Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287
Memorandum, of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (McBride)
Participants:
- Mr. Cable, United Kingdom Delegation
- Mr. McBride
Subject:
- Indo–China Phase of Conference—Procedural and Substantive.
Mr. Cable of the United Kingdom Delegation called at his request to discuss the Indo–China phase of the Conference. He said that on procedural arrangements for Indo–China, he agreed with us that the settlement of all other problems depended upon the firm solution first of the participation question. Accordingly, he was gratified that Bidault was meeting Molotov today, and hoped a settlement of this issue might be forthcoming. He asked if we would be satisfied to have Bidault speak for the three Western delegations if this would solve the four–power vs. five–power problem and I said so far as I knew, we would.
Mr. Cable said that the British position on participation was that the three Associated States should be invited as full participants as well, of course, as the five states mentioned in the Berlin communiqué. [Page 587] He added that the British would not take the initiative in inviting Ho, but would not strenuously oppose such an invitation. I said I believed our position was about the same. We discussed the problem the French had with the Vietnamese if Ho were invited on a basis of equality, but he felt the French would not make a major issue of this point, and indeed could hardly do so. If Rhee accepted the North Koreans at the table, it seemed totally illogical for Bao Dai to make such an issue of the Viet Minh, he thought, though he admitted Rhee had much more support in his country than Bao Dai, who had none.
Beyond the nine (U.S., U.K., France, U.S.S.R., Communist China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and the Viet Minh) the British had no position, since they believed any additions such as Burma and Thailand would cause them serious trouble with the Australians and possibly elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The Australians had said again today they definitely wanted to be included if participation went beyond the nine. Therefore, the British would much prefer to have just the nine, and if it were decided to have more, then would have to support Australia. He mentioned that the U.K. also had to reply substantively at some point to the notes from Thailand and the Philippines, formally requesting an invitation. He added a similar note had been received from Cambodia but in that case the U.K. had said they would consider this request “sympathetically”.
He said the best argument he could think of for including Burma and Thailand was that it might solve a chairmanship problem that would otherwise exist. With just the nine, he did not see how the chairmanship would work. Conceivably the Russians might suggest a rotation of France and Communist China, which the U.S. could not accept. If the two adjoining states were added, the present arrangement might continue, or if this were rejected for some reason, a permanent Burmese chairman might be a possibility, inasmuch as the Soviets seem generally to accept Burma as a neutral.
Passing to the question of timing, Mr. Cable said it was the U.K. opinion that time was working against us and accordingly we should proceed as fast as possible. I reiterated our feeling that the participation question obviously must be settled first. He agreed but said as soon as it was settled, invitations should probably be sent to the Associated States and others who might be involved. He said that there might not be much delay, since the Associated States had people in France now, and he understood that Ho had a delegation in the vicinity also. He asked if we visualized that, after the chairmanship, participation, seating arrangements, etc., had been settled for the Indo–China phase, talks could begin and continue simultaneously with the Korean phase. I said this was presumably being discussed at higher levels in our delegation, and I did not know the answer. He repeated that the U.K. [Page 588] felt strongly the situation was deteriorating in the area, that time was on the side of our enemies, and that the sooner we could actually begin the talks, the better, especially from the point of view of maintaining the French position at a relatively satisfactory level.
Mr. Cable added that his delegation would also like to talk about questions of substance. I said that I was not qualified to go into this, but that I did know a number of things that were definitely unsatisfactory from our viewpoint. I said that I realized this was a negative position, and that we would of course be working on something more substantive which would be discussed with his Delegation by the senior members of our own delegation. I gathered that the British position is well–advanced, and from Mr. Cable’s remarks, that it involves a participation [partition] plan for Vietnam. He said that the U.K. definitely was not opposed to partition, and indeed believed that both the Soviets and the Communist Chinese might be well satisfied with a buffer state in Tonkin. He said it was not necessarily true that the Viet Minh would continue guerrilla warfare south of an agreed line, and that indeed they might be quite satisfied to observe such a division and leave Cochin China and Annam, south of the line, in peace. He said the status of Cambodia and Laos was not involved as the Viet Minh attack was a foreign aggression in these two cases.
It was agreed that Mr. Cable and Mr. Tahourdin of the U.K. Delegation would meet again with Mr. Bonsal and myself when we might be in a position to discuss the situation more in detail.