UN” supervision, Chauvel stated French had no firm position on this but subsequent discussion indicated French continue to oppose use of UN machinery as establishing precedent which would be used against them in North Africa and elsewhere and that British definitely share their point of view. Allen suggested something like peace observation commission would be preferable to UN auspices. Achilles stressed importance of insisting on UN auspices.

Chauvel said studies by French military had confirmed their impression that withdrawal of French Union Forces from Cambodia and Laos except for two bases in latter would be of definite military advantage rather than disadvantage.

Smith

1. Dated May 4, p. 689.
2. Laniel’s conditions proposed on Mar. 5 are contained in telegram 3240 from Paris, Mar. 6; see p. 435.
3. Communiqué issued by Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan following their meeting at Colombo, Apr. 28–May 2. Text printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1954, pp. 166–169. For a report by the Ambassador in Ceylon (Crowe) on discussions at this conference, see telegram 339 from Colombo, Apr. 29, p. 610.